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Judicial Officer: Petty, Gene A.
Filed on: 01/20/2017
Case Number History:
Appellate Case Number: 45779-2018
Previous Case Number: CV-2017-568-C
CASE INFORMATION
Bonds





Case Type: AA- All Initial District Court 
Filings (Not E, F, and H1)
Case
Status:





Court Canyon County District Court
Date Assigned 06/19/2017
Judicial Officer Petty, Gene A.
PARTY INFORMATION
Lead Attorneys
Plaintiff Kosmann, David A Messerly, Loren Keith
Retained
208-407-2188(W)
Defendant Dinius & Associates, PLLC Anderson, Robert Allan
Retained
208-344-5800(W)
Dinius, Kevin Anderson, Robert Allan
Retained
208-344-5800(W)
DATE EVENTS & ORDERS OF THE COURT INDEX
01/20/2017 New Case Filed Other Claims
New Case Filed-Other Claims
01/20/2017 Miscellaneous
Filing: AA- All initial civil case filings in District Court of any type not listed in categories E, 
F and H(1) Paid by: Greener Burke Shoemaker Oberrecht Receipt number: 0002933 Dated: 






Summons Issued (Dinius and Associates)
01/27/2017
CANYON COUNTY DISTRICT COURT
CASE SUMMARY
CASE NO. CV-2017-568






Plaintiff's Motion to Disqualify Judge Christopher Nye Without Cause (w/order)
02/03/2017 Order for Disqualification of Judge
Order on Plaintiff's Motion to Disqualify Judge Christopher Nye Without Cause
02/03/2017 Change Assigned Judge
Change Assigned Judge
02/09/2017 Change Assigned Judge
Change Assigned Judge
02/09/2017 Order
Order of assignment (to vandevelde)
03/15/2017 Affidavit of Service
Affidavit Of Service 2/26/17 Kevin subservice Roberta (fax)
03/15/2017 Affidavit of Service
Affidavit Of Service 2/26/17 Dinius & Associates subservice Kevin (fax)
03/20/2017 Miscellaneous
Notice of Intent to Take Default-Fax
03/20/2017 Notice of Appearance
Notice Of Appearance-Robert Anderson for Kevin Dinius/Dinius & Associates
03/21/2017 Notice of Service
Notice Of Service Of Discovery Requests-Fax
03/22/2017 Miscellaneous
Filing: I1 - Initial Appearance by persons other than the plaintiff or petitioner Paid by: 
Anderson, Robert A (attorney for Dinius, Kevin) Receipt number: 0016330 Dated: 3/22/2017 
Amount: $136.00 (Check) For: Dinius & Associates, PLLC (defendant) and Dinius, Kevin
(defendant)
03/22/2017 Answer
Answer and Demand for Jury Trial
03/28/2017 Order for Disqualification of Judge
Order for Self Disqualification




04/05/2017 Change Assigned Judge
Change Assigned Judge
04/11/2017 Notice of Service
Notice Of Service discovery requests (fax)
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Motion for Disqualification (fax) w/order
04/19/2017 Order for Disqualification of Judge
Order for Disqualification-Southworth
05/01/2017 Change Assigned Judge
Change Assigned Judge
05/01/2017 Order
Order of Assignment-Judge Bradly S Ford
05/02/2017 Motion
Motion To Stay Litigation
05/02/2017 Memorandum
Memorandum In Support Of Motion To Stay Litigation
05/09/2017 Notice of Hearing
Notice Of Hearing RESPS' Motion to Stay Litigation-05/11/2017
05/09/2017 Hearing Scheduled
Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 05/11/2017 09:00 AM) RESP'S Motion to Stay Litigation
05/09/2017 Affidavit
Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Kosmann's Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Stay
Litigation
05/10/2017 Memorandum
Kossman's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Stay Litigation
05/10/2017 Miscellaneous
Reply in Support of Motion to Stay Litigation (fax)
05/10/2017 Order
Order of voluntary disqualification
05/10/2017 Change Assigned Judge
Change Assigned Judge
05/11/2017 DC Hearing Held: Court Reporter: # of Pages:
Hearing result for Motion Hearing scheduled on 05/11/2017 09:00 AM: District Court 
Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Debora Kreidler
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100 pages
05/11/2017 Hearing Held
Hearing result for Motion Hearing scheduled on 05/11/2017 09:00 AM: Hearing Held - Court 
recuses itself
05/11/2017 Motion Hearing (9:00 AM)  (Judicial Officer: Ford, Bradly S.)
RESP'S Motion to Stay Litigation Hearing result for Motion Hearing scheduled on 05/11/2017 
09:00 AM: District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Debora Kreidler
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100 pages
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Notice of service of discovery responses (fax)
06/06/2017 Notice of Service
Notice Of Service of Discovery Responses (fax)
06/13/2017 Notice of Service
Notice Of Service of discovery responses (fax)
06/14/2017 Hearing Scheduled
Hearing Scheduled (Mediation - DC 07/26/2017 09:00 AM)
06/19/2017 Order
Order of Assignment




06/23/2017 Notice of Service
Notice Of Service Of Discovery Request-Fax
07/07/2017 Notice
Notice of Change of Firm (fax)
07/26/2017 Hearing Held
Hearing result for Mediation - DC scheduled on 07/26/2017 09:00 AM: Mediation Held- case 
resolved- Ms. Dunbar to prepare docs
07/26/2017 Mediation (9:00 AM)  (Judicial Officer: Dunn, Stephen S.)
Hearing result for Mediation - DC scheduled on 07/26/2017 09:00 AM: Mediation Held- case 
resolved- Ms. Dunbar to prepare docs
08/02/2017 Bond Posted - Cash
Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 43130 Dated 8/2/2017 for 89.25) TRANSCRIPT
08/02/2017 Motion
Motion To Enforce Settlement-Fax
08/02/2017 Notice of Hearing
Notice Of Hearing-Fax
08/02/2017 Miscellaneous
Miscellaneous Payment: CD Copies Paid by: Anderson, Julian and Hall Receipt number: 
0043135 Dated: 8/2/2017 Amount: $10.00 (Credit Card)
08/02/2017 Hearing Scheduled
Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 08/21/2017 11:00 AM) Motn.To Enforce Settlement
08/03/2017 Motion
Cross Motion to Enforce Settlement (Fax)
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Transcript Filed (Mediation Agreement 7-26-17)
08/08/2017 Notice of Hearing
Amended Notice of Hearing (fax)
08/08/2017 Hearing Vacated




Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 08/31/2017 11:00 AM) motn to enforce settlement
08/17/2017 Memorandum
Memorandum in support of Motion to Enforce Settlment (FILED UNDER SEAL)
08/17/2017 Affidavit
Affidavit of Yvonne Dunbar in Support of Motion to Enforce Settlement (FILED UNDER 
SEAL)
08/21/2017 CANCELED Motion Hearing (11:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Petty, Gene A.)
Vacated
Motn.To Enforce Settlement
BLOCK 1 HR Hearing result for Motion Hearing scheduled on 08/21/2017 11:00 AM: 
Hearing Vacated
08/28/2017 Affidavit
Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Kosmann's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Enforce 
Settlement Agreement and in Response to Dinius's Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement 
08/28/2017 Affidavit
Second Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Kosmann's Memorandum in Support of Motion to 
Enforce Settlement Agreement and in Response to Dinius's Motion to Enforce Settlement 
Agreement 
08/28/2017 Affidavit
Declaration of David A Kosmann
08/28/2017 Memorandum
Memorandum in Reponse to Dinius's Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement
08/29/2017 Answer
Reply in Support of Motion to Enforce Settlement (fax) 
08/29/2017 Affidavit
Supplemental Affidavit of Yvonne Dunbar in Support of Motion to Enforce Settlement (fax)
08/29/2017 Affidavit
Declaration of Kevin Dinius in Support of Motion to Enforce Setttlement
08/31/2017 DC Hearing Held: Court Reporter: # of Pages:
Hearing result for Motion Hearing scheduled on 08/31/2017 11:00 AM: District Court 
Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Kathy Klemetson
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: Less than 100
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Hearing result for Motion Hearing scheduled on 08/31/2017 11:00 AM: Hearing Held
08/31/2017 Hearing Held
Hearing result for Motion Hearing scheduled on 08/31/2017 11:00 AM: Motion Held- Motion 
to Enforce Settlement {Underadvisement}
08/31/2017 Affidavit
Supplemental Declaration of David A. Kosmann (fax)
08/31/2017 Brief Filed
Supplemental Brief in Support of David Kosmann's Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement
(fax)
08/31/2017 Motion Hearing (11:00 AM)  (Judicial Officer: Petty, Gene A.)
Hearing result for Motion Hearing scheduled on 08/31/2017 11:00 AM: District Court 
Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Kathy Klemetson
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: Less than 100
09/05/2017 Motion
Motion to strike ( fax)
09/05/2017 Memorandum
Memorandum in support of defendants motion to strike (fax) 
09/06/2017 Bond Converted
Bond Converted (Transaction number 3706 dated 9/6/2017 amount 73.50)(transcript)
09/06/2017 Bond Converted
Bond Converted (Transaction number 3707 dated 9/6/2017 amount 15.75)(refund transcript)
09/07/2017 Motion
Kosmann's Motion for leave to file supplemental material (fax) w/order
09/07/2017 Motion
Kosmann's Motion for leave to file supplemental material (fax) 
09/07/2017 Affidavit
Affidavit of Counsel in support of Kossman's motion for leave to file supplemental materials 
and motion to enforce settlement 
09/07/2017 Affidavit
Affidavit of Counsel in support of Kossman's motion for leave to file supplemental materials 
and motion to enforce settlement 
09/14/2017 Hearing Scheduled
Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 10/02/2017 01:30 PM) RE Motion to Enforce Settlement
09/20/2017 Objection
Opposition to Kossman's Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Material (fax)
09/20/2017 Motion
Kosmann's Motion for Sanctions Against Dinius and Dunbar for Obtaining a Settlement 
Through Unethical Behavior and then Repeatedly Refusing to Admit and Remedy Their
Violations, at Great Expense to Kosmann (Filed Under Seal) (fax)
CANYON COUNTY DISTRICT COURT
CASE SUMMARY
CASE NO. CV-2017-568






Kosmann's Memorandum in Support of His Motion for Sanctions Against Dinius and Dunbar 
(Filed Under Seal) (fax)
09/20/2017 Motion
Kosmann's Motion for Leave to Shorten Time for Hearing on His Motion for Sanctions Against 
Dinius and Dunbar (Filed Under Seal) (Fax)
09/26/2017 Miscellaneous
Opposition to Kosmann's Motion for Leave to Shorten Time (fax)
09/27/2017 Miscellaneous
Supplemental Reply in Support of Motion to Enforce Settlement (Filed Under Seal) (Fax)
09/27/2017 Affidavit
Second Supplemental Affidavit of Yvonne Dunbar in Support of Motion to Enforce Settlement 
(Filed Under Seal) (Fax)
09/27/2017 Affidavit
Second Declaration of Kevin Dinius in Support of Motion to Enforce Settlement (Filed Under 
Seal) (Fax)
09/29/2017 Order
Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Shorten Time for Hering on His Motion for Sanctions 
Against Dinius and Dunbar
10/02/2017 DC Hearing Held: Court Reporter: # of Pages:
Hearing result for Motion Hearing scheduled on 10/02/2017 01:30 PM: District Court 
Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Monica Fuhs (M&M)
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: Less than 100
10/02/2017 Hearing Held
Hearing result for Motion Hearing scheduled on 10/02/2017 01:30 PM: Hearing Held
10/02/2017 Hearing Held
Hearing result for Motion Hearing scheduled on 10/02/2017 01:30 PM: Motion Held- Motion 
for Leave to file Supplemental Brfng
10/02/2017 Motion Granted
Hearing result for Motion Hearing scheduled on 10/02/2017 01:30 PM: Motion Granted
10/02/2017 Motion Hearing (1:30 PM)  (Judicial Officer: Petty, Gene A.)
Hearing result for Motion Hearing scheduled on 10/02/2017 01:30 PM: District Court 
Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Monica Fuhs (M&M)
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: Less than 100
10/05/2017 Order
Granting Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Materials
10/13/2017 Opposition to
Supplemental Brief in Support of David Kosmann's Motion
10/17/2017 Notice of Hearing
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CASE SUMMARY
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for Kosmann's Motion for Sanctions
10/25/2017 Motion
Motion for Sanctions [filed under Seal]
10/25/2017 Memorandum In Support of Motion
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Sanctions [under Seal]
10/25/2017 Notice of Hearing
Motion for Sanctions 11-8-17 9:00am
10/31/2017 Opposition to
to Plaintiff's Motion for Sanctions [Filed Under Seal]
11/01/2017 Opposition to
Defendants' Motion for Sanctions
11/01/2017 Affidavit
Affidavit of Counsel in Opposition to Defendants' Motion Seeking Sanctions
11/03/2017 Decision or Opinion
Memorandum Decision and Order to Enforce Settlement Agreement and Order to Release
Funds
11/06/2017 Reply
Defendants' Reply in Support of Motion for Sanctions
11/06/2017 Brief Filed
Kosmann's Reply Brief in Support of His Motion for Sanctions Against Dinius and Dunbar
11/08/2017 Motion Hearing - Civil (9:00 AM)  (Judicial Officer: Petty, Gene A.)
Kossman's Motion for Sanctions
11/08/2017 Court Minutes
Cross Motions for Sanctions taken under advisement. / Written Decision to be issued
11/22/2017 Decision or Opinion
Memorandum Decision and Order on Parties' Cross-Motions for Sanctions
11/22/2017 Judgment
11/27/2017 Claim Granted (Judicial Officer: Petty, Gene A.)
Comment ()
Party (Kosmann, David A; Dinius, Kevin; Dinius & Associates, PLLC)
Monetary/Property Award
In Favor Of: Kosmann, David A
Against: Dinius, Kevin; Dinius & Associates, PLLC
Entered Date: 11/27/2017





11/27/2017 Claim Granted (Judicial Officer: Petty, Gene A.)
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Party (Kosmann, David A; Dinius, Kevin; Dinius & Associates, PLLC)
Monetary/Property Award
In Favor Of: Dinius, Kevin; Dinius & Associates, PLLC
Against: Kosmann, David A
Entered Date: 11/27/2017








Second Supplementalof David A. Kosmann
12/12/2017 Order
Setting Case for Hearing Upon Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider
12/24/2017 Memorandum In Support of Motion
plaintiff's to reconsider
12/24/2017 Declaration
OF COUNSEL IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO RECONSIDER
12/27/2017 Exhibit
Declaration of Counsel in Support of Motion to Reconsider
12/28/2017 Motion
To Strike(Second)
12/28/2017 Memorandum In Support of Motion
to Strike(Second)
12/28/2017 Notice of Hearing
re: Defendants' Second Motion to Strike
12/29/2017 Opposition to
Defendants' Second Motion to Strike
01/04/2018 Opposition to
Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider [Filed Under Seal]
01/04/2018 Affidavit
of Dunbar ISO Opposition [Filed Under Seal]
01/09/2018 Reply
in Support of Defendants' Second Motion to Strike [Filed Under Seal]
01/09/2018 Affidavit in Support of Motion
Defendants' Second Motion to Strike [Filed Under Seal]
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Kosmann Reply Brief in support of Motion to Reconsider
01/11/2018 CANCELED Motion Hearing (10:30 AM)  (Judicial Officer: Petty, Gene A.)
Vacated
Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider
Defendant's Second Motion To Strike
01/18/2018 Notice
of Taking Cases Under Advisement
01/24/2018 Decision or Opinion
Memorandum Decision and Order on Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider and Defendants' Second 
Motion to Strike
01/25/2018 Notice
notice of change of firm
02/02/2018 Notice of Appeal
02/02/2018 Appeal Filed in Supreme Court
02/07/2018 Clerk's Certificate of Appeal
03/07/2018 Supreme Court Document Filed-Misc
Order Conditionally Dismissing Appeal
03/08/2018 Supreme Court Document Filed-Misc
Order Withdrawing Conditional Dismissal and Reinstating
04/12/2018 Reporter's Notice of Transcript(s) Lodged
10-2-17 Hearing for Appeal
04/12/2018 Transcript Lodged
SC Appeal 10-2-17 Hearing
04/13/2018 Supreme Court Document Filed-Misc
Order Granting District Court Clerk's Motion for Extension of Time
04/24/2018 Transcript Lodged
SC Appeal 8-31 & 11-8-2018 Hearings
05/22/2018 Exhibit
Certificate of Exhibits for SC Appeal
05/22/2018 Miscellaneous
Certificate of Clerk SC Appeal
05/22/2018 Certificate of Service
SC Appeal
DATE FINANCIAL INFORMATION
Defendant  Dinius & Associates, PLLC
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Total Payments and Credits 136.00
Balance Due as of  5/22/2018 0.00
Defendant  Dinius, Kevin
Total Charges 3.00
Total Payments and Credits 3.00
Balance Due as of  5/22/2018 0.00
Other Party  Unknown
Total Charges 10.00
Total Payments and Credits 10.00
Balance Due as of  5/22/2018 0.00
Plaintiff  Kosmann, David A
Total Charges 221.00
Total Payments and Credits 221.00
Balance Due as of  5/22/2018 0.00
Defendant  Dinius, Kevin
Civil Cash Bond Account Type Balance as of  5/22/2018 0.00
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Loren K. Messerly, ISB # 7434 
GREENER BURKE SHOEMAKER OBERRECHT P.A. 
950 West Bannock Street, Suite 950 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
JAN 2 0 2017 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
A YOUNG, DEPUTY 
Telephone (208) 319-2600 
Facsimile (208) 319-2601 
lmesserly@greenerlaw.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
DAVID A. KOSMANN, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
KEVIN DINIUS an individual; and 
DINIUS & AS SOCIA TES, PLLC, an 
Idaho professional limited liability 
company, 
Defendant. 
Case No.Cvac 17 -t5w D 
COMPLAINT 
COMES NOW Plaintiff, David A. Kosmann, by and through his counsel of record Loren 
K. Messerly of the firm Greener Burke Shoemaker Oberrecht P.A., and hereby submits this 
Complaint and complains and alleges as follows: 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
1. David A. Kosmann ('"Kosmann") is, and was at all times mentioned herein, an 
individual living in the state of Idaho and county of Canyon as alleged herein. 
COMPLAINT-PAGE 1 19725-002 / 915963 
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2. The Defendant Kevin Dinius is a resident of Canyon County, Idaho as alleged 
herein. Defendant Dinius & Associates, PLLC, is a law firm with its principal place of business 
in Canyon County, Idaho. 
3. At all time relevant to this action, Kevin Dinius was an employee of Dinius & 
Associates, PLLC. All acts described in this Complaint occurred within the course and scope of 
his employment by Dinius & Associates, PLLC, and the liability for those acts should therefore 
be imputed to Dinius & Associates, PLLC. Defendants therefore collectively are called "Dinius" 
in this document. 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
Kosmann's Financial Distress. 
4. Since approximately 2000, Kosmann was the owner of real property located at 
1020 W. Homedale Road, Caldwell, Idaho 83607 (the "Property"). 
5. Since approximately 2000, Kosmann was a pilot for United Airlines flying the 
737. 
6. In February 2003, United furloughed Kosmann; during the next three years of 
unemployment, Kosmann paid his expenses, in part, by expanding his hobby of restoring vehicle 
trim. 
7. Kosmann built a large garage on the Property, at significant expense. He set up 
his vehicle restoration business inside the garage, with a car lift, with buffers, and other 
equipment. He also had dozens of "parts cars" on the Property for use in his restoration work. 
8. In May 2006, Kosmann was rehired as a pilot for United. 
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9. In 2008, just before the real estate crash, Kosmann obtained a significant home 
equity loan against the Property (resulting in a mortgage of $260,000 on the Property). He 
invested that loan in a real estate investment that then was a complete loss in the real estate 
crash. 
10. In May 2009, Kosmann was furloughed again by United and returned to his trim 
business, while also receiving some unemployment benefits. He understood that he would likely 
be unemployed for 5-7 years, which proved to be true (he was rehired in early 2014). 
11. In 2010, Kosmann and his wife of twenty-four years divorced, with Kosmann 
keeping the Property and its corresponding underwater mortgage. He and his ex-wife have 
eleven children and some of the children remained living on the Property with Kosmann after the 
divorce. His divorce decree required him to pay support of over $2,000 a month. 
12. Unemployed and with expensive child support obligations, Kosmann was 
struggling financially. He did not believe that he could pay his mortgage payments that expected 
to increase dramatically in the near future. He worried that he was going to lose his home. 
Realtor McCarthy's Plan to Save Kosmann's Home and Eliminate the Excessive Mortgage. 
13. Because of the real estate crash, his Property was now only appraised by the 
Canyon County Assessor's office at $119,600 for 2012. But the Property had a mortgage of more 
than $260,000. He tried to participate in the various refinance programs that were being 
publicized as part of the governmental attempts to revitalize the housing industry. However, he 
was denied. 
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14. In mid-2011, Kosmann began speaking with a realtor, Justin McCarthy 
("McCarthy"), about finding a solution to his underwater mortgage through a short sale and lease 
with an option to purchase. 
15. Justin advertised himself as "Just-In-Time Solutions." He advertised himself as 
part of the Just In Time Real Estate Team at Realty Management Associates, Inc., an established 
real estate company of more than thirty years. Justin advertised that this business was "a full 
service team that can help families stop foreclosure, investors maximize returns, and repair credit 
in a one stop shop." 
16. Justin knew that Kosmann's main goals were to both (1) not lose his long-time 
family home and location of his business and sole source of income and (2) greatly reduce the 
excessive mortgage that was too expensive for his dramatically reduced income and more than 
twice the value of the Property after the real estate crash. 
17. Justin told Kosmann that these goals could both be accomplished. Justin 
explained that it could be done by first selling the Property at short sale, with the approval of his 
lender (GMAC) that would agree to eliminate the deficiency balance because of Kosmann's 
economic distress from unemployment. Kosmann would keep the Property because he would be 
selling it to either Justin's investors or Kosmann's friend with whom Kosmann would have an 
agreement that the investor or friend would sell it back to Kosmann. 
18. Justin told Kosmann this was all acceptable. He told Kosmann that the rules 
required Kosmann to wait 90 days after the sale before putting the buy-back agreement in 
writing. Justin said he did this often with his investors. The investors would buy the Property and 
sell it back in return for a 10-20% return on their investment. 
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19. Kosmann believed Justin. He wanted to believe Justin. He was worried about his 
finances, about caring for his children, and about losing his home and location of his business 
and sole source of income. He also rationalized his actions based on the real estate crash that had 
been brought on by mortgage companies like GMAC and that had helped lose him all his value 
in his Property and lose his real estate investment that was the majority of his $260,000 
mortgage. 
20. To facilitate the short sale, Kosmann stopped paying the mortgage on the Property 
in approximately September 2011. 
Initial Attempts to Sell the Home to Friends. 
21. From mid-2011 until mid-2012, Kosmann and Justin worked on finding a friend 
who was able to help Kosmann. The friend had to obtain a mortgage to buy the Property at the 
short sale. Justin understood that Kosmann intended to cover all other aspects of the sale: paying 
any down payment amount and closing costs and paying all mortgage payments until he bought 
the Property back. 
22. The Property was never put on the MLS Multiple Listing Service. No "For Sale" 
signs were ever placed on the Property. It was never advertised for sale in any medium. Instead, 
Kosmann only discussed his sale and buyback plan with his close friends. 
23. Two friends eventually signed Purchase and Sale Agreements to buy the Property. 
The first was Kathleen Brady, Kosmann's girlfriend. She signed a Purchase and Sale Agreement 
on August 18, 2011. 
24. Justin proposed a purchase price of $105,000, with Brady obtaining a mortgage 
for $84,000 and making a down payment of $21,000. Again, it was understood that Kosmann 
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would pay the entire down payment and pay Brady's mortgage payments that were expected to 
be about $500-$700 a month. The PSA stated that Brady was not buying the Property to live in 
it. The PSA said nothing about a rental agreement, though it was understood that Kosmann was 
going to pay the mortgage payments until he bought the Property back. The PSA indicated that 
no "private property" was being transferred. 
25. In an addendum dated February 9, 2012, the price was raised to $111,000, as 
required by GMAC. The addendum also stated, "Seller and Buyer each represent that the sale is 
an 'arm's length' transaction." McCarthy indicated that this was an arm's length transaction as 
long as they did not put the buy-back agreement into writing until at least 90 days after the 
closing on the sale to Brady. The addendum further stated, ''the Buyer agrees not to sell the 
property within 90 days of closing of the sale," which was consistent with McCarthy's 
statements that they just had to wait 90 days before entering into the buy-back agreement. 
26. Before the purchase could be finalized, Kosmann and Brady ended their personal 
relationship and therefore Brady withdrew her involvement in helping Kosmann save his home. 
27. Kosmann then asked his long-time friend Brent Sterling to purchase the Property. 
On July 31, 2012, McCarthy provided Sterling with a Purchase and Sale Agreement to buy the 
Property for $111,000, with a mortgage of $100,000, and a down payment of $11,000. The PSA 
was otherwise identical to what had been signed by Brady. The PSA again stated nothing about 
the rental agreement, although it was understood that Kosmann was not going to move out and 
was going to pay the new mortgage until he repurchased the Property from Sterling. 
28. Before the sale could be completed, Sterling decided he was not comfortable with 
the arrangement. 
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29. With both of these proposed sales, McCarthy worked as a dual agent for the buyer 
and seller, with an agreement that he would get the full commission from both of 3% each. 
Neither Brady nor Sterling had otherwise been in the market for buying an investment property. 
They only got involved to see if they could help their friend save his home. 
Kosmann Meets Gilbride and Gilbride Volunteers to Help Kosmann. 
30. ln May 2012, Kosmann met Gilbride. Their paths crossed because Gilbride was 
living with a female roommate that Kosmann started dating. They connected because both had a 
military background and both had an interest in motorcycles, airplanes, and classic cars. 
31. They quickly became friends, or so Kosmann thought. They got together for 
motorcycle rides, talked about flying, and talked about many personal subjects, including various 
relationships with women. 
32. Gilbride overhead Kosmann discussing his troubles with his Property and his 
need to find a friend who could buy the Property and sell it back. Gilbride volunteered that he 
could and would do it. 
33. Gilbride was working in the National Guard. Gilbride was also a paramedic with 
Canyon County, though he was in litigation with his employer and on paid leave. Kosmann 
assumed he could trust a fellow military man. 
34. Gilbride was not wealthy. He already owned a home that was almost fully 
mortgaged. He had a retirement but almost no other savings. He was not a high wage earner. 
Gilbride had not been in the market for a second, rental home. Gilbride did not have a broker or 
realtor. Other than his retirement assets that could only be liquidated with tax and other penalty 
consequences, Gilbride did not have any liquid assets to invest in a second rental home. 
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35. Kosmann brought Gilbride to McCarthy as a "friend" who would buy the home 
and sell it back. McCarthy became the dual agent for Kosmann and Gilbride and had an 
agreement to be paid both the buyer (3%) and seller (3%) commissions. 
Gilbride Uses Deceit to Obtain Kosmann's Agreement to the PSA. 
36. Gilbride first spoke to McCarthy in September 2012. Within a few days, 
McCarthy had provided Gilbride with the same Purchase and Sale Agreement that had 
previously been signed by Brady and Sterling. 
37. Gilbride signed a PSA to buy the home for $111,000, the purchase pnce 
previously required by GMAC from the Brady and Sterling proposed sales. The PSA stated that 
Gilbride would obtain a 30 year mortgage for $86,000 and would make a down payment of 
$25,000. 
38. Like the two prior PSAs, this PSA stated that all closing costs would be paid by 
Kosmann and it was contingent on GMAC agreeing to waive its deficiency balance against 
Kosmann. For the first time, the PSA also stated that it was contingent on Gilbride renting the 
Property back to Kosmann for not less than one year. Again, any rental was for the period after 
the sale and before the buy back, during which Kosmann had promised he would pay the new 
mortgage through rental payments. The PSA stated that Gilbride was buying the Property "as is" 
which is normal in any short sale. 
39. Within six days of Gilbride signing the PSA, McCarthy had Kosmann sign an 
addendum that said "seller and buyer each represent that the sale is an 'arm's length' 
transaction" and "the buyer agrees not to sell the property within 90 days of closing of the sale." 
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Kosmann Providing Gilbride Money In Order to Buy the Property and Qualify For 
Mortgage. 
40. McCarthy was aware that Kosmann was providing cash to Gilbride for the down 
payment. Kosmann also discussed with McCarthy (in texts) regarding whether Gilbride should 
say "it's cash on hand or do I need to put the money into an account of his" in order to "help his 
debt ratio." McCarthy responded, "Have him ask his mortgage guy. Every underwriter is 
different." 
41. A couple of days after Gilbride signed the PSA, he met with Kosmann. Kosmann 
had promised Gilbride that Gilbride would not have to spend any of his own money, other than 
obtaining a mortgage. Kosmann promised he would provide the $25,000 down payment to 
Gilbride, so that Gilbride would be buying the Property solely with Kosmann's own money. 
Kosmann also promised that for the period until he bought back the Property, he would pay rent 
to Gilbride in an amount to fully pay the mortgage payment, so that Gilbride would never have 
any out of pocket costs (for closing costs, for a down payment, or for mortgage payments). At 
this meeting on September 23, 2012, Kosmann provided Gilbride with $23,000 in cash, money to 
be used in purchasing the Property. 
42. Gilbride was working with Roger Howell, at Fairway Mortgage, to obtain the 
mortgage that he needed to buy the Property. Gilbride had average income, high debts (including 
a home and mortgage), and minimal liquid assets. He was having trouble getting qualified. He 
told Kosmann (in a recorded voice mail) that he had to use some of Kosmann's down payment 
money to pay off a second mortgage on Gilbride's home, in order to reduce his income-debt ratio 
to qualify for his mortgage. 
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43. McCarthy sent the PSA to GMAC, asking GMAC to approve the purchase of the 
Property for only $111,000. McCarthy indicated that his 6% commission and all other closing 
costs would be paid from the purchase price, which would further reduce the amount of the 
purchase price that would go to GMAC. As with all short sales, GMAC was being asked to agree 
to accept a specific amount of the purchase price as payment in full, waiving its claim to any 
further payments from the sale or from Kosmann. 
44. As part of his communications with GMAC, McCarthy was required to submit a 
document stating that there were no side agreements or hidden agreements between the seller and 
buyer. McCarthy, Kosmann, and Gilbride all had to sign this agreement, despite the fact that they 
knew that there was a side agreement to sell the property back to Kosmann. They all knew that 
one of the two main goals of the sale was to save the house for Kosmann, which was only 
workable if they had a side agreement to sell it back to Kosmann. The document said that they 
would all be liable for the full amount of the loan and/or loss to GMAC if they made 
misrepresentations of this being an "arm's length" agreement between Kosmann and Gilbride. 
Again, McCarthy told Kosmann this was acceptable to sign as long as they waited 90 days to 
sign the buy-back agreement. McCarthy backed up his claims by also signing the "arm's length 
affidavit." This document was submitted to GMAC. 
45. On October 1, 2012, Kosmann met with Gilbride to give him the remaining 
amount of the down payment for the home purchase. Kosmann gave Gilbride $3,000 in cash. 
Kosmann was worried about giving so much cash to Gilbride without anything in writing. 
Therefore, Kosmann secretly recorded the meeting with Gilbride. The recording captures 
Gilbride admitting that he had now received a total of $26,000, which he specifically described 
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as $25,000 for the down payment and $1,000 for the earnest money. Despite receiving $26,000, 
Gilbride did not put most of those funds into his bank accounts, instead using the money to pay 
off debts and expenses and eliminating a paper trail. 
46. On or about October 22, 2012, GMAC told McCarthy that it would require a 
purchase price of $117,500. GMAC also represented that it would allow all closing costs to be 
paid from that purchase price (including McCarthy's commission), with only $103,661.64 to be 
paid to GMAC and the remaining deficiency balance of $159,232.90 on Kosmann's mortgage 
would be released/waived. On October 26th, Kosmann and Gilbride signed an addendum to the 
PSA to adjust the purchase price to $117,500. 
Gilbride's Mortgage with Fairway Mortgage. 
47. Gilbride was separately working with his mortgage company, Roger Howell and 
Fairway Mtg., in order to obtain the needed mortgage to buy the Property. 
48. Gilbride was short on liquid funds in his bank accounts to meet mortgage 
requirements. Gilbride discussed with Kosmann the need for additional amounts to be put into 
Gilbride's bank accounts in order to help him qualify for his mortgage. In a text on November 7, 
2012, Gilbride stated, "We should throw that other 3K we talked about in, sometime this week so 
it shows on the bank statement." On November 18, Gilbride drove Kosmann to Kosmann's bank 
where Kosmann took out $4,000 in cash and provided it to Gilbride. Gilbride put this money into 
his bank account to help him qualify for his mortgage. 
49. In his Uniform Residential Loan Application executed on November 27, 2012 
("Loan Application"), Gilbride stated that he was seeking a mortgage of $94,000 and that he was 
buying the property for an "investment." The $94,000 mortgage was exactly 80% of the 
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$117,500, which would allow Gilbride to avoid paying mortgage interest. The Loan Application 
shows that Gilbride had approximately $82,000 in a retirement IRA account and only $22,000 in 
bank accounts (despite having already been given $30,000 by Kosmann). The Loan Application 
shows Gilbride's home at Bonnie Lane in Nampa was valued at $140,000 but had liens of 
$126,000. Gilbride had $213,000 in liabilities. He only had a positive net worth by claiming 
house hold goods worth $100,000 ( during a recent deposition he refused to disclose any assets to 
support that valuation), his IRA with $82,000, and a Cessna 140 and Harley motorcycle that he 
valued at a combined $53,000. The Loan Application states that the buyer will have to pay 
$25,262.77 at closing, which is the down payment ($117,500-$94,000) plus a few closing costs 
not accounted for to be paid out of purchase price. Gilbride specifically affirmed that none of the 
down payment was borrowed (despite the fact that Kosmann had provided him with $30,000 for 
the purchase of the home and Gilbride had already admitted on audio that $25,000 from 
Kosmann was for the down payment and another $1000 for earnest money). 
50. The Fairway Mtg. documents show that on November 27, 2012, Gilbride locked 
in a mortgage rate of 4.375% and estimated the value of the Property at $158,000. 
51. On that same date of November 27th, Gilbride proposed to pay a larger down 
payment, reducing his mortgage to $88,125. The Fairway Mtg. file contains a Good Faith 
Estimate, which would have been provided to Gilbride, for a 15 year mortgage for $88,125 at 
3. 7 5% for a monthly payment of $640.86 (plus property taxes and homeowner' s insurance). 
52. Gilbride did not tell Kosmann that he was choosing to obtain a lesser mortgage 
($88,125 instead of $94,000) amount and choosing to pay a larger down payment ($29,375 
instead of $23,500). Gilbride also did not tell Kosmann about possibly obtaining a 15 year 
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mortgage rather than a 3 0 year mortgage, creating a higher mortgage payment in exchange for a 
lower mortgage interest rate. These decisions impacted Kosmann, who (1) had promised to pay 
the mortgage payment after closing until he repurchased the Property and (2) had expected his 
$30,000 to be more than enough to cover all moneys at closing plus approximately $4,000 for 
future rent or other expenses with the property. Gilbride was secretly agreeing to spend more of 
Kosmann's money for the down payment. Gilbride was using Kosmann's extra down payment 
money in order to qualify for a much lower interest rate (from 4.375% over 30 years to 3.75% 
over 15 years). 
53. On or about December 3rd, Fairway Mtg. received its appraisal on the Property. 
The appraisal said the Property was worth $130,000 and was evaluated "as is" per the PSA. The 
appraisal was also based on misinformation, as the appraiser disclosed that it was aware of a 
purchase price of $117,500 for an "arms length sale." The Property had never even been 
advertised for sale. The appraisal stated that market rent for the Property was $1,000. 
54. On December 20, 2012, Gilbride sent an email to Roger Howell at Fairway Mtg. 
claiming that an error had been made and he was planning to buy the Property with a 30 year 
mortgage not a 15 year mortgage. Gilbride, however, did not tell Kosmann about the error or 
how it might affect the mortgage payments that he had promised to pay. Instead, Gilbride 
decided not to delay closing. Gilbride unilaterally went forth with the closing and obtained the 15 
year mortgage, with the greatly reduced interest rate. 
55. Gilbride obtained a mortgage for only $88,125. With some additional closing 
costs (that were not covered by GMAC's agreement to pay closing costs of $12,000), the total 
amount needed at closing was approximately $31,500. Despite knowing about the larger down 
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payment and lesser mortgage amount since November 2ih, Gilbride waited till approximately 
December 25th to tell Kosmann about the need for more funds at closing. Gilbride asked for an 
additional $1,000 for closing. Kosmann was confused why more money would be needed than 
the $30,000. But, Kosmann had promised to cover closing costs, so he quickly provided the 
additional money. Texts from December 26th capture the request for the additional $1,000 and 
Kosmann's immediate action to pay. 
Gilbride's Plot to Get Kosmann Out of the Property and to Keep the Property and Money. 
56. Sometime in early December, Gilbride called Canyon County Code Enforcement 
("CCCE"). Gilbride wanted to discuss code violations that he believed existed on the Property. 
Specifically, Gilbride believed that Kosmann was violating code and/or zoning ordinances with 
(1) all of his parts cars on the Property and (2) by operating his vehicle restoration business on 
the Property. Gilbride had researched the code and zoning issues. Gilbride spoke with CCCE 
about those concerns, the code requirements, and the punishments, which included criminal 
misdemeanors and fines. Gilbride did not discuss his concerns with Kosmann. Gilbride told 
CCCE that he wanted them to come inspect the property in early January, after he purchased the 
Property. Again, Gilbride did not disclose this to Kosmann. 
57. Gilbride was buying the Property through a short sale "as is" and for a mortgage 
that was only 67% of the appraised value "as is." Thus, Fairway Mtg. did not require a 
professional home inspection. Gilbride, however, told Kosmann that he had to do his own home 
inspection to appease his lender. In December, Gilbride walked through the Property and took 
hundreds of pictures, so that he had documentation of everything on the Property, including 
everything in Kosmann's garages that contained all of his business equipment. Gilbride would 
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use these pictures to give them to CCCE and claim business, zoning, and other code violations. 
He would also use these pictures to claim that he had purchased all the business equipment in the 
garages. Again, Kosmann had no idea that Gilbride was taking the photographs for these 
deceitful purposes. He just took Gilbride at his word that he needed the photographs for the 
lender and to save the expense of having a professional home inspection. Kosmann knew there 
was no need for a professional home inspection since he was never going to leave the Property 
and was going to buy the Property back. 
58. Gilbride also submitted a rental agreement to Fairway Mtg. on December 5, 2012, 
that he represented was the rental agreement for Kosmann as the renter of the Property that he 
Gilbride was buying for "investment purposes." The rental agreement stated that Kosmann 
would pay $600 bi-weekly, or approximately $1,200 a month. Gilbride did not disclose to 
Fairway Mtg. that Kosmann had not seen this rental agreement. Gilbride did not disclose that 
Kosmann had only agreed to pay the mortgage amount (expected to be about $500-$700 a 
month) and had otherwise not agreed to any other terms and had never seen any proposed rental 
agreement. 
59. McCarthy knew that Gilbride was drafting a rental agreement in order to comply 
with the PSA term that Kosmann would rent the Property for at least one year. McCarthy never 
informed Kosmann of the rental agreement being drafted by Gilbride. McCarthy never instructed 
Kosmann that he needed to get a written rental agreement in place to protect himself, as part of 
closing. 
60. Gilbride's rental agreement that he sent to Fairway Mtg. on December 5
th was 
almost identical to the rental agreement that he would eventually demand that Kosmann sign on 
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December 27, 2012. However, during those 18 days between December 5th and 22nd, Gilbride 
never disclosed to Kosmann that he had a draft rental agreement and never discussed the greater 
rental amount of approximately $1,200 a month. Kosmann had no idea that Gilbride had this 
agreement or that he was sending it to other parties. The rental agreement also stated that 
immediately upon signing the agreement, Kosmann would have to pay $2400 in first and last 
month's rent, another $1,000 in a security deposit, and another $600 rent payment. 
61. The rental agreement also had terms that said (1) the Property could only be used 
for residential purposes, unless Gilbride gave written consent, (2) no retail or commercial use 
was allowed unless Gilbride gave written consent and it conformed to zoning laws, (3) no 
vehicles without correct and legal documentation, (4) no use of the Property in violation of code, 
etc. Thus, Gilbride had provisions in the secret lease that would allow Gilbride to shut down 
Kosmann's business and sole source of income. In addition, Gilbride had provisions in the secret 
lease that would allow him to claim a breach of the lease based on his secret work with CCCE to 
find violations on the Property. In addition, Gilbride had provisions in the secret lease that would 
allow Gilbride to demand immediate deposits of $4,000 from Kosmann, despite the fact that 
Kosmann had already given $31,000 and only $25,000 was supposed to have been spent at 
closing by Gilbride. 
62. In other words, long before closing, Gilbride had decided that he was going to 
keep the Property and kick Kosmann out of the Property based on any number of reasons that he 
was preparing (failure to sign the rental agreement, failure to pay rent, violation of the rental 
agreement's many terms regarding payment or use of the property, violation of code or zoning 
requirements, lack of rent payment after having the business shut down). The fraud is 
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overwhelming and obvious when all the facts are uncovered. Unfortunately, Kosmann knew 
nothing of what his "friend" was planning. 
63. Gilbride had great incentive to hide his plan. He was obtaining a Property that 
Fairway Mtg. had estimated was worth $158,000 in exchange for only a mortgage of $88,125. 
64. He was not only defrauding Kosmann. He was defrauding GMAC. GMAC 
accepted the reduced purchased price of $117,500 and a payoff from that amount of only 
$105,023.27 (with all of Gilbride's closing costs paid by Kosmann and GMAC), rather than the 
true value of the Property, based on the representations that this was an arm's length transaction. 
Closing on the Transfer of Title Based on Gilbride's Misrepresentations and Fraud. 
65. The parties signed the closing papers on December 26 and 27, 2012. The final 
papers required Gilbride to pay a total of $31,629.82. Despite receiving $31,000 from Kosmann, 
Gilbride had never placed most of that money into his bank accounts. To make the payments at 
closing, Gilbride moved money from his retirement IRA into his checking accounts and then he 
wrote three checks from his various bank accounts. Gilbride was attempting to create a paper 
trail showing that he used his own money to buy the Property, rather than the $31,000 from 
Kosmann. Again, Gilbride had decided long before closing that he was not going to give the 
Property back, that he was going to deny having an agreement to sell the Property back, and that 
he was going to deny receiving the $31,000 in cash from Kosmann. Kosmann had no idea that 
Gilbride was moving money from his retirement or otherwise trying to ensure that the $31,000 
from Kosmann was not the actual money spent at closing. 
66. TitleOne was the escrow agent for the sale of the Property. TitleOne appears to 
have been unaware of the many red flags of this sale: property never advertised, purchase price 
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chosen based on what GMAC would accept rather than the market, Kosmann's main goal of 
permanently retaining the Property and never moving out, Kosmann's agreement to rent the 
Property but no rental agreement or agreed upon terms, Gilbride's use of Kosmann's money in 
order to qualify for and obtain a mortgage with a much better interest rate, Kosmann's payment 
of $31,000 for the down payment and closing costs, and Gilbride's promise to sell the Property 
back after 90 days. 
67. Kosmann (and his ex-wife) signed a Warranty Deed to Gilbride on December 24th 
and the title was transferred and recorded in the property records on December 27, 2012. 
68. Up through closing, Gilbride had never changed his agreement with Kosmann that 
Kosmann was only selling Gilbride the Property and giving Gilbride $31,000 to buy the Property 
and agreeing to pay the new monthly mortgage payments in exchange for an agreement that 
Gilbride was going to sell the Property back to Kosmann after 90 days. By definition what Mr. 
Gilbirde did was theft. He obtained Kosmann's house by means of deception and took $31,000 
ofKosmann's money without providing anything that was promised in return. 
69. As part of the closing, Gilbride signed a promissory note for $88,125. He had 
monthly rental payments of approximately $800 (including property tax and homeowner 
insurance escrow), which did not start until February 2013. The rental payments were inflated by 
approximately $200 a month because of his 15 year rather than 30 year mortgage. Kosmann 
received no money from the closing. McCarthy received a commission of $7,050 (6% of the 
purchase price). 
COMPLAINT-PAGE18 19725-002 I 915963 
Page 30
Gilbride's Immediate Steps to Breach His PSA and Closing Agreements. 
70. Within hours after the closing, Gilbride took his first step in breach of his PSA. 
Gilbride drove to the Property and handed Kosmann two documents: a one page "Receipt for 
Rental Agreement" and a 14 page "Residential Rental Agreement." The Receipt stated, "Original 
signed and non altered 'Rental Agreement' must be returned to Leo Gilbride within 24 hours of 
signing this receipt, or all rights to occupy the premises are forfeited and premises must be 
vacated within 30 days." Gilbride was threatening Kosmann that his rights to buy back the 
Property as Gilbride had promised and also his $31,000 was going to be forfeited to Gilbride if 
Kosmann did not sign the 14 page Residential Rental Agreement. 
71. The Residential Rental Agreement was almost identical to the document Gilbride 
had sent to Fairway Mtg. back in early December. One important difference was that Gilbride 
had increase the rent from $600 biweekly to $800 biweekly, which Gilbride admits averages to 
$1,733 a month. Again, the agreed upon monthly rent was supposed to be the mortgage amount, 
which even after being inflated with a 15 year mortgage, was only $800, less than half of what 
Gilbride was now demanding. The rent demanded was also 70% greater than the market rental 
rate of $1,000 stated in the December 2012 appraisal. 
72. Kosmann reviewed the proposed Rental Agreement and was horrified. The 
document had numerous egregious and unfair terms: $5,000 due within 24 hours ( consisting of a 
security deposit of $1,000, first and last month rent deposit totaling $3,200, and a half-rent 
payment of $800); monthly rent of $1,733 a month; Gilbride would store his dump truck and 
tractor on the Property; Gilbride had a lien on all of Kosmann's and his daughter's personal 
property and the right to sell all of the personal property (in the event of default) and keep 
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"money over and above what [he was] owed;" fourteen days for Kosmann to prove ownership of 
all vehicles on the Property or else remove them within 24 hours; no commercial use of the 
Property without prior written consent from Gilbride and conformity to zoning laws; and a one-
way attorney fee provision protecting Gilbride. 
73. The "Residential" Rental Agreement was clearly a set up: an attempt to force 
Kosmann to either forfeit all rights to the Property by refusing to sign the rental agreement or to 
sign the agreement and then get evicted for many different reasons including not paying $5,000 
immediately, not shutting down his business and sole source of income, and not cleaning up the 
Property to Gilbride's standards. If Kosmann signed the rental agreement in an attempt to save 
his Property, it also would then allow Gilbride to take all of Kosmann's (and his daughter's) 
personal property, sell it all and keep all the proceeds. Again, this was clear fraud and a clear 
breach of the PSA and closing agreements. 
74. In addition, the Rental Agreement was not a one year lease, which was a 
contingency of the PSA and closing. Instead, it said it was a month-to-month lease until either 
party gave 30 day notice to terminate. Again, the proposed Rental Agreement, in numerous 
ways, violated the PSA and contingencies for the title transfer. 
Gilbride's Lies at Shari's Caught on Audio Recording. 
7 5. Kosmann texted Gilbride that he was concerned about the proposed lease 
document and the rent requested. Gilbride then stated, for the first time, "Numbers have to be 
that way so I can make sure house makes code." This was a new lie. Gilbride had no issue with 
making code and no agreement that Kosmann would fund any repairs to the Property. The PSA 
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said the Property was purchased "as is," it was a short sale, and Kosmann was merely renting it 
temporarily to buy it back. 
76. Kosmann now was beginning to understand that he had been defrauded. Kosmann 
immediately arranged for a meeting with Gilbride at Shari's Restaurant. Kosmann's 
communications were friendly, trying to hide his fears. He came to Shari's with a tape recorder 
so he could catch Gilbride in his fraud and save himself. 
77. At the meeting: 
• Gilbride openly discussed Kosmann' s expectation to buy the home back and the fact that 
McCarthy had indicated they should wait until 90 days after closing and then sign the 
agreement for the lease with option to purchase (per the requirements of the lender), but 
Gilbride indicated he was not going to let that happen, was making no promise he would 
ever allow a buy back, and was not going to even discuss the buy back until Kosmann 
signed the rental agreement and a year passed; 
• Gilbride repeatedly made comments to indicate Kosmann would potentially be able to 
buy back the Property in the future but Gilbride refused to put anything in writing that 
would be enforceable; 
• Gilbride refused to negotiate any terms of his proposed 14-page Rental Agreement; 
• On at least seven different occasions, Kosmann said he gave the $31,000 for the Property, 
the down payment, or as his investment in the Property, and each time Gilbride either 
said nothing to disagree or explicitly agreed; 
• Gilbride claimed he was entitled to $1,733 in rent in order to make repairs at the property, 
however, Gilbride also: said that if Kosmann did the repairs himself then Gilbride would 
still require the $1,733 in rent; refused to show Kosmann any paperwork to support any 
current or future repairs; refused to let Kosmann get a second opinion on any repair costs; 
refused to limit the period that Kosmann would have to pay this bloated rental payment; 
and admitted contextually that none of this had been discussed at any prior time. 
• Gilbride twice told Kosmann that he could keep all the vehicles on the Property as long 
as he had a bill of sale or title, and Gilbride did not disclose that he had already contacted 
code enforcement about the vehicles being a code violation and had already told 
insurance that the vehicles would be removed; 
• Gilbride refused to show Kosmann the closing documents or otherwise explain why the 
closing costs of approximately $31,500 were much higher than Kosmann expected; 
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• Kosmann pointed out that it was unfair of Gilbride to make unilateral decisions with 
Kosmann's money to pay higher closing costs, and Gilbride failed to disclose that he had 
unilaterally increased the down payment from 20% to 25% and from $25,000 to $29,375; 
• Kosmann pointed out that he paid $31,000 towards the Property and some of that money 
should be used to waive the initial rent payments being demanded but Gilbride refused; 
• Gilbride unilaterally said that the most recent $1,000 paid by Kosmann would be applied 
to a security deposit on the Rental Agreement that had never been previously discussed; 
• Gilbride threatened Kosmann that if he defaulted on the Rental Agreement then he would 
lose the down payment and investment he had in the Property; and 
• Gilbride claimed it was an accident that he ended up with a 15 year mortgage (instead of 
30 year), increasing the mortgage payment that Kosmann would have to cover, but 
Gilbride admitted he could have fixed the mistake with a delay of closing and Gilbride 
did not disclose the issue to Kosmann. 
78. Gilbride had no idea that Kosmann was recording all of the lies he was saying and 
admissions he was making. Kosmann's recording would prove crucial in showing Gilbride's 
malicious and fraudulent intent. 
79. Kosmann then went on the internet and found a basic four page Lease agreement. 
He filled in rent of $1,000 a month and added the term: "Owner will/shall enter into a 
lease/option to buy in 90 days or March 1, 2013." He signed the lease December 31, 2012, and 
provided it to Gilbride. Gilbride ignored it. He was working on stealing the Property, not renting 
it as promised in the PSA. 
Gilbride's Initial Manipulation of and Misrepresentations to CCCE in Order to Harass 
Kosmann. 
80. On December 31, 2012, Gilbride left a voice message for Eric Arthur, the officer 
at CCCE. Gilbride's message said Gilbride now owned the Property, that Kosmann would not 
sign a rental agreement, and Gilbride was authorizing Arthur to do his site inspection of the 
Property as soon as he wanted. Gilbride mentioned the vehicles as a violation on the Property 
and he also asserted that there was a Sodium Hydroxide tank issue on the Property. Gilbride 
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moved up Arthur's visit to the Property from mid January to January 3rd (only a week after 
closing). Arthur visited the Property and they took photographs of Kosman.n's many parts cars 
on the Property. Again, all of this was done by Gilbride secretly, without any disclosures to 
Kosmann. 
81. Gilbride did not disclose to CCCE that he had defrauded Kosmann in order to 
become the owner of the Property or that he was using CCCE in order to try and shut down 
Kosman.n's business and sole source of income and in order to develop reasons for evicting 
Kosmann from the Property. CCCE had no idea how it was being manipulated. It believed that 
this was a tenant who was violating his agreements with his landlord and refusing to keep the 
Property in order. 
82. On January 7, 2013, Arthur (at Gilbride's insistence) sent a Notice of Violation to 
both Gilbride and Kosmann regarding too many vehicles on the Property. Gilbride specifically 
demanded to have the Notice of Violation sent to himself as the Property owner, so that he could 
argue that he was being directly harmed by Kosmann. 
83. The Notice from the CCCE threatened Kosmann with criminal charges and with 
fines and required that he spend resources in order to clean up the Property. This caused 
tremendous stress to Kosmann. 
Gilbride's Immediate Eviction Attempt and Gilbride's Ridiculous Demands. 
84. On January 11, 2013, Gilbride posted a "Three-Day Notice to Pay Rent or 
Vacate" on the Property. It stated that Kosmann was in default for rent in the amount of $3,200 
(Gilbride's unilateral deposit demand from his Residential Rental Agreement that Kosmann 
never signed) and had three days to pay or move out. This eviction notice was posted 
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approximately two weeks after the closing, despite a written agreement in the PSA for a lease of 
at least one year and despite Kosmann having given Gilbride $31,000. 
85. Kosmann hired Kevin Dinius to solve the issue with Gilbride. On January 11, 
2013, Dinius sent his first communication to Gilbride and McCarthy. The letter stated that 
Gilbride had bought the Property solely to help Kosmann avoid losing the property and that 
Gilbride used Kosmann's $31,000 to buy the Property and Kosmann agreed to "pay Mr. 
Gilbride's loan payments for several months until such time as Dave paid the loan off and the 
property was conveyed back to him." The letter stated that Gilbride was now refusing to honor 
the agreement, but Kosmann was prepared to immediately sign the lease option to purchase 
agreement. Attached to the letter was a proposed lease option agreement drafted by Dinius that 
said: Kosmann would pay $1,000 a month to be applied to pay down the Gilbride mortgage, 
would have a lease for 24 months, and during those 24 months would have the option to buy the 
Property for the amount of Gilbride's unpaid mortgage plus an additional amount to be 
negotiated. This agreement would benefit Gilbride by paying his mortgage in full plus another 
$200 a month during the lease, plus an additional negotiated profit amount. 
86. This was a consistent theme in ever interaction between Kosmann and Gilbride. 
Kosmann did everything he could to do right by Gilbride. Kosmann helped Gilbride qualify for 
the mortgage, Kosmann let Gilbride pay off some of his debts with Kosmann's money, Kosmann 
paid $31,000 for the house purchase, Kosmann made sure Gilbride did not have any out-of-
pocket expenses, and Kosmann paid more than the mortgage payment monthly. Even after 
finding that Gilbride was trying to defraud him, Kosmann made reasonable offers that would 
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give Gilbride a significant profit for his fraud. Gilbride cannot point to any action that
 Kosmann 
ever took to take advantage of Gilbride. 
87. Gilbride hired Ron Shepherd as his attorney. 
88. On January 16, 2013, Shepherd sent a letter back to Dinius stating, "L
eo 
acknowledges receiving $26,750 from Dave in cash, but that had nothing to do wit
h the real 
estate transaction. The $26,750 Leo received from Dave was payment for parts for a c
lassic car 
that Leo sold to Dave and Dave was going to restore." This is the first moment tha
t Gilbride 
mentioned his invented story about car parts. Gilbride offered to pay back the $2
6,750 and 
demanded Kosmann vacate the Property in one month and pay $1,500 in monthly 
rent from 
January 1, 2013 through February 15, 2013. Gilbride and Shepherd had no idea that 
Kosmann 
had the secret audio from the Shari's meeting where Gilbride admitted receiving $31,0
00 for the 
Property and never mentioned anything about the purchase of a classic car. 
89. The letter from Shepherd also mentioned the CCCE notice of violation, attach
ed 
the version sent to Gilbride, and threatened Kosmann that Gilbride would "seek indem
nification 
and damages for any adverse consequences Leo suffers as a result of Dave's code vi
olations." 
Gilbride did not disclose that he had asked for the notice of violation to be issued again
st himself 
and so he was not actually at risk for damages ( and any damages he suffered would
 be of his 
own making). It is not clear what Shepherd knew, if anything, about all the fraud that
 his client 
had committed. Shepherd eventually dropped out of the case in 2014. 
90. On January 22, 2013, Kosmann offered to pay off the entire mortgage plus 
an 
additional $5,000 for Gilbride's profit. In response, Gilbride said he would offer to 
return all 
$31,000 instead of just the $26,750. In response, Kosmann offered to pay $10,000
 and then 
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$15,000 (in addition to the full mortgage payoff). On January 23rd, Gilbride finally offered to 
return the property in return for payoff of his mortgage plus $100,000. In other words, Gilbride 
and Shepherd were demanding a $100,000 profit for buying the Property with Kosmann's money 
and owning it for a month. In response, Kosmann offered $20,000 in profit to Gilbride (plus 
payoff of the mortgage) for Gilbride's month of ownership. Kosmann had a wealthy friend who 
stood ready to finance the repurchase of the Property and save Kosmann from Gilbride's fraud. 
91. Gilbride had invested none of his own money and was being offered $20,000 only 
one month after obtaining his mortgage of $88,125. Ifhe had truly purchased the Property as an 
"investment" then this was certainly an extraordinary return on his minimal investment. 
However, he had lied about buying the Property as an investment property. He purchased it so he 
could steal it from Kosmann. 
Dinius' Pleadings That Fall Well Short and Are Never Fixed. 
92. On January 25, 2013, Dinius filed the lawsuit alleging breach of contract, specific 
performance, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, unjust enrichment, 
and (in an Amended Complaint) fraud. The case was assigned to Judge Kerrick. 
93. Dinius did not know many of the facts of the fraud that had occurred. However, 
he knew sufficient facts to know that Gilbride had breached the PSA and his contingencies 
regarding the closing and transfer of title on December 27th• Dinius had dozens of facts to 
unwind the PSA and closing and to return title to Kosmann. 
94. The most obvious breach by Gilbride was that he promised a rental agreement of 
at least one year but had instead demanded (take it or leave it) a month to month rental 
agreement with a right to terminate with only 30 days notice. A one year rental agreement was a 
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condition precedent to the sale of the Property and Gilbride's violation of that condition would 
have made the sale completely voidable. Dozens of other take-it-or-leave-it provisions in the 
Residential Rental Agreement showed that Gilbride violated that condition precedent for a 
reasonable rental agreement, such that the sale should and could be voided. 
95. Similarly, the facts regarding Gilbride's many secrets prior to closing, including 
the secret of the draft rental agreement sent to Fairway Mtg. but not to Kosmann, the secret of 
Gilbride's conversations with CCCE about fmding code violations, and Gilbride's secret 
preparations to create means to evict Kosmann or shut down his business were all overwhelming 
facts that could have been used to unwind the closing and transfer of title. Again, these facts 
would unwind the PSA based on the contingency that Gilbride had promised to rent the property 
to Kosmann but had never intended to comply with that contingency. 
96. Remarkably, Dinius did not even seek to void the PSA or the December 27th sale. 
Instead, he only sought to enforce the oral buy-back agreement. This pleading error would 
remain throughout the case and eventually be one of many independent reasons that Dinius lost a 
case that should have been a clear victory against an obvious :fraudster. There is no explanation 
for Dinius' error in how he pied the case. Voiding the PSA and/or the Property closing would 
have returned title to Kosmann and Kosmann would have only been required to pay off 
Gilbride's mortgage, in order to return the parties to where they were before the closing. 
Kosmann was already making that offer. Kosmann had wealthy friends that were prepared to 
loan him the money to pay off the mortgage. The mortgage was only $88,125. 
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97. During the next two years of litigation, Dinius never corrected this pleading 
mistake. At trial, Dinius inexplicably sought only to enforce the buyback agreement rather than 
to unwind the PSA and title transfer. 
Dinius Fails to Hold McCarthy Accountable and Recover Kosmann's Damages. 
98. After filing his lawsuit against Gilbride, Kosmann met with McCarthy on two 
occasions in February and May of 2013. Kosmann secretly recorded the conversations. He 
obtained the information that Dinius needed in order to prove that McCarthy had (1) counseled 
Kosmann that his actions were not a violation of his representations to GMAC, (2) instructed 
Kosmann that these buy back agreements were common to save properties from foreclosure, (3) 
instructed Kosmann that he could use a friend or investors to accomplish both of his goals of 
saving his home and eliminating an underwater mortgage, ( 4) provided counsel that allowed 
Gilbride the opportunity to defraud Kosmann because the buyback agreement was not in writing, 
and ( 5) assisted Gilbride in developing a rental agreement but never counseled Kosmann to 
protect himself with a written rental agreement prior to closing. The audio recording captures 
McCarthy explaining to Kosmann that McCarthy's investors are required to sell back the 
property, even without a written agreement, because if they do not do it then they know 
McCarthy will not work with them again. 
99. Despite this information on audio recordings, Dinius did nothing to hold 
McCarthy accountable. Most importantly, Dinius did not file a malpractice action against 
McCarthy. 
100. McCarthy's negligence and the resulting damage were clear immediately in 
January 2013. His representations about how the oral buy back agreement was not a violation of 
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representations to GMAC was incorrect. He put his client at risk for criminal charges. He put his 
client at risk of civil liability for the entire mortgage that Kosmann was attempting to get 
released. His representations that Kosmann could save his property by selling it to a friend, 
without a written and enforceable buy back agreement, helped result in Kosmann losing his 
home. He represented Kosmann in drafting a PSA that required a rental agreement between 
Kosmann and Gilbride as a contingency of the PSA and title transfer but then he negligently 
failed to ensure that the parties actually had a signed rental agreement in place to protect them 
both. McCarthy drafted the PSA that contradicted itself by correctly stating that Gilbride was not 
planning on residing in the Property but incorrectly stating that Gilbride was entitled to 
possession at the time of closing. Gilbride would use that mistake about possession and bring 
multiple motions claiming that Kosmann had breached the PSA by not moving out at closing. 
101. McCarthy's professional negligence insurance policy should have been used to 
recoup all of Kosmann's damages from having to litigate against Gilbride and incur a $100,000 
attorney fee bill. A lawsuit for damages from McCarthy should have protected against the 
possibility of losing the home during the litigation with Gilbride. 
102. Instead, as of December 27, 2014, prior to trial even going forward against 
Gilbride, Dinius had allowed the two year statute of limitation to pass against McCarthy for his 
professional malpractice. This malpractice by Dinius resulted in several hundred thousand in 
damages to Kosmann in being cut off from recovering his damages from McCarthy. 
Kosmann's Attempts to Fix His Mistake With GMAC. 
103. Toe facts show that Kosmann admitted his mistake with GMAC and tried to fix it 
numerous times. He first filed a public complaint on January 25, 2013, that admitted the entire 
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side agreement with Gilbride, including the transfer of $31,000 and the buyback arrangement as 
a means to avoid foreclosure and wipe out the deficiency through a short sale without losing the 
Property. Thus, Kosmann put himself at risk for criminal charges and a reinstatement of his 
entire loan balance of at least $160,000 by GMAC. 
104. Kosmann admitted it again in a letter he sent to TitleOne on May 10, 2013. He 
asked TitleOne to inform GMAC that he had clearly violated the "arm's length" and other 
representations to GMAC. He admitted his affidavit statements (which were also affidavit 
statements from Gilbride and McCarthy) to GMAC were not accurate. Kosmann included a copy 
of the Complaint that detailed the entire side agreement with Gilbride. Again, Kosmann was 
opening himself up to civil liability from GMAC. Kosmann was trying to communicate his 
mistake directly to the only party who could claim to be a victim - GMAC. Kosmann sent the 
letter through GMAC's agent and the party most likely to be able to get GMAC's attention. 
105. In contrast to Kosmann's efforts to admit the truth, Gilbride tried to further 
mislead GMAC. On May 14, 2013, Shepherd, on behalf of Gilbride, sent a letter to TitleOne 
trying to contradict Kosmann's admissions: "Please be advised that Mr. Gilbride rejects any 
notion that Mr. Gilbride and Mr. Kosmann entered into an underlying agreement to sell the 
property back to Mr. Kosmann." Shepherd attached Gilbride's publicly filed Answer that denied 
any receipt of $31,000 from Kosmann for the Property and denied any agreement to sell the 
Property back to Kosmann. Gilbride was lying to save himself from criminal exposure and to 
save himself from being potentially liable to GMAC. He was also trying to block Kosmann's 
attempts to fix the mistake that they and McCarthy had made. 
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106. Kosmann (through Dinius) then tried to follow up with TitleOne to ensure the 
message had been passed to GMAC. On June 5, 2013, TitleOne's representative (Cameron 
McFadden) sent an email to Dinius and Shepherd stating, "I just wanted to advise you that I have 
spoken with a GMAC representative on 5/29 and that person asked for copies of the pleadings to 
be faxed to a central fax number, which I have done. I have heard nothing since." GMAC 
ultimately told McFadden that they had no interest in doing anything regarding the issue. GMAC 
took no action against Kosmann, Gilbride, or McCarthy. 
107. Thus, both publicly and with GMAC, Kosmann tried to make it right and he put 
himself at the mercy of criminal and civil sanctions that could have taken his liberty and 
destroyed him financially. Kosmann had done everything he could reasonably do to make right 
what he had done to GMAC. GMAC, the only victim, and after full disclosure by Kosmann, 
decided it would not take any action. 
Litigation Over Ownership of the Property. 
108. Throughout the litigation, Gilbride continued to lie under oath and to the Court. 
He had to continue with his lies in order to cover up all of his fraud. 
109. He lied in his discovery responses. For example, in response to Request for 
Admission No. 4 asking Gilbride to admit "the parties agreed [Kosmann] would pay [Gilbride] 
more than $31,000 so that Defendant would have sufficient funds to close on the Property," 
Gilbride answered, "Denied. Defendant sold Plaintiff a 1957 Chevrolet convertible rebuilt 
chassis and two rear clips for parts. Defendant received approximately $27,500 from Plaintiff for 
such parts." 
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110. At his deposition on March 26, 2013, still unaware of the secret Shari's recording, 
Gilbride falsely claimed that during the December 28, 2012, Shari's Meeting he was clear in 
telling Kosmann that the $31,000 was for car parts (the audio recording confirms that car parts 
were never mentioned during the Shari's Meeting as the "car parts story" had not yet been 
invented by Gilbride). Gilbride also testified at his deposition that he told real tor McCarthy that 
the $31,000 was for car parts; however, McCarthy testified at trial that he had never heard 
anything about car parts. 
Gilbride's Harassment of Kosmann That Went Unchallenged by Dinius and Resulted in 
Much More Damage to Kosmann. 
111. Kosmann's Complaint was filed in January 2013, but the trial was not held until 
late January 2015, and a full resolution by the District Court was not issued until March 30, 
2015. In the meantime, Kosmann dealt with constant harassment by Gilbride, and Dinius did 
little to nothing to stop the harassment, protect his client, and use the harassment to his advantage 
in the corning trial. 
112. From January through May 2013, Gilbride was trying to get CCCE to shut down 
Kosmann's business on the Property (Kosmann's sole source of income to pay his rent, buy back 
the Property, and litigate to save his Property) and make Kosmann spend considerable funds to 
remove all parts cars from the Property or else pay fines or otherwise face criminal charges. 
Gilbride's actions contradicted various statements (captured on audio recordings) both before 
and after closing on the Property where Gilbride told Kosmann not to worry about running his 
business or having his parts cars on the Property. Gilbride's actions were a clear extension of his 
fraud and an attempt to get Kosmann off the Property and eliminate Kosmann's funds for his 
litigation to save his Property. 
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113. In approximately March and April 2013, Dinius and Kosmann met with CCCE to 
address its concerns. In early May 2013, CCCE dropped the issue and noted that Kosman.n's 
property and any technical violations of code or zoning were not worthy of further pursuit 
because his Property looked as good as or better than surrounding properties and "most in the 
County." 
114. Gilbride would not stop the manipulation of CCCE. In September 2013, Gilbride 
filed another complaint with CCCE. This time, Gilbride threatened CCCE with a lawsuit if it did 
not act. Gilbride again claimed Kosman.n's business should be shut down and Gilbride accused 
Kosmann and Dinius of lying to CCCE. 
115. Gilbride did not disclose to CCCE that his rights as owner were based on a fraud 
that he had perpetuated against Kosmann. Gilbride did not disclose that he had bought the 
property and made promises to rent it back to Kosmann and promised Kosmann that he could 
continue to run his business and not make any changes to the Property. Gilbride did not disclose 
that he was only pursuing these code issues as a means to harass Kosmann and gain an upper 
hand in the on-going litigation before Judge Kerrick. 
116. Based on these misrepresentations from Gilbride, CCCE issued a new violation 
notice to Kosmann on October 21, 2013, again threatening criminal misdemeanors and fines. For 
the next few months, Kosmann was again forced to deal with trying to appease CCCE. Kosmann 
was forced to meet with CCCE representatives and to make a plan for removing some of the 
vehicles. Kosmann expended time and resources responding to CCCE, which was being 
completely manipulated by Gilbride. 
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11 7. Gilbride was not satisfied by his harassment of Kosmann by way of the CCCE. 
Thus, in November 2013, Gilbride filed a complaint with the Idaho Department of 
Environmental Qualities ("IDEQ"). Gilbride claimed numerous environmental violations. 
Gilbride had not been on the Property for almost a year, but he used the photographs taken 
during his "home inspection" in December 2012, and claimed they showed possible 
environmental violations. Gilbride hoped IDEQ would find something to shut down Kosmann's 
business. 
118. In late November 2013, IDEQ visited Kosmann's property unannounced to do an 
inspection. Kosmann tried to reach Dinius for legal assistance but had no luck. IDEQ did its 
inspection and found nothing. Kosmann was shocked that Gilbride was able to continue to harass 
him through these various governmental agencies. 
119. During this same time period, Gilbride was also trespassing and stalking 
Kosmann and the Property. Law enforcement records show that Kosmann called law 
enforcement at least five times from September 2013 through March 2014, complaining that 
Gilbride was driving around the Property constantly, coming on the Property without notice or 
authorization and in violation of the Kosmann family's constant request that he stay away, and 
stalking his family. In recent deposition testimony, Gilbride admitted that he drove onto the 
Property numerous times during this period to take pictures and otherwise "observe" the 
Property. He repeatedly drove on an irrigation ditch path that was on the Property, claiming that 
it was an easement that he could use. He used the irrigation ditch path to drive onto the Property 
and park within a few hundred feet of the front door and taunt the Kosmann family. 
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120. In addition, he drove by the Property at least weekly (and oftentimes more) and 
would frequently reduce his speed to 10-15 mph in a 55 mph zone to again stalk the Kosmann 
family. He had no acceptable reason to be around the Property. The parties were in litigation and 
Gilbride was both looking for opportunities to trespass when no one was home and trying to 
intimidate Kosmann and his family. Gilbride also went on the Property to take pictures that he 
then submitted to CCCE and IDEQ in his efforts to manipulate those agencies against Kosmann. 
121. In February 2014, Gilbride went on the Property unannounced and without 
authority when he thought it was empty. Kosmann's terrified daughter was home and hiding 
inside. She saw Gilbride peering in the windows and heard him trying to enter the home. 
122. In January 2014, Gilbride convinced CCCE to create a probable cause affidavit of 
misdemeanor charges for code violations on the Property. Gilbride agreed that the charges be 
brought against himself, as the Property owner. CCCE created the affidavit and supporting police 
report and forwarded it to the prosecutor solely at the request and/or demand of Gilbride. 
Gilbride wanted this probable cause affidavit to be issued so that it would appear like he was 
being criminally charged based on Kosmann's alleged code violations on the Property. Gilbride 
wanted to use this probable cause affidavit and police report to then get Kosmann evicted from 
the Property. 
123. Once the probable cause affidavit was sent to the prosecutor, in February Gilbride 
served Kosmann with a notice of eviction. Gilbride told Kosmann he had to move out within 30 
days or else he would be charged $100 a day in rent (approximately $3000 a month or three 
times the rent). Gilbride admitted he invented that $100 a day threat. Gilbride was represented by 
counsel Ron Shepherd at the time and it is unclear what role, if any, counsel had in this notice of 
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eviction. The notice said that Kosmann was being evicted for several reasons including his 
failure to comply with CCCE's requirements (that Gilbride had orchestrated). Gilbride posted 
this notice to evict despite the fact that he had the ongoing litigation over the Property in front of 
Judge Kerrick and Judge Kerrick had ordered that Kosmann had possession and was paying 
$1000 a month to Gilbride for that possession. 
124. Kosmann did not move out, and Dinius did not address or resolve the issue of the 
notice. 
125. Instead, on March 31, 2014, Gilbride filed a prose unlawful detainer action. The 
Complaint referenced Kosmann' s violations of code, the letters of violation from CCCE, and the 
"case now pending with Canyon Co. Prosecutor." So, Gilbride had orchestrated the violation 
letters and the probable cause affidavit sent to the prosecutor and now he was using those 
documents to try and get Kosmann evicted. Gilbride filed this case pro se and to a new judge, 
even though he was still represented by Shepherd in his litigation in front of Judge Kerrick. 
Dinius represented Kosmann in getting that pro se lawsuit dismissed. Dinius received several 
thousand dollars in attorney fees for his work in that frivolous eviction action that was obviously 
barred by the on-going litigation with Judge Kerrick. However, Dinius never raised the issue 
with Judge Kerrick. He never filed a motion for contempt. He never asked Shepherd to 
voluntarily dismiss the case in order to avoid unnecessary litigation and fees. 
126. On March 24, 2014, Gilbride lied to Eric Arthur at CCCE in order to get Arthur to 
come visit the Property again. Gilbride falsely claimed that Kosmann had vacated the Property. 
Gilbride and Arthur showed up on the Property unannounced and without authorization. Arthur 
called law enforcement when Gilbride got into a confrontation with Kosmann's daughter. 
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Gilbride would not leave the Property as requested by Arthur. Gilbride was walking around the 
Property despite protests from Kosmann's family. Gilbride then left before law enforcement 
arrived. Law enforcement then discussed the issue with both Arthur and Kosmann. Law 
enforcement informed Kosmann and Dinius that Gilbride would be notified that he was 
"trespassed" from the Property and that a notation was being placed into the law enforcement 
databases so that if he was caught on the Property again then he would be charged with criminal 
trespass. Law enforcement passed this information along to Shepherd to pass along to Gilbride. It 
is not clear what Shepherd did with that information. Dinius sent Shepherd an email that stated 
Gilbride had to stay off the Property or else be charged with a crime. Shepherd passed Dinius' 
email to Gilbride. 
127. Gilbride stated in a recent deposition that he did not care about these threats from 
law enforcement or from Dinius because he was the rightful owner on title so he could go on the 
Property whenever he wanted and without any notice or authorization. 
128. In August 2014, Kosmann's next-door neighbor, LaDawn Wade, called law 
enforcement about a suspicious vehicle that had been continuously driving by her house for three 
months at very slow speeds and she was afraid was stalking her daughter who played in front of 
the house. Ms. Wade had no knowledge of the litigation between Kosmann and Gilbride that had 
been ongoing for more than a year and a half. Law enforcement determined the suspicious 
vehicle was Gilbride and informed Ms. Wade that the vehicle was not stalking her house. Wade 
spoke with Kosmann about the situation and learned that Gilbride was harassing Kosmann and 
had been "trespassed" from the Property by law enforcement. She agreed to watch for Gilbride's 
future attempts to trespass. 
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129. Gilbride spoke with law enforcement several times regarding Kosmann's 
complaints about the stalking. Gilbride deceived law enforcement by claiming he was the 
rightful owner and thus he was entitled to go on or around the Property as he liked. Gilbride 
never disclosed the fraud that he had used to obtain title to Kosmann's home. Gilbride never 
disclosed that Judge Kerrick had already ruled that Kosmann was entitled to possession during 
the litigation. 
130. During all of this harassment from January 2013 through December 2014, Dinius 
never took any significant actions to protect his client. He never filed a motion for contempt 
regarding Gilbride's stalking of the Property, his trespass, his manipulation of CCCE and IDEQ, 
or his frivolous eviction notice and unlawful detainer action. He never asked the Court to order 
Gilbride to stay off the Property, to stop driving by the Property at slow speeds, to stay off the 
irrigation path located on the Property, to stop trying to get Kosmann in trouble with CCCE or 
IDEQ or any other agencies (and for Gilbride to instead bring any legitimate issues to the Court), 
and to dismiss his frivolous eviction action. None of this abusive action by Gilbride was 
discussed at the trial with Judge Kerrick in January 2015, and Dinius never attempted to amend 
the Complaint to add claims related to this harassment and abuse. Instead, Kosmann has had to 
bring these claims for trespass, breach of quiet enjoyment, intentional infliction of emotional 
distress, and punitive damages, as counterclaims in the subsequent litigation filed by Gilbride, 
discussed infra. 
Criminal Trespass and Dinius' Failure to Assist. 
131. On March 22, 2015, Gilbride was seen by Wade while he was again trespassing 
on the Property. The Court had not yet issued its final ruling regarding the litigation between 
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Kosmann and Gilbride. Kosmann was still in possession and had not been ordered to move out. 
Kosmann had informed Gilbride that he was not moving out and Kosmann had filed post-trial 
briefing asking to be awarded the Property based on fraud regarding the buyback agreement. 
Despite all this, Gilbride came on the Property unannounced and without authorization. Wade 
observed the trespass and called Kosmann and then both of them called law enforcement. 
132. Law enforcement noted that Gilbride had been trespassed from the Property on 
March 24, 2014, so law enforcement gathered witness statements from Wade and her father and 
then issued the criminal trespass citation to Gilbride. Gilbride was served with the citation on 
March 28, 2015. 
133. Gilbride ignored the citation. Two days later, on March 30th, he went on the 
Property again without notice or authorization and was caught on video by Kosmann's newly 
purchased and newly installed hidden camera. Gilbride was caught trespassing by that hidden 
camera one more time on April 14, 2015. It is unclear how many times Gilbride trespassed on 
the Property without getting caught from 2013 through March 2015, when the hidden camera 
was first installed. 
134. Dinius again did nothing to raise these trespass and harassment issues with the 
Court. Dinius agreed that Gilbride should be charged with a crime, but he did nothing to assist 
Kosmann or to provide law enforcement with the facts of all that Gilbride had been doing to 
harass and stalk the Property. 
The History of Orders Regarding Possession of and Rent For the Property During the 
Litigation, Which Supported Contempt Proceedings the Dinius Failed to Bring. 
135. As early as June 11, 2013, Gilbride and Shepherd had filed a motion for summary 
judgment asking Judge Kerrick to remove Kosmann from the Property. On August 9, 2013, 
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Judge Kerrick rejected that motion and indicated Kosmann would remain in possession during 
the litigation. Gilbride tried again in October 2013 with a second motion for summary judgment 
and a motion for reconsideration. On November 14, 2013, Judge Kerrick again denied those 
motions such that Kosmann retained possession during the entirety of the litigation. The first 
order indicating that Kosmann would have to turn over possession of the Property was not issued 
until March 30, 2015. 
136. In addition, as early as February 1, 2013, Kosmann was sending $1,000 a month 
to Gilbride as rent for the Property. On February 15, 2013, Gilbride began accepting those 
monthly payments. As early as November 14, 2013, Judge Kerrick entered an order that 
confirmed this arrangement of Kosmann paying $1,000 a month in rent in exchange for 
possession of the Property during the entirety of the litigation. Kosmann paid the rent throughout 
the litigation, in a total amount of $28,000 for the period of January 2013 through April 2015. 
After the order of March 30, 2015 that awarded the Property to Gilbride, Kosmann and Gilbride 
reached an agreement that Kosmann would move out in a month and continue to pay $1,000 a 
month. Kosmann fully complied with payment and moved out fully the last day of April 2015. 
137. Despite multiple court orders granting Kosmann possession of the Property and 
despite Kosmann paying stipulated rent for that possession, Dinius did nothing substantial to stop 
Gilbride from harassing Kosmann and his family in and around the Property from January 2013 
through the end of April 2015. Dinius never raised the issue with Judge Kerrick. 
138. Despite being initially charged with criminal trespass, Gilbride eventually got 
away with all of his trespassing. After Judge Kerrick gave Gilbride the Property on March 30, 
2015, Gilbride provided that order to the Canyon County Prosecutor who then dismissed the 
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trespass complaint, despite the fact that as of March 24, 2015 (when the trespass occurred) the 
standing order from Judge Kerrick was that Kosmann and not Gilbride had possession of the 
Property and law enforcement had informed Gilbride that he was not allowed on the Property or 
else he would be charged criminally. Gilbride never disclosed to the Canyon County Prosecutor 
that he obtained title to the Property through fraud and deceit, nor did he disclose that the Court 
had ordered that Kosmann had possession during the litigation and prior to March 30, 2015. 
Dinius took no action to make sure the prosecutor understood the correct facts that supported the 
trespass charge. 
Hours Of Gilbride Lies Under Oath At the Jury Trial. 
139. On January 27, 2015, the jury trial went forward regarding Kosmann's claims and 
Gilbride's counterclaims. Some of the facts stated above came out in evidence, showing some of 
Gilbride's fraud and deceit. For example, at trial, Gilbride admitted that McCarthy and Kosmann 
both told him that Kosmann's main goal was to permanently retain the Property, that Kosmann, 
both before and immediately after closing, told Gilbride that he intended and wanted to buy the 
Property back from Gilbride, yet Gilbride claimed that he had always only told Kosmann that 
they could discuss a buyback but he was not guaranteeing anything. That "story," of course, was 
dependant on Gilbride having an explanation for why Kosmann gave Gilbride $31,000 if there 
was not an agreement already in place for Kosmann to get the home back. 
140. So, Gilbride had to persist with his "story" that the $31,000 he received from 
Kosmann was for car parts. He invented an explanation for: why no car parts had ever been 
delivered despite the payment of $31,000; why Kosmann bought parts he had never seen; why 
Gilbride never mentioned car parts during the audio of the Shari's Meeting; why he asked for 
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another $1,000 from Kosmann at the time of closing; why Gilbride could be heard on audio at 
the Shari's Meeting agreeing that Kosmann had paid money towards the Property; why it 
appeared that he was using Kosmann's money for the down payment and closing costs; and why 
he had threatened Kosmann that he would lose his "down payment" if he did not sign the Rental 
Agreement. 
141. Gilbride invented an elaborate narrative of the negotiations with Kosmann over 
the car parts, he claimed $30,000 was the fair market value for the car parts, without producing 
any evidence of value, he changed his deposition testimony about whom he had told about the 
car parts deal, he brought in his wife and best friend to claim that he told them about the car parts 
(clearly inadmissible hearsay), and he tried to discredit the clear testimony of his ex-girlfriend 
about his own admissions about the $31,000. Gilbride had no explanation for why he never 
mentioned the car parts in any texts, bill of sale, or other writings to Kosmann, why he 
incorrectly stated in his deposition that he had discussed the car parts with Kosmann during the 
Shari's Restaurant meeting, and why he had no evidence (other than his unsupported testimony) 
to support his car parts story. In other words, Gilbride repeatedly provided false testimony under 
oath regarding how he had not agreed to a buyback and how he had not accepted the $31,000 as 
part of that agreement. 
142. Gilbride did not stop with those misrepresentations. He claimed that he did not 
call code enforcement, seek to shut down Kosmann's home business, or provide the 
unconscionable rental agreement with the intent to harm Kosmann, to take immediate possession 
of the Property, to invalidate his agreement to rent the property to Kosmann for at least a year, to 
steal Kosmann's $30,990, or to invalidate his buy back agreement. Gilbride invented non-
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credible "explanations" for: why he demanded $1,733 in monthly rent, why he demanded $5,000 
in immediate rental deposits and payment, why he was secretly meeting with code enforcement 
and asking for violations and citations to be issued, why he told the insurer he would get 
Kosmann's vehicles removed without discussing it with Kosmann, why he did not tell Kosmann 
about his belief that the vehicles needed to be moved and the business stopped on the Property, 
why he lied to Kosmann during the Shari's Meeting about keeping all the vehicles on the 
Property, why he did not tell Kosmann that he was behind the violation letter from code 
enforcement, why he included all the provisions in the rental agreement about the property, 
business, and vehicles being in compliance with code, why he made the rental agreement non-
negotiable, why he sought to evict Kosmann just two weeks into his one year rental, why he had 
a provision in the rental agreement allowing him to sell all of Kosmann' s personal assets and 
keep all proceeds (regardless of any amount owed), and where he got the unconscionable terms 
in the rental agreement and why they were reasonable. 
143. Gilbride had no explanation for why he waited until after closing on the Property 
to: spring the rental agreement and its non-negotiable, undisclosed, and unconscionable terms 
upon Kosmann; disclose the 15 year mortgage and resulting higher mortgage payment; disclose 
his desire for Kosmann to shut down his business on the Property; disclose the payment of a 25% 
down payment with Kosmann's money rather than 20%; disclose his promise to the property 
insurer that the vehicles would be removed; or disclose his concerns with possible code 
violations and his raising those issues with code enforcement. 
144. In sum, almost all of Gilbride's trial testimony to the court and jury was not 
truthful and his truthful admissions revealed his shocking deceit. Gilbride even tried to use his 
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military service and deployments to Iraq to bolster the credibility of his many misrepresentations 
to the jury. It is disturbing to consider what additional harm would have been done by Gilbride if 
Kosmann had not secretly recorded that Shari's Meeting or if Kosmann had foolishly signed the 
Rental Agreement under pressure of losing his home to Gilbride. 
145. In contrast to Gilbride, at trial Kosmann again publicly admitted his mistakes with 
GMAC. Kosmann again opened himself to possible criminal and civil liability for his mistakes. 
Kosmann told a jury of his peers and Judge Kerrick about his mistakes regarding GMAC. 
Dinius Fails to Present Crucial Evidence. 
146. At trial, Dinius failed to submit some of the most important evidence of the case. 
14 7. At trial, Dinius referenced the letter that Kosmann sent to TitleOne stating that 
they should tell GMAC about the misrepresentations. However, he never called Cameron 
McFaddan from TitleOne to discuss how he passed along the letter and the complaint, how 
Shepherd and Gilbride then tried to obstruct this attempt to confess the truth as they sent their 
Answer disputing the truth, how McFaddan had a conversation with GMAC where GMAC had 
every opportunity to ask any follow up conversations that it wanted and request any additional 
evidence, how Kosmann and Dinius followed up several times to try and ensure that GMAC had 
been contacted directly and told about the situation so that it could make an informed decision, 
and how instead GMAC dropped the issue after full disclosure by Kosmann. This was key 
testimony to make sure everyone was aware that Kosmann had tried to fix his mistake, had 
opened himself up for criminal prosecution and hundreds of thousands of dollars in judgments, 
and had made real efforts to make sure GMAC could take informed action if it wanted. This was 
also key testimony to make sure everyone was aware that Gilbride had done the opposite, had 
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tried to obstruct Kosmann from disclosing his errors to GMAC, and had all the blame if GMAC 
was misled into not taking action. 
148. Dinius also provided no evidence to show how Gilbride had benefitted by 
defrauding GMAC (with a much smaller purchase price and not having to pay any closing costs 
and obtaining a Property they valued at $158,000 for only $88,125). Gilbride was allowed to 
assert that Kosmann was the only party who benefitted by any misrepresentations to GMAC. The 
Court and jury were left to believe that Kosmann had more guilt with regard to GMAC and had 
gotten away with a great fraud, which was incredibly inaccurate. The true facts showed that any 
of Kosmann's misrepresentations were directed by McCarthy (as discussed herein) and were 
either victimless because GMAC decided it did not care or only damaged GMAC because 
Gilbride deceived GMAC into not taking any action. 
149. Dinius also called McCarthy to testify but failed to obtain some of the most 
important testimony. Dinius never asked McCarthy to admit that he told Kosmann that not 
entering into a written agreement and waiting 90 days to sign the lease to purchase was sufficient 
to be able to sign the arm's length agreement. Dinius had McCarthy "dead to rights" because 
McCarthy had been recorded admitting that he knew there was an agreement for a buyback and 
that he had investors who did this all the time. Dinius had multiple documents with language 
describing how the only limitation on sale of the Property was a 90 day window. He had 
McCarthy's own texts admitting he knew about the money passing from Kosmann to Gilbride. 
Dinius let McCarthy act as though he was unaware of what was going on. Dinius did not point 
out the lack of marketing of the property, the use of three "friends" in succession, the purchase 
price chosen by McCarthy and not by the free market, the buyers not having to pay for most or 
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any of the closing costs and getting greatly reduced purchase prices, and McCarthy's 6% 
commission for illogically helping Kosmann to save his home by selling it someone else. Dinius 
instead let Kosmann hang alone, when clearly it was McCarthy who had master-minded this 
complex arrangement for saving Kosman.n's home while wiping out an unsecured deficiency 
balance and generating a $7,000 commission for McCarthy. 
150. Dinius also left out crucial facts and admissions by Gilbride that would have 
further confirmed his deceit and his perjury at trial. For example, Dinius never presented the 
voicemail or audio recordings from Gilbride in September and October 2012, when Gilbride 
admitted he had accepted $26,000 from Kosmann that he used for a down payment and for 
earnest money. It is not clear if Dinius just forgot he had the audio recordings. The recordings 
make clear that the money was not for car parts. Dinius left out hundreds of documents and facts 
that further confirmed that Gilbride had promised to sell the Property back, had taken $31,000, 
had promised to rent the Property to Kosmann and let him live in the Property until Kosmann 
bought it back after 90 days, and invested none of his own money into the transaction other than 
obtaining a mortgage that was incredibly favorable and obtained through use of Kosmann' s 
money. 
151. As discussed below, Dinius left out crucial testimony from Kosmann and others 
that would have blocked the Court from entering a directed verdict. 
152. Dinius left out many witnesses who should have been called to provide crucial 
testimony, including Don Bland, Courtney Kosmann, Mikayla Kosmann, Dori Greene, Ron 
Shepherd, Roger Howell, and Cameron McFadden. 
COMPLAINT - PAGE 46 19725-002 / 915963 
Page 58
' J -
153. Also, much of the evidence that Dinius left out of the trial was evidence crucial to 
any future appeal. Dinius did almost nothing to protect Kosmann on a future appeal. 
154. To the extent any of the evidence was left out of trial because it was precluded by 
the Court, Dinius did not preserve the issue on appeal or ensure that the evidence was in the 
record on appeal. Kosmann had a factual record on appeal that was not complete. 
The District Court's Shocking Directed Verdict that Legalized Gilbride's Theft. 
155. After only two days of trial, Kosmann rested his case and the district court entered 
a directed verdict against him regarding his claim to enforce a buyback of the Property. The 
court concluded that the parties did not have a sufficiently specific buyback agreement that could 
be enforced. 
156. Under cross-examination, Kosmann had stated that the parties never specified the 
terms for when or how Kosmann would buy back the home. However, Dinius failed to 
rehabilitate Kosmann's testimony to point out that they had agreed upon a lease to purchase after 
90 days, that the agreement was that Gilbride was acting solely as a friend and would only 
require payoff of the mortgage and at a most a small profit ( certainly nothing more than the 
$20,000 that Kosmann had offered immediately after the closing), that Kosmann was prepared to 
do the buyback immediately after the closing and certainly at the end of 90 days through loans 
from his wealthy friends, that Gilbride had not invested any of his own money and thus it was 
understood by the parties that he had no expectation of being paid anything significant in profit 
by Kosmann, and the Court could add a reasonable term for any profit that Kosmann would pay 
to Gilbride in addition to paying off the mortgage. Thus, the timing and amount of the buy-back 
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were not indefinite in any meaningful way; immediately after the closing, Kosmann had 
attempted to pay Gilbride even sooner and with more money than the parties had agreed upon. 
157. In addition, this issue of indefiniteness of contract had been an issue litigated 
earlier in the case. Gilbride had brought a motion for summary judgment based on that issue 
early in the litigation. Kosmann had submitted testimony via affidavit that had prevented 
summary judgment. The Court had specifically stated the testimony from Kosmann was 
sufficient to prevent summary judgment. Dinius knew this, yet he failed to rehabilitate 
Kosmann' s testimony to at least say the same things he had said in his affidavit. Those 
statements would have been enough to prevent a directed verdict and allow a jury to decide the 
issue. Certainly a jury would have easily recognized Gilbride's fraud and allowed Kosmann to 
buyback his Property as had been agreed. 
158. Under cross-examination, Kosmann had also admitted that he did not yet have 
financing finalized to buy back his home. Dinius failed to rehabilitate that testimony as well. 
Kosmann would have testified that he had wealthy benefactors ready to pay off the mortgage 
(the same benefactors who had offered to finance his settlement offers that he made immediately 
after the closing). Kosmann would have clarified that he could qualify for a mortgage but had not 
tried because he had wealthy benefactors to pay off the mortgage that was only approximately 
$60,000 by the time of trial. Kosmann could have clarified that he had no long-term debt and 
was employed as a pilot again making a good monthly wage, easily enough to get qualified for a 
$60,000 mortgage. It is inexplicable that Dinius went to trial asking to buy back the Property but 
did not elicit any testimony to show that Kosmann had the ability to buy back the Property. 
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159. Dinius did not call Kosmann's wealthy benefactors to testify that they were 
standing ready to provide Kosmann with financing. 
The Improper Legal Framing of the Issues at Trial. 
160. As discussed, Dinius had the case incorrectly pied. Even without all of the 
evidence that he left out and that should have been included, he still had plenty of evidence to 
prevail if he had just pied the case correctly. He had overwhelming facts to void the PSA and 
closing and transfer of title, based on Gilbride's clear violation of his conditions precedent and 
based on his fraud regarding the PSA and transfer of title. 
161. The Court would ultimately find that no fraud occurred with regard to the 
buyback agreement. But the Court's findings only addressed the limited fraud allegations raised 
by Dinius. Dinius never asked the Court to find fraud in how Gilbride obtained the PSA or 
transfer of title at closing. The Court could never have ignored the overwhelming fraud that 
occurred that should have voided the PSA and transfer of title. 
162. The parties then dismissed the jury and proceeded by court trial regarding the 
parties' numerous remaining claims. Had Dinius properly pied the case and properly litigated the 
case, a jury would have been looking to enter a judgment in the hundreds of thousands against 
Gilbride for his obvious fraud and deceit. Instead, Kosmann was in shock, with Judge Kerrick 
indicating that she did not think she could do anything for him despite the obvious fraud. 
163. The court trial ended, January 29, 2015, and the parties submitted post-trial 
briefing and proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
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164. The proposed factual findings submitted by Dinius again indicate how many facts 
he failed to present to the Court. The proposed conclusions of law again show how Dinius failed 
to properly plead and argue the case. 
The Second Shocking Ruling From the District Court. 
165. On March 30th, the district court issued its "Memorandum Decision Following 
Court Trial." The Court found no fraud by Gilbride and specifically only addressed the very 
limited fraud issues that Dinius had raised. Dinius had failed to raise dozens of instances of fraud 
that could not have been rejected by the Court. For the next two years, Gilbride used this limited 
fraud ruling to claim that the Court said he did not commit fraud (which the Idaho Supreme 
Court implicitly rejected by referring to Gilbride double crossing Kosmann, though Dinius had 
dismissed the appeal regarding fraud, precluding the Idaho Supreme Court from explicitly 
finding fraud). 
166. Shockingly, Judge Kerrick gave the Property to Gilbride. At the time of this 
ruling, the Property was assessed, for tax purposes, at approximately $250,000. It is currently 
assessed at approximately $286,000. By the time of the Court's March 30, 2015, ruling, the loss 
of the Property was a loss of approximately $200,000 for Kosmann. 
167. The court ruled that Gilbride had been unjustly enriched in the amount of the 
$30,990 and that money should be returned to Kosmann. The court specifically found that 
Gilbride's story about the car parts was not credible: 
The Court does not find Defendant's testimony and arguments regarding the car parts 
contract to be credible. . . . the evidence does not support the existence of an agreement 
for the sale of car parts, much less that the $30,990.00 Plaintiff paid to Defendant 
between September and December of 2012 was in furtherance of such an agreement. In 
fact, the timing of the payments make more sense in the context of the parties' agreement 
that Plaintiff would fund the down payment and closing costs as a condition of Defendant 
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agreeing to purchase the real property. The evidence establishes that Plaintiff paid 
Defendant $22,990.00 on September 23, 2012, the day before Plaintiff executed the 
purchase and sale agreement. Plaintiff subsequently paid Defendant $3,000 on October 1 
and $4,000.00 on November 19, 2012. At their December 28, 2012 meeting at Shari's 
Restaurant, when Plaintiff stated to Defendant that he put money toward Defendant's 
loan, Defendant responded, "That's right, you did." There is no reason Defendant would 
have made such an admission if the payments from Plaintiff to Defendant had been made 
on an executory contract for the purchase of automobiles and automobile parts. The court 
does not believe Defendant's explanation at trial that he was simply allowing Plaintiff to 
talk, since Defendant was very direct and adamant in addressing every matter Plaintiff 
raised at the meeting .... 
168. As discussed above, the court could have cited many more facts showing 
Gilbride's car parts story was not credible. The court also found Gilbride's ex-girlfriend, Ms. 
Phillips, credible in her testimony that "at least as late as October 2012, [Gilbride] stated to her 
that the sums [Gilbride] received from [Kosmann] in the summer and fall of 2012, and the sums 
he expected to receive from Plaintiff thereafter, were related to the transaction involving 
[Kosmann's] house." 
169. The court further found that, despite Gilbride's testimony to the contrary, the 
$31,000 was paid to Gilbride in exchange for an unenforceable agreement for re-conveyance of 
the property: 
Application of the [ clean hands] doctrine would allow Defendant a windfall in 
that he would retain title to the real property at issue, as well as sums paid to him 
by Plaintiff based upon the unenforceable agreement for re-conveyance of the 
property. 
The court concludes that Plaintiff paid the $30,990.00 to Defendant in furtherance 
of an unenforceable agreement whereby Defendant would purchase the property 
from Plaintiff and re-convey the property to Plaintiff at a later date. 
Defendant was unjustly enriched because of amounts paid by Plaintiff in reliance 
on the unenforceable agreement for re-conveyance of the property. 
The evidence establishes that [Kosmann] paid that money to [Gilbride] m 
furtherance of the unenforceable agreement for re-conveyance of the property. 
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170. The court also explicitly rejected Gilbride's testimony that the final payment of 
$1,000 from Kosmann was for a security deposit: "The evidence establishes that Plaintiff paid 
that money to Defendant in furtherance of the unenforceable agreement for re-conveyance of the 
property." The court chose not to address all of the other false testimony under oath from 
Gilbride at trial. 
171. In the Memorandum Decision, the court rejected: Gilbride's argument to keep the 
entire $31,000 based on the car parts story or the unclean hands defense, Gilbride's argument to 
keep $6,000 of the $31,000 for repairs to the Property or for a unilateral security deposit, 
Gilbride's claim that the PSA entitled him to immediate possession of the Property after the 
closing, and Gilbride's claim for $1773 in monthly rent since the closing. The court ordered the 
return of the entire $30,990 to Kosmann. That same day, the court entered a Judgment that 
stated, "Plaintiff shall recover the sum of $30,990.00 against Defendant ... [ and] Defendant Leo 
Gilbride shall have and recover from Plaintiff David Kosmann possession of the real property 
located at 1020 W. Homedale Road ... " Gilbride did not appeal any of these district court 
factual findings and legal conclusions. 
Gilbride's Malicious and Baseless Felony Charges and Insurance Fraud. 
172. Kosmann was fully moved out of the Property by the last day of April 2015. 
Dinius and Reid had worked out an agreement that gave Kosmann all of April to move out all of 
his personal property (including his many parts cars). Kosmann had to pay $1,000 in rent for that 
month to move out. Kosmann expended significant financial resources selling his property and 
moving property to new locations. He had no place to put all of his business equipment. He was 
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broke and basically homeless (initially relying upon the kindness of his friends for 
accommodations and eventually moving into a motor home). 
1 73. In email communications, Reid referred to Kosmann moving out all of his 
personal property. Reid and Gilbride never mentioned any personal property that Kosmann 
should leave behind. The parties had never discussed selling any personal property, as Gilbride 
would later admit in his deposition. The PSA specifically said no private property was being sold 
with the real property. Kosmann left the Property in very good condition, which is amazing 
considering how he had been defrauded and his finances mostly ruined. 
174. The day after Kosmann moved out, Gilbride continued his fraud by calling law 
enforcement and claiming the home had been ransacked by a tenant who was moving out. 
Gilbride had law enforcement come to the Property. Gilbride claimed that Kosmann had stolen 
all of the business equipment from the garages. Gilbride claimed that Kosmann had stolen 
washers and dryers and a refrigerator. Gilbride showed law enforcement the PSA that had 
boilerplate language about "fixtures" and Gilbride asserted that the business equipment in the 
garages was "fixtures" because it had been bolted down for safety reasons. Gilbride has admitted 
this is his sole basis for claiming ownership of all of Kosmann's business equipment. Gilbride 
claimed ownership to washers and dryers, a freezer, refrigerator and other appliances by 
claiming that the Property Disclosure document said Kosmann was selling those appliances. 
Gilbride admits this was never discussed, the Property Disclosure document only says the 
appliances were working, the PSA says that no "private property" was transferred, and McCarthy 
admits that such appliances would only be transferred through the PSA and not through the 
Property Disclosure document. Again, this claim of ownership was wholly fabricated by 
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Gilbride. He was emboldened by stealing the Property and so he tried to steal even more 
property from Kosmann. 
17 5. Gilbride asked law enforcement to charge Kosmann with a felony for grand theft 
of more than $35,000 for the business equipment and personal property. Gilbride presented 
documents to law enforcement to support his charges of theft. Gilbride inflated the value of all 
the property he claimed was stolen, for example, using values for brand new equipment rather 
than for the well-used equipment that Kosmann owned. Dinius took minimal steps to forward 
two documents to law enforcement to dispute the allegations. However, a police report was 
developed based on Gilbride's lies and was forwarded to the prosecutors. Fortunately, no charges 
have been brought. 
176. At the same time, Gilbride filed an insurance claim under his insurance policy on 
the Property. Gilbride again claimed that Kosmann had stolen things and damaged the Property 
and the insurance should reimburse these losses. Gilbride was again basing these claims, at least 
in part, on Judge Kerrick's order that gave him ownership of the Property and therefore of the 
"fixtures." Gilbride's sole basis for his insurance claim was again the Property Disclosure form 
and the boilerplate fixtures language. Gilbride was seeking to be paid for personal property and 
business equipment that belonged to Kosmann and that Gilbride had never purchased or even 
discussed with Kosmann. 
177. The insurer was eventually defrauded as well. The insurer paid Gilbride $20,000 
for the "damage" to the Property of Kosmann removing his own business equipment from the 
garages. The successful insurance claim also harmed Kosmann; it meant that Kosmann was put 
at risk for a claim being brought against him by the insurer for reimbursement. 
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178. Again, both the false felony charges and the fraudulent insurance claim arose out 
of Gilbride's successful fraud regarding the Property. He was emboldened in so many ways 
because he was successful in stealing the Property. Dinius' malpractice was a proximate cause of 
all of these subsequent abuses by Gilbride. 
Dinius' Errors on the Motion for Fees. 
179. After Judge Kerrick's final judgment on the various causes of action, the parties 
then sought fees and costs. Kosmann had been unaware that if he did not prevail at trial in 
getting back his home, then he was at risk for paying all of Gilbride's attorney fees, putting at 
risk all of Kosmann's assets and likely resulting in a bankruptcy. Kosmann was already broke 
from losing his home and paying tens of thousands in fees to Dinius. 
180. Both parties claimed to be the prevailing party, Gilbride prevailing on ownership 
of the home and Kosmann prevailing on recovery of the $30,990. Kosmann had actually 
prevailed on many more issues than Gilbride. Gilbride obtained a home but lost on all other 
issues. Gilbride did not prevail on most of what he was trying to accomplish: (1) his multiple 
attempts and arguments for keeping Kosmann's $31,000 (though it has not yet been returned); 
(2) obtaining another $3,200 in deposits from Kosmann; (3) getting a lien on and selling all of 
Kosmann's personal property through the Rental Agreement; (4) shutting down Kosmann's 
business and eliminating his source of income at the time; (5) obtaining rent payments that were 
170% of the market rent; (6) getting Kosmann evicted in January 2013; (7) getting Kosmann 
evicted in May 2014; (8) getting Kosmann fined by the CCCE; (9) getting Kosmann fined by 
IDEQ; and (10) deceiving the district court with false testimony under oath. 
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181. Dinius did not raise most of those arguments about who was the prevailing party. 
Dinius did not push the District Court to enforce sanctions against Gilbride for his clear civil 
perjury. The District Court had ruled that Gilbride's entire case and testimony had been "non-
credible," yet Dinius did not adequately argue for the District Court to impose sanctions for that 
civil perjury that had been proven. 
182. On June 18, 2015, the Court found that Kosmann was not the prevailing party. 
The Court found that Gilbride was the prevailing party sufficient to recover all of his costs as a 
matter of right in the amount of $1,732.25. The Court, however, denied Gilbride's request for a 
recovery of $75,955.81 in attorney fees. The Court concluded that the sale of Gilbride's 
residence to try and avoid foreclosure was not a commercial transaction, and the Court found 
there was no applicable contractual fee agreement because the dispute had been about an alleged 
oral contract that did not have an attorney fee provision. In his opposition brief to Gilbride's 
motion for fees and costs, Dinius had not even raised the argument that the litigation was focused 
on an oral contract without a fee provision. Fortunately, the Court noted the issue on its own and 
correctly did not award fees against Kosmann. 
Dinius Dismisses the Appeal and All of Kosmann's Protection Against Further Abuse. 
183. On June 3, 2015, Dinius filed a notice of appeal on behalf of Kosmann. Kosmann 
and Dinius rightly appealed the rulings below that had resulted in Gilbride being allowed to 
legally steal Kosmann's home. 
184. On July 10, 2015, Gilbride filed a cross-appeal, seeking to recover his almost 
$76,000 in attorney fees that had been denied. Gilbride, with the assistance of his counsel Mr. 
Reid and Ms. Mahoney, did everything he could to financially ruin Kosmann by not only 
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stealing his home and trying to steal his $31,000, but also asking to get paid $100,000 in appeal 
and trial attorney fees as a reward for their misrepresentations and false statements to the District 
Court and to the Idaho Supreme Court. 
185. Dinius was unhappy that he had not been paid his $50,000 trial fee that he 
presented to Kosmann shortly after losing the trial and losing Kosman.n's home. Dinius told 
Kosmann that he needed to be paid or else he would not proceed with the appeal. Kosmann had 
lost everything through the trial and had nothing more to pay. 
186. Dinius then helped convince Kosmann that the appeal should be dismissed. On 
July 20, 2015, Dinius filed a motion to dismiss Kosman.n's appeal. On July 28, 2015, the Idaho 
Supreme Court issued its Order Granting Dismissal of Appellant Kosman.n's Appeal. 
187. Voluntary dismissal of the appeal was further egregious malpractice. Even with 
all the errors made at trial and Dinius' failure to preserve numerous valid issues for appeal, 
Kosmann had numerous potentially valid issues to assert on appeal. Kosmann still had issues that 
could have allowed him to regain his ownership of the Property. The District Court's rulings 
regarding no fraud and an indefinite buyback agreement were both highly suspect and merited an 
appeal. The facts showed that a great injustice had been done and the Idaho Supreme Court 
should have been allowed to fix that injustice. In addition, Kosmann should have been appealing 
the denial of all of his attorney fees, based on prevailing on the majority of issues and/or based 
on Gilbride's abuse of the courts, obvious fraud, and civil perjury. 
188. In addition to dismissing a potentially meritorious appeal, Dinius committed 
malpractice in not, at a minimum, counseling his client to maintain the appeal for leverage and 
settlement purposes. 
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189. Dinius dismissed the appeal because he had not been paid what he believed he 
should be paid. Dinius pressured his client into believing he did not have the funds to pursue his 
appeal. The appeal did not need to be dismissed based on finances. The only immediate cost was 
the cost to transcribe two days of trial testimony. Briefing was not yet scheduled. The Idaho 
Supreme Court did not issue a briefing schedule until January 8, 2016 and the initial briefs were 
then due on February 12, 2016. Dinius convinced his client to dismiss his appeal almost seven 
months before the first brief was due. 
190. The voluntary dismissal of the appeal caused tremendous harm to Kosmann. 
Kosmann lost all leverage. Gilbride no longer had to worry about the risk of losing the home on 
appeal. Gilbride no longer had to worry about being hit with tens of thousands in attorney fees on 
appeal. Gilbride could instead pursue the appeal to its conclusion, with no downside and only 
upside. In addition, the only issue on appeal was now Gilbride's request for fees. Kosmann was 
potentially limited regarding what facts were relevant to that issue. It was no longer clear that all 
of Gilbride's fraud, deceit, and perjury were relevant on appeal because the issues on appeal 
were seemingly limited to whether contract or statute would allow recovery of Gilbride's fees. 
191. Not surprisingly, Kosmann was not able to obtain a reasonable settlement of 
Gilbride's cross-appeal. Kosmann had nothing to negotiate with. Even more importantly, 
Kosmann's new counsel was unable to fix what Dinius had done wrong. With the appeal 
dismissed, there was no way for Kosmann to win back his home on appeal and thus no way for 
Kosmann to recover all his attorney fees that Dinius was claiming. 
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The New Frivolous Lawsuit Brought by Gilbride and Kosmann's Increased Exposure 
Based on Dinius' Malpractice. 
192. As soon as this trial ended in the litigation over the Property, Gilbride filed a new 
lawsuit against Kosmann, again with Mr. Reid and Ms. Mahoney as his attorneys. Gilbride filed 
the new Complaint on July 20, 2015, alleging conversion and malicious prosecution. Both claims 
were extensions of Gilbride's fraud from stealing the Property. Gilbride was emboldened by the 
ruling from Judge Kerrick. 
193. In this new lawsuit, Gilbride doubled down on his dishonesty and he claimed that 
since he was legally allowed to illegitimately take Kosmann's house, then he was also legally 
entitled to all of Kosmann' s business equipment that Kosmann had been using to remodel cars in 
the garages on the Property. Gilbride brought a conversion claim for $30,000 claiming that 
Kosmann stole that business equipment when he moved out of the house. Gilbride filed that 
lawsuit in Canyon County with Judge Nye, Case No. CV-2015-6582. 
194. Also in this newest lawsuit, Gilbride claimed that Kosmann falsely accused him 
of criminal trespass. Gilbride's claim for malicious prosecution is again based on his attempt to 
further profit from being legally allowed to steal Kosmann's home: Gilbride asserts that he was 
always the rightful owner of the property after December 27, 2012, and therefore he could never 
be charged for trespass even though he was repeatedly going on the property during the entire 
two years of the litigation, in violation of the Court's orders that Kosmann was to have 
possession until the litigation was resolved. 
195. In the new litigation, Gilbride, Mr. Reid, and Ms. Mahoney continued to claim, 
despite the rulings in the prior litigation by Judge Kerrick, that Gilbride did nothing wrong. They 
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claimed that Gilbride did not lie at trial before Judge Kerrick, that Gilbride did not take 
Kosmann's money for the house, and that Gilbride had no side deal to sell the house back to 
Kosmann after a period of time. Based on those repeated falsehoods, Judge Nye has declined to 
grant summary judgment dismissing all of Gilbride's claims and Kosmann has incurred tens of 
thousands in additional attorney fees defending himself for the last year and a half. 
196. Recently, the case was set for a IO-day trial beginning on February 21, 2017, in 
front of Judge Nye, where Kosmann was finally going to present all the evidence that should 
have been used in the earlier trial, plus all the evidence of the abuse that has occurred since that 
earlier lawsuit was filed in January 2013. However, a month before the trial was to begin, Mr. 
Reid and Ms. Mahoney suddenly filed a motion to withdraw as counsel for Gilbride, setting the 
motion with less than 24-hour notice and sealing the medical records at issue so that they could 
not be reviewed by Kosmann's counsel. In seeking to withdraw as counsel, Mr. Reid relied upon 
a long-standing health condition (not an emergent medical issue) that made it too stressful to try 
the case and Ms. Mahoney claimed she was too part-time, inexperienced, and uninvolved in the 
case to take the case through trial. This, despite the fact that both of them were counsel for the 
jury trial on January 27-29, 2015, regarding the Property and both had been the listed counsel for 
Gilbride continuously since their notice of appearance in August 2014. Over Kosmann's protests, 
Mr. Reid and Ms. Mahoney were allowed by Judge Nye to vacate the trial and exit the case. In 
other words, Mr. Reid and Ms. Mahoney brought the frivolous litigation, listed themselves as the 
counsel, and then revealed a month before trial that they could not actually do the trial for 
reasons that they had known the entire time. They were capable of doing the trial in January 
2015 against Dinius but they were not capable of doing the trial in February 2017 against better 
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prepared and fully engaged new counsel for Kosmann. Mr. Reid and Ms. Mahoney were still 
allowed out of the trial and without even having to dismiss their baseless and frivolous litigation. 
Thus, the new litigation remains unresolved and will have to be reset for trial. By dropping out of 
the case at the last minute and vacating a IO-day, first priority, trial date that had been set for 
more than six months, Reid and Mahoney and Gilbride harmed Kosmann by significantly 
delaying his justice and causing Kosmann to incur thousands more in attorney fees. 
197. Had Dinius properly litigated the prior lawsuit regarding ownership of the 
Property, then this second lawsuit would never have been filed. For example, had Dinius 
properly pled the first litigation, had he properly amended the first litigation to add all of 
Gilbride's on-going abuse, had he done sufficient discovery, had he presented all the relevant 
evidence at trial, then Gilbride (not Kosmann) would have lost the house based on his fraud and 
deceit and Gilbride (1) would never have been able to claim malicious prosecution for being 
cited for criminal trespass for going on the Property without notice or authorization and (2) 
would never have been able to claim conversion of any other of Kosman.n's personal property or 
equipment related to the Property. 
198. Similarly, had Dinius taken steps to stop Gilbride's harassment during the two 
years prior to the January 2015 trial, then Gilbride would have been stopped from trespassing 
and/or his criminal trespass on March 24, 2015 would have been even more obvious, preventing 
him from bringing his malicious prosecution claim. 
199. Similarly, had Dinius remained pro-active as Kosman.n's counsel after the trial, 
then the conversion claim would have been avoided and any issues regarding what property 
Gilbride owned would have been resolved by Judge Kerrick as supplemental proceedings to the 
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trial. As early as May 1, 2015 Gust a few days after Judge Kerrick issuing her amended final 
judgment), Dinius knew that Gilbride was claiming that Kosmann stole the business equipment 
and other personal property when he moved out. Dinius knew that Gilbride was asking for felony 
charges to be brought based on this alleged theft. Dinius did not raise the issue with Judge 
Kerrick. Dinius was still Kosmann's counsel through late July, 2015, but he never asked Judge 
Kerrick to address these false claims being brought by Gilbride, both to protect Kosmann against 
felony charges and to protect Kosmann from future civil claims by Gilbride (like conversion). 
The Idaho Supreme Court's Ruling Confirming Gilbride's Deceit. 
200. Gilbride's appeal of his claim of attorney fees in the underlying litigation 
proceeded through full briefing, oral arguments, and then a written decision from the Idaho 
Supreme Court. 
201. Kosmann was able to convince the Supreme Court that Gilbride had committed 
fraud to acquire the Property. The Idaho Supreme Court pointed out the obvious facts that 
Gilbride had lied to and double-crossed Kosmann in order to steal his home and that he was now 
trying to be rewarded for those actions. 
202. The Supreme Court also noted that it believed realtor McCarthy was a guilty party 
but that the record was incomplete about his actions. As discussed supra, Dinius failed to include 
those facts in the appeal record, so Kosmann was unable to show how McCarthy had misled 
Kosmann regarding the acceptability of the transaction. McCarthy avoided any liability in this 
case because Dinius let the statute oflimitation run for McCarthy's professional malpractice. 
203. Kosmann also had no evidence to show the Supreme Court the full extent of what 
had actually happened with GMAC. As discussed supra, Dinius failed to include those facts in 
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the appeal record, including testimony from McFadden from TitleOne to show that Kosmann had 
made full disclosure and offered to make it right, Gilbride had lied to protect himself and try to 
push all the blame to Kosmann, Gilbride had tried to block any fix by GMAC, and GMAC had 
chosen to do nothing. Without these clarifying facts in the record, Gilbride and his counsel 
successfully deceived the Idaho Supreme Court into believing that somehow Gilbride and 
Kosmann were equivalent bad actors in the aforementioned events and Kosmann's name was 
tarnished in a Supreme Court opinion and Kosmann was prevented from recovering his attorney 
fees in defending against Gilbride's fraudulent and frivolous appeal. 
204. It is truly remarkable how many times Gilbride has been able to avoid any 
liability or sanction by just making misrepresentations and claiming that Kosmann was also a 
bad actor. As discussed above, there is no comparison between the two and only Gilbride's 
deception (with the help of his attorneys) has caused so many parties to unwittingly equate the 
two. There is no legal or equitable principle that states a fraudster is allowed to commit fraud 
because the victim also made a mistake (particularly where the victim tried to fix the mistake in 
good faith). There is no legal or equitabie principle that states a fraudster is not sanctioned for his 
hundreds of bad acts and deceits because his main victim also made one mistake. Yet, this is 
seemingly what has occurred to date. 
205. The list of the people that Gilbride (with and without the help of his counsel) has 
deceived or tried to deceive is remarkably long: Kosmann, McCarthy, Roger Howell and 
Fairway Mtg., TitleOne and Cameron McFadden, numerous law enforcement officers and 
Canyon County Sherriff' s Office, Ruth Coose and Canyon County Prosecutors, Eric Arthur and 
CCCE, Natalie Clough and Michael Stromer and IDEQ, Judge Kerrick and her chambers, the 
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jury at the January 2015 trial, Dinius and Kosmann's current counsel, GMAC, the five justices of 
the Idaho Supreme Court, Michelle Phillips, Safeco Insurance, and undoubtedly many more. 
206. None of these parties have tried or been able to hold Gilbride accountable. It is 
currently unclear what conspiratorial role Gilbride's counsel played in all of Gilbride's deceit 
and on-going abuse. Counsel has raised the attorney-client privilege to avoid disclosing their 
knowledge and/or participation in Gilbride's fraudulent actions. Shepherd dropped out of the 
case in 2014. Reid and Mahoney dropped out in January 2017. Gilbride is apparently currently 
hiring new counsel to help him further perpetuate his fraud. 
Dinius' Claims for Additional Attorney Fees. 
207. At the end of the first trial, Dinius sent Kosmann invoices for an additional 
$50,000. Dinius was seeking a total fee of over $100,000 for representing Kosmann. Such a fee 
was wholly unreasonable for many reasons, including the malpractice committed, the failure to 
properly plead the case in a way that might have resolved it well before trial, Dinius' lack of 
attention to detail and insufficient efforts, the excessive costs of trial, and the damage done to 
Kosmann by Dinius' malpractice. 
208. Despite his many errors and the horrible result that Dinius obtained for Kosmann, 
Dinius said he would no longer help Kosmann without being paid in full his approximately 
$100,000 in fees. Kosmann had already paid Dinius more than $50,000 in fees, but Dinius was 
demanding an additional approximately $50,000. Dinius was refusing to help Kosmann with 
Kosmann's appeal and Gilbride's cross-appeal. 
209. Dinius' final act as counsel for Kosmann was to dismiss Kosmann's appeal for no 
good reason, thus making Dinius' many errors permanent and unfixable. Those permanent errors 
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have haunted Kosmann and helped Gilbride have success in further harming Kosmann since 
March 30, 2015. 
210. Dinius continued to tell Kosmann that he would not help with the new lawsuit for 
conversion and malicious prosecution or with the remaining appeal by Gilbride seeking $80,000 
in fees. Dinius refused to do anything more without being paid his fees. 
211. Kosmann was broke. He had lost everything. He was being threatened with a 
collection action from Dinius. He had a judgment against Gilbride for return of the $31,000 less 
the costs that had been awarded. Gilbride was refusing to pay it. Gilbride used the appeal as 
means to avoid having to pay back the $31,000 that he had taken from Kosmann during the 
deceitful transactions. Instead, he paid the money into the Court and stated that he expected to 
never have to give it to Kosmann if they prevailed on the appeal. 
212. Kosmann offered to give Dinius all of his rights in the approximately $30,000 
judgment, in order to stop Dinius from threatening to come after Kosmann for fees. Kosmann 
had almost nothing else to give. Dinius refused to accept that settlement. Instead, he threatened 
Kosmann with putting a lien on his assets and taking other collection efforts. 
213. In early August 2015, Kosmann contacted his current counsel. After several 
months of investigation, current counsel began to understand some of the fraud and inequity that 
had occurred. 
214. Kosmann's new counsel was stymied in his understanding of the case because 
Dinius refused to cooperate. Dinius refused to turn over his entire case file. Instead, he claimed 
that he needed to be paid in full everything that he was demanding before he would turn over the 
file. Meanwhile, new counsel was trying to protect Kosmann on Gilbride's appeal and on the 
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new litigation regarding conversion and malicious prosecution, despite not having most or all of 
the evidence that was all in Dinius' possession. 
215. Dinius never did turn over the client file. 
Dinius Breaches His Arbitration Agreement With Kosmann. 
216. Kosmann eventually agreed to binding arbitration with Dinius. Kosmann told 
Dinius that he was going to file a malpractice lawsuit against Dinius and even sent Dinius a copy 
of a draft lawsuit. The draft Complaint shows how little Kosmann' s new counsel knew of the 
facts at that point, mostly because Dinius refused to turn over the client file. The draft complaint 
said nothing about almost all of the malpractice that is now apparent and described above. 
217. Kosmann agreed to arbitrate in exchange for an agreement that the malpractice 
claims would be brought as part of the arbitration. Kosmann hoped that Dinius' malpractice 
would offset against all fees he had already paid and Dinius would be forced to disgorge all his 
fees. Through the arbitration agreement, Kosmann agreed to limit his damage claims to just the 
amount of Dinius' fees. Thus, Dinius was protected from having to pay damages greater than a 
disgorgement of the approximately $50,000 he had been paid in fees. In addition, Dinius agreed 
to cap his fee request at an additional $35,000, so Kosmann was protected from any liability for 
fees greater than an additional $35,000. Kosmann did not trust Dinius to abide by the agreement, 
so Kosmann included language that said the malpractice statute of limitation was tolled until 
arbitration was completed. 
218. Kosmann and Dinius signed the arbitration agreement in January 2016. They then 
jointly waited a year before they moved forward with the actual arbitration. Kosmann's new 
counsel used that year to learn the facts and to redo all the discovery of the facts. Kosmann had 
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to redo most of the discovery because Dinius failed to do so much and because Dinius refused to 
turn over the client file. Kosmann incurred many more fees than necessary because his new 
counsel had to redo discovery and had no assistance from Dinius in trying to understand the two 
years of prior litigation from January 2013 through July 2015. 
219. In December 2016, Kosmann and Dinius agreed to proceed with the actual 
arbitration. A voluntary arbitration panel was assigned. In settlement discussions, Dinius 
suddenly claimed that the arbitration was limited only to his claim for $35,000 in additional fees. 
Dinius claimed he did not have any risk to disgorge any fees. 
220. Kosmann informed Dinius that he was breaching the agreement. Kosmann gave 
Dinius several days to decide whether he would stand by the terms of the agreement or continue 
to claim that he did not have any risk beyond his $35,000 in additional fees. Dinius refused to 
agree that his entire fee could be disgorged based on his malpractice and damages there from. 
Therefore, Kosmann informed Dinius that he had breached the agreement and Kosmann was 
moving forward to file this malpractice complaint. This was the final act of Dinius acting to try 
and harm his former client by trying to redefine and renegotiate the arbitration agreement he had 
signed a year prior. 
LEGAL MALPRACTICE 
221. Dinius owed a duty to meet the standard of care for legal representation of his 
client Kosmann during the dispute with Gilbride as detailed above. 
222. Dinius' actions fell below the standard of care in many regards, again as detailed 
above, including how Dinius: did not plead or argue the case correctly which was key to the 
ultimate result, did not do sufficient discovery to uncover all the key facts, did not protect 
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Kosmann from constant harassment and harm caused by Gilbride to Kosmann during the entire 
two years leading up to trial, did not present several witnesses at trial who had key testimony, did 
not present key testimony from Kosmann, Mr. McCarthy, and other witnesses that were called, 
did not present key audio recordings, did not present key evidence that would have prevented the 
directed verdict, did not preserve issues for appeal, did not retain Kosmann's appeal so that he 
could continue to try and save his house and have protection against Gilbride's appeal, did not 
sue McCarthy for his clear professional negligence (as recently noted by the Idaho Supreme 
Court), did not accurately disclose the expected costs of the litigation to Kosmann, did not send 
Kosmann to new counsel to pursue his appeal rights, did not take basic actions that could have 
protected Kosmann from the new claims of malicious prosecution and conversion, did not turn 
over his clients complete file to the new counsel, refused to help new counsel to understand all 
the facts of what had occurred and instead worked to obstruct new counsel, and was only 
concerned about his fee and abandoned Kosmann after losing the trial, despite the appeal by 
Gilbride that threatened another $100,000 loss and despite the new lawsuit filed for conversion 
and malicious prosecution. 
223. Dinius' errors and breaches of his duty ultimately caused significant damage to 
Kosmann, including excessive legal fees being claimed by Dinius of more than $100,000, loss of 
the Property that was valued at approximately $250,000 at the time of trial, loss of rental 
payments of $28,000, loss of court costs, loss of use of his $31,000, damages from having to 
move out of his long-time home, lost recovery of all his damages from McCarthy, attorney fees 
incurred defending the recently resolved appeal, attorney fees incurred defending the still on-
going new litigation with Gilbride, and emotional distress from two years of unnecessary 
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litigation, from dealing with Gilbride's harassment that Dinius failed to prevent, and from losing 
his home. 
BREACH OF CONTRACT AND/OR THE IMPLIED 
COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING 
224. Dinius had a contract to provide legal services to his client Kosmann and upon 
information and belief that contract contained additional contractual obligations. 
225. Dinius breached that contract in many regards, as detailed above, including how 
Dinius: did not plead or argue the case correctly which was key to the ultimate result, did not do 
sufficient discovery to uncover all the key facts, did not protect Kosmann from constant 
harassment and harm caused by Gilbride to Kosmann during the entire two years leading up to 
trial, did not present several witnesses at trial who had key testimony, did not present key 
testimony from Kosmann, Mr. McCarthy, and other witnesses that were called, did not present 
key audio recordings, did not present key evidence that would have prevented the directed 
verdict, did not preserve issues for appeal, did not retain Kosmann's appeal so that he could 
continue to try and save his house and have protection against Gilbride's appeal, did not sue 
McCarthy for his clear professional negligence (as recently noted by the Idaho Supreme Court), 
did not accurately disclose the expected costs of the litigation to Kosmann, did not send 
Kosmann to new counsel to pursue his appeal rights, did not take basic actions that could have 
protected Kosmann from the new claims of malicious prosecution and conversion, did not turn 
over his clients complete file to the new counsel, refused to help new counsel to understand all 
the facts of what had occurred and instead worked to obstruct new counsel, and was only 
concerned about his fee and abandoned Kosmann after losing the trial, despite the appeal by 
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Gilbride that threatened another $100,000 loss and despite the new lawsuit filed for conversion 
and malicious prosecution. 
226. Dinius' breaches of his contract ultimately caused significant damage to 
Kosmann, including excessive legal fees being claimed by Dinius of more than $100,000, loss of 
the Property that was valued at approximately $250,000 at the time of trial, loss of rental 
payments of $28,000, loss of court costs, loss of use of his $31,000, damages from having to 
move out of his long-time home, lost recovery of all his damages from McCarthy, attorney fees 
incurred defending the recently resolved appeal, attorney fees incurred defending the still on-
going new litigation with Gilbride, and emotional distress from two years of unnecessary 
litigation, from dealing with Gilbride's harassment that Dinius failed to prevent, and from losing 
his home. 
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES 
Kosmann has been forced to incur attorney fees related to the prosecution of this matter. 
Plaintiff is entitled to recover its reasonable costs and attorney fees incurred in this matter 
pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and Idaho Code § 12-120, 12-121, and/or other 
applicable law. A reasonable attorney fee in the event that judgment is entered by default is 
$5,000.00. 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
Kosmann demands a trial by jury on all issues as to which he has that right. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for relief as follows: 
1. A warding Kosmann damages in an amount to be proved at trial, which will be in 
excess of $10,000.00; 
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2. Awarding Kosrnann costs and attorney fees incurred in the prosecution of this 
action; and 
3. Granting Kosrnann such other relief as the Court deems just under the 
circumstances of this action. 
DATED this /ifi-aay of January, 2017. 
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Robert A. Anderson, ISB No. 2124 
Yvonne A. Dunbar, !SB No. 7200 
ANDERSON, JULIAN & IillLL LLP 
C. W. Moore Plaza 
250 South Fifth Street, Suite 700 
Post Office Box 7426 
Boise, Idaho 83707-7426 
Telephone: (208) 344-5800 
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cANYON COUNTY CLERK 
R GRAY, DEPUTY CLERK 
1N THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE'COUNTY OF CANYON 
DA VlD A. KOSMANN, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
KEVIN DINIUS an individual; and DINIUS & 
ASSOCIATES, PLLC, an Idaho professional 
limited liability company, 
Defe11dants. 
Case No. CV-2017-568 
ANSWER AND DEMAND FOR 
JURY TRIAL 
CO1\1ES NOW, Defendants, by and through their attorneys ofrecord, Anderson, Julian & 
Hull, LLP, answers Plaintiff's Complaint as follows: 
FIRST DEFENSE 
The Complaint fails to state a claim against the Defendants upon which ·relief can be 
granted. 
ANSWEltp l ORIGINAL 
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SECOND DEFENSE 
l. The Defendap.ts deny each and every allegation of the Complaint not herein expressly 
and specifically admitted. 
2. The Defendants are without sufficient information to admit or deny the allegations 
contained in Paragraph 1 and, therefore, deny the same. 
3. Defendants' admit Paragraph 2 of the Complaint. 
4. With regard to the allegations set forth in Paragraph 3, Defendants only admit Kevin 
Dinius was an employee of Dinius & Associates, PLLC and denies the remaining allegations 
contained therein as they call for a legal conclusion. 
5. With regard to the allegations set forth in Paragraph 4, Defendants. only David 
Kosmann was one of the owners of the real property and deny the remaining allegations 
contained therein. 
6. With respect to the· allegations set forth in Paragraph 5, Defendants only admit 
Kosmann was an employee of United Airlines intermittently at times and deny the remaining 
allegations contained therein. 
7. The Defendants are without sufficient information to admit or deny the allegations 
contained in• Paragraph 6 and, therefore, deny the same. 
8. With respect to the allegations set forth in Paragraph 7, Defendants only admit 
Kosmann informed :them he had cars and a shop on the property· and deny the remaitting 
allegations contained therein. 
9. With respect to the allegations set forth in Paragraph 8. Defendants only admit 
Kosmann informed them he returned to wo:rk at U:pited Airlines for a period of time and deny the 
remaining allegations contained therein. 
ANSWER-2 
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10. With respect to the allegations set forth in Paragraph 9, Defendants only admit 
Kosmann informed them he used loan prnceeds in connection with an investi.nen't, deny the 
remaining allegations contained therein, and specifically deny that the investment was a 
complete loss. 
11. With respect to the allegations set forth in Paragraph I 0, Defendants only admit 
Kosmann informed them he was worked for United Airlines intermittently and was rehired by 
United Airlines in approximately 2014 and deny the re1naining allegations contained therein. 
12. With respect to the allegations set forth in Paragraph 11, Defendants only admit 
Kosmann informed them he kept the property after his. divorce and deny the remaining 
allegations contained therein. 
13. With respect to the allegations set forth in Paragraph 12, Defendants only admit 
Kosmann strategically defaulted on the mortgage to allow for a short sale and deny the 
remaining allegations contained therein. 
14. With respect to the allegations set forth in Paragraph 13, Defendants only admit 
Kosmann informed them he tried to take advantage of refinance programs and deny the 
remaining allegations contained therein. 
15. With respect to the allegations set forth in Paragraph 14, Defendants only admit 
Kosmann spoke with Justin McCarthy at some point and deny the remaining allegations 
contained therein. 
16. The advertisements referenced in Paragraph .15 speak for themselves and Defendants 
deny the allegations contained in Paragraph 15 to the extent they are contrary to such 
advertisements. Defe11dants further d~ny the allegatio11s as they are without sufficient 
information to admit or deny the same. 
ANSW:ER-3 
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17. With respect to the allegations set forth in Paragraph 16, Defendants only admit 
Kosmann informed them of his goals as ·stated in Paragraph 16, deny the remaining allegations 
contained therein, and state they are without sufficient information to admit or deny McCarthy's 
lrn.owledge ofKosmarui's goals and, therefore deny the same. 
18. With respect to the allegations set forth in ·paragraphs 17 and 18, Defendants. only 
admit Kosmann inf orm.ed them McCarthy made the statements alleged therein and deny the 
remaining allegations contained therein. 
19. With respect to the allegations set forth in Paragraph 19, Defendants only admit 
Kosmann wanted to believe McCarthy and deny the remaining allegations contained therein. 
20. With respect to the allegations set forth in Paragraph 20, Defendants only admit 
Kosmann strategically defaulted on the mortgage and deny the remaining allegations contained 
therein. 
21. With respect to the allegations set forth in Paragraph 21, Defendants only admit 
Kosmann infonned them he tried to find a friend to buy the property through a short sale and 
deny the remaining allegations contained therein. 
22. With respect to the allegations set forth in Paragraph 22., Defendants only admit 
Kosmann informed them the property was not listed on the I\,1LS and .deny the remaining 
allegations contained th~rein. 
23. The documents referenced in Paragraphs 23. 24. 25 are the best evidence and speak 
for themselves and Defendai1ts deny the allegations which are contrary to the same. Defendants 
also deny the remaining allegations contained therein. 
24. With respect. to the allegations set forth in Paragraph 26, Defendants only adni.it 
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25. The documents referenced in Paragraph 27 are the best evidence and speak for 
themselves and Defendants deny the allegations which are contrary to the same. Defendants also 
deny the remaining allegations contained therein. 
26. With respect to the allegations set forth in Paragraph . 28, Defendants only admit 
Kosmann informed them Sterling .could not qualify for the sale and deny the remaining 
allegations co11tained therein. 
27. The referenced agency agreement in Paragraph 29 is the best evidence and speaks for 
itself and Defendants deny the allegations which are contrary to the same. Defendants also deny 
the remaining allegations contained therein. 
28. With respect to the allegations set forth in Paragraph 30, 31, 32, 33, Defendants only 
admit Kosmann informed them of these allegations. 
29. With respect to the allegations set forth in Paragraph 34, Defendants only admit they 
understood. at the time, Gilbride was not liquid in his financial situation and deny the remaining 
allegations contained therein. 
30. With respect to the allegations set forth in Paragraph 35, Defendants only admit 
Kosmann informed them and McC~y confirmed· that Kosmann brought Gilbride to McCarthy. 
Defendants also state the referenced agency agreement is the best evidence and speaks for itself 
and Defendants deny the allegations which are contrary to the same. 
31. The documents referenced in P'aragraphs 36, 37, 38, 39 are the best evidence and 
speak for themselves and. Defendai1ts deny the allegatiqns which are contrar}' to the same. 
Defendants also deny the remaining allegations contained therein. 
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32. With respect to the allegations contained in Paragraph 40, Defendants state the 
deposition and trial testimony are the best evidence and speak for themselves and Defendants 
deny the allegations which are contrary to the same. 
33. With respect to the allegations set forth in Paragraph 41 Defendants only admit 
Kosmann informed them of these allegations. Defendants also state the deposition and trial 
testimony are the best evidence and speak for themselves and Defendants deny the allegations 
which are contrary to the same. 
34. The voicemail referenced in Paragraph 42 is the· best evidence and speaks for itself 
and Defendants deny the allegations which are contrary to the same. Defend.au.ts also deny the 
remaining allegations contained therein. 
35. The documents referenced in Paragraphs 43, 44·are the be~ evidence and speak for 
themselves and Defendants deny the allegations which are contrary to the same. Defendants also 
deny the remaining allegations contained therein. 
36. With respect to the allegations set forth in Paragraph 45, Defendants only admit the 
communication was recorded, state the recording is the best evidence and speaks for itself, and 
Defendants deny the allegations which are contrary to the same. Defendants also deny the 
remaining allegations contained therein. 
3 7. The documents referenced in Paragraphs 46 are the best evidence and speak for 
themselves and Defendants deny the allegations which are contrary to the same. Defendants also 
deny the remaining allegations contained therein. 
38. The Defendants are without sufficient information to admit or deny the allegations 
contained in Parag-raph 4 7 and, therefore, deny the same. 
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39. The documents referenced in Paragraphs 48, 49. 50, 51 are the best evidence and 
speak for themselves and D!!fendants deny the allegations which are contrary to the same. 
Defendants also deny the remaining allegations contained therein. 
40. With respect to the allegations set forth in Paragraph 52 Defendants only admit 
Kosmann informed them he was unaware of the changes alleged in this paragraph. Defendants 
deny the remaining allegations contained therein. 
41. The documents referenced in Paragraphs 53~ 54 are the best evidence and speak for 
themselves and Defendants deny the allegations which are contrary to the same. Defendants also 
deny the remaining allegations contained therein. 
42. With respect to the allegations set forth in Paragraph 55 Defendants only admit 
Kosmann informed them Gilbride requested additional money at or near closing and state the 
documents and texts referenced therein are the best evidence and speal<: for themselves and 
Defendants deny the allegations which are contrary to the same. Defendants also deny the 
remaining allegations contained therein. 
43. With respect to the alleg;ations set.forth in Paragraph 56, Defendants only admit they 
became aware Gilbride had contacted the Canyon County Code Bnforcement and deny the 
remaining allegations contained therein as they are without sufficient information to admit or 
deny the same. 
44. With respect to the allegations set forth in Paragraph 57, Defendants only admit 
Kosmann informed them Gilbride photographed his property and deny the remaining allegations 
contained therein as they are without sufficient information to admit or deny the same. 
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45. Toe documents referenced in Paragraphs 58 are the best evidence and speak for 
themselves and Defendants deny the allegations which are contrary to the same. Defendants also 
deny the remaining allegations contained therein. 
46. With respect to the allegations set forth in Paragraph 59; Defendants only admit 
Kosmam1 informed them of these allegations. 
47. The docwnents refc:irenced in Paragraphs 60, 61 are the be.st evidence and speak for 
themselves and Defendants deny the allegations which are contrary to the same. Defendants also 
deny the remaining allegations contained therein. 
48. The Defend'1,nts are without sufficient information to admit ot deny the allegations 
contamed in Paragraph 62 and, therefore, deny the same. Defendants further deny to the extent 
the allegations call for a legal conclusion. 
49. Defendan~ deny the allegations in Paragraph 63 as they are without sufficient 
information to admit or deny the. same and because the documents referenced therein are the best 
evidence and speak for themselves. 
50. With respect to the allegations set forth in Paragraph 64, Defendants only admit the 
Idaho Supreme Court held in its December 2016 decision that the contract between Kosmann 
and Gilbride was illegal. Defendants deny the remaining allegations. 
51. The documents referenced in Paragraphs 65~ 66t 67 are the best evidence and speak 
for themselves and Defendants deny the allegations which are contrary to the same. Defendants 
also deny the remaining allegations·contained therein. 
52. Defendants deny the allegations in Paragraph 68 as they are without sufficient 
information to admit or deny the same and they call for.a legal conclusion. 
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53: The documents referenced in Paragraphs 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75 are the best 
evidence and speak for themselves and Defendants deny the allegations which are contrary to the 
same. Defendants also deny the remaining allegations contained therein. 
54. With i-espect to the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 76, 77, Defendants only admit 
the communication was recorded, state the audio recording is the best evidence and speaks for 
itself, and deny the allegations which are contrary to the same. 
55. Defendants deny the allegations in Paragraph 78 as they are without sufficient 
information to admit or deny the same and they call for a legal conclusion. · 
56. The documents referenced in Paragraph 79 are the best evidence and speak for 
themselves and Defendants deny the allegations which are contrary to the same. 
57. The voicemail referenced in Paragraph 80 is the best evidenqe and speak for 
themselves and Defendants deny the allegations which are contrary to the same. Defendants also 
deny the remaining allegations contained therein. 
58. With respect to the allegations contained in Part:1,graph 81, Defendants stated Mr. 
Arthur's deposition and trial testimony are th.e best evidence and speak for themselves and 
Defendants deny the allegations which are contrary to the same. Defendants further deny the 
allegations as they are without sufficient information to admit or deny the same. 
59. The documents referenced in Paragraph 82, 83,.84 are the best evidence and speak for 
themselves and Defendants deny the allegations which are contrary to the same. 
60. With respect to the allegations contained in Paragraph 85, the Defendants only admit 
Plaintiff retained Dinius & Associates, PLLC to represent him regarding Plaintiffs certain 
disputes between Plaintiff and Gilbride and state the referenced documents speak:s·for themselves 
and deny any allegation which is contrary to the- terms of the same. 
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61. Defendants deny the allegations in Paragraph 86 as they are without sufficiertt 
information to admit or deny the same and the allegations call for a legal conclusio11_ 
62. With respect to the allegations contained in Paragraph 87, the Defendants o:ttly admit 
Ron Shepherd represented Gilbride for a period of time. 
63. With respect to the allegations contained in Paragraph. 88, the Defendants state the 
referenced documents are the best evidence and speak for themselves and deny any allegation 
which is contrary to the terms of the same. Defendants also deny the remaining aliegations as 
they are without sufficient information to admit or deny the same. 
64. With respect to the allegations contained in Paragraphs 89, Defendants. state the 
referenced documents are the best evidence and speak for themselves and deny ·any allegation 
which is contrary to the terms of the same. 
65. With respect to the allegations contained in Paragraphs 90, Defendants state the 
referenced documents are the best evidence and speak for themselves and deny any allegation 
which is contrary to the tenns of the same. Defendants further deny the remaining ~llegations as 
they are factually inaccurate and/or call for a legal conclusion. 
66. Defendants deny the allegations in Paragraph 91 as they are without sufficient 
information to admit or deny the same and the allegations call for a legal conclusion. 
67. With respect to the allegations contained in Paragraph 92, Defendants state the 
referenced documents are the best evidence and sp~ak for themselves and deny any allegation 
which is contrary to the tenns of the same. · 
68. The Defendants deny the allegations contained in Paragraph 93. 
69. With respect to the allegations contained in Paragx:aph 94. Defendants state the 
referenced documents are the best evidence and speak for themselves and deny any allegation 
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which is contrary to the terms of the same. Defendants further deny the allegations as they call 
for a legal conclusion. 
70. The Defendants deny the allegations contained in Paragraph 95, 
71. The Defendants deny the allegations contained in Paragraphs 96 as they call for a 
legal conclusion; to the extent the allegations are contrary to the documents referenced therein, 
which documents speak for themselves, and because the Idaho Supreme Court ruled the contract 
between Kosmann and Gilbride was illegal. 
72. The Defendants deny the allegations contained in Paragraph 97. 
73. With respect to the allegations contained in Paragraphs 98, the Defendants only admit 
the communications were recorded, stated the recordings are the best evidence and speaking for 
themselves, and deny any allegations which are contrary to the same. 
74. With respect to the allegations contained in Paragraphs 99. the Defendants only admit 
Dinius & Associates, PLLC did not file litigation against McCarthy and specifically deny that 
Dinius & Associa,tes, PLLC was retained to file such litigation. 
75. With respect to the allegations contained in Paragraph 100, Defendants state the 
referenced documents are the best evidence and speak for themselves and deny any allegation 
which is contrary to the terms of the same. Defendants further deny the allegations as they call 
for a legal conclusion. 
76. Defendants deny the allegations in Paragraph 101 as they are without sufficient 
infonnation to admit or deny the same and the allegations call for a legal conclusion. 
77. Defendants deny the allegations contained in Paragraph 102. 
78. With respect to the allegations contained in Paragraphs 103, 104, I 05, Defendants 
state the referenced documents are the best evidence and speak for themselves and deny any 
ANSWER-11 
Page 94
03/22/2017 15:48 \~A>:)2083445800 P.013/024 
allegation which is contrary to ~e terms of the same. Defendants further deny the remaining 
allegations. 
79. With respect to the allegations contained in Paragraphs 106, the Defendants only 
admit Kevin Dinius communicated with Cameron Mc.Fadden. TI1e Defendants also state such 
communications speak for themselves and deny any allegations which are contrary to same. 
80. With respect to the allegations contained in Paragraph 107, Defendants state the 
referenced documents are the best evidence and speak for themselves and deny any allegation 
which is contrary to the terms of the same. Defendants further deny the remaining allegations. 
81. With respect to the allegations contained in Paragraph 108, Defendants state the 
testimony and court's findings are the best evidence and speak for themselves and deny any 
allegation which is contrary to the terms of the same. Defendants further deny the remai11ing 
allegations as they call for a legal conclusion. 
82. With respect to the allegations contained· in Paragraph I 09, Defendants state the 
referenced documents are the best evidence and speak for themselves and deny any allegation 
which is contrary to the terms of the same. 
83. With respect to the allegations contained in Paragraph 110, Defendants state the 
referenced :recording and testimony are the best evidence and speak for themselves and deny any 
allegation which is contrary to the terms of the same. 
84. With. respect to the allegations contained in Paragraph 111, the Defendants only admit 
the Complaint in the underlying litigation was filed on or about January 25, 2013, the trial 
occurred in January 2015, post-trial motions were filed, and a judgment was entered on or about 






factually inaccurate and/or the Defendants are without sufficient information to admit or deny 
the same. 
85. With respect to the allegations contained in Paragraph 112, Defendants state the audio 
recording, documents and testimony are the best evidence and speak for themselves and deny 
any allegation which is contrary to the terms of the same. 
86. With respect to the allegations contained in Paragraph 113, the Defendants only admit 
Kevin Dinius and Plaintiff met with an employee of the Canyon County Code Enforcement 
office and the office ultimately decided not to pursue any alleged code violations. Defendants 
deny the remaining allegations as they are without s1.iffici~nt information to admit or deny the 
same 
87. The Defendants deny the allegations contained in Paragraphs 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 
119, 120, 121, 122, 123 as they are without sufficient information to admit or deny the same, the 
allegations are factually inaccurate, and/or to the extent the allegations are contrary to the 
documents referenced therein, which dociunents speak for themselves. 
88. With regard to the allegations set forth in Paragraph 124, Defendants only admit 
Kosmann did not move out and deny the remaining alle:gations contained therein. 
89. With respect to the allegations contained in Paragraph 125, the Defendants only admit 
Gilbride filed an unlawful detainer action against Plaintiff, Kevin Dinius represented Plaintiff in 
that matter, that matter was dismissed, Kevin Dinius rightfully billed for the time he spent on that 
matter, and Gilbride pai<i Dinius' fees as ordeted by the Court. Defendants deny the remaining 
allegations contained therein. as they are factually inaccurate, the Defendants are without 
sufficient information to admit or deny the same and/or to the extent the allegations are contrary 
to the documents referenced therein, which documents speak for themselves. 
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90. With respect to the allegations contained in Paragraph 126, the Defendants only admit 
Gilbride entered the property where Plaintiff resided without Plaintiff's permission and that 
Kevin Dinius communicated with law enforcement· and Ron Sheperd regarding the same. 
Defendants deny the remaining allegations contained therein as they are without sufficient 
information to admit or deny the same and/or to the extent the. allegations are contrary to the 
documents referenced therein, which documents speak for themselves. 
91. With respect to the allegations contained in Paragraphs 127, Defendants state the 
referenced testimony is the best evidence an~ speaks for itself and deny any allegations contrary 
to the same. Defendants further deny the allegations contained therein as they are without 
sufficient information to admit or deny the same. 
92. Toe Defendants deny the allegations contained in Paragraphs 128, 129 as they are 
without sufficient information to admit or deny the same. 
93. The Defendants deny the allegations contained in Paragraphs 130 as the allegations 
are factually inaccurate, they seek a legal conclusion and/or to the extent the allegations are 
contrary to the docume11ts referenced therein, which docUillents speak for themselves. 
94. The Defendants deny the allegations con:tained in Paragraphs 131, 132, 133 as they 
are without sufficient information to admit or deny the same. 
95. The Defendants deny the allegations contained in. Paragraph 134. 
96. With respect to the allegations.containt')d in Paragraphs 135, 136, the Defendants state 
the court record and documents filed therein are the best evidence and speak for themselves and 
deny any allegations which are contrary to the same. 
97. The Defendants deny the allegations contained in Paragraph 137. 
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98. The Defendants deny the allegations contained in Paragraphs 138 as the allegations 
are factually inaccurate and/or the Defendants are without sufficient information to admit or 
deny the same. 
99. The Defendants deny the allegations contained in Paragraph 139 to the extent the 
allegations are contrary to the trial transcript, which speaks for itself. 
100. The Defendants deny the allegations contained in Paragraphs 140, 141, 142, 143~ 
144, 145 as they are without sufficient information to admit or deny the same and/or to the extent 
the allegations are contrary to the trial transcript, which speaks for· itself. 
IO 1. The Defendants deny the. allegations contained in Paragraph 146. 
102. The Defendants deny the allegations contained in Paragraphs 147, 148, 149, 150, 
151, 152, 153, 154 as the allegations seek a legal conclusion, are factually inaccurate, and to the 
extent the allegations are contrary to the referenced documents, various transcripts and the 
court's findings, which speak for themselves and are the best evidence. 
103. With regard to the allegations contained in Paragraph 155 Defendants state the 
trial transcript and court's findings are the best evidence and speak for themselves and deny any 
allegations which are contrary to the same. 
104. With regard to the allegations contained in Paragraph 156, Defendants state the 
trial transcript an.d court's findings are the best evidence and speak for themselves and deny any 
allegf!,tions which are contrary to the same. 
105. Defendru.1ts deny the allegations contained in Paragraph 157, 158. 
106. With regard to the allegations contained in Paragraph 159, Defendants deny that 
Kosmann had any wealthy benefactors. 
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l 07. The Defendants deny the allegations contained in Paragraph 160 as the allegations 
seek a legal conclusion and are factually inaccurate. 
108. With regard to the allegations contained in Paragraph 161; Defendants state the 
court's rulings, written decisions, and orders are the best evidence and speak for themselves and 
deny any allegations which.are contrary to the same. 
109. The Defendants deny the allegations contained in Paragraph 162 as the allegations 
seek a legal conclusion. and are factually inaccurate 
110. The Defendants admit the allegations contained in Paragraph 163. 
111. The Defendants deny the allegations contained in Paragraphs 164 as the 
allegations seek a legal conclusion and are factually inaccurate. 
112. With respect to :the allegations contained in Paragraphs 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 
170, 171 .the Defendants only admit Judge Kerrick entered her Memorandum Decision 
Following Court Trial and Judgment on March. 30, 2015, states the documents speak for 
themselves,· and deny the allegations to .the extent they are contrary to the documents. The 
Defendants also deny the remaining allegations as they seek a legal conclusion. 
113. With respept to the allegations contained in P!itagrapb 172, the Defendants only 
admit Dinius and Associates, PL.LC spoke with Gilbride's counsel and reached an agreement on 
behalf of Plaintiff that Plaintiff would move from the property by the end of April 2015. 
Defendants deny the remaining allegations as they are without sufficient information to admit or 
deny the same. 
114. The Defendants deny the allegations contained in Paragraph 173 to the extent they 
are without sufficient information to ~d:mit or deny the same; the allegations are factually 
inaccurate, and/or the allegations call for a legal conclusi9n. Defendants also state the 
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documents referenced therein are the best evidence and speak for themselves, and deny the 
allegations to the extent they are contrary to the documents. 
115. The Defendants deny the allegations contained in Paragraphs 17 4, 17 5, 17 6, 177, 
178, 179, 180, 181 to the extent they are without sufficient information to admit or deny the 
same; the allegations are factually inaccurate, and/or the allegations call for a legal conclusion. 
116. The Defendants deny the allegations contained in Paragraph 180 to the extent they 
are without sufficient information to admit or deny the same; the allegations are factually 
inaccurate, and/or the allegations call for a legal conclusion. Defendants also state the 
documents referenced therein are the best evidence and speak for themselves, and deny the 
allegations to the extent they are contrary to the documents. 
117. The Defendants deny the allegations contained in Paragraph 181 to the extent they 
are without sufficient information to admit or deny the · same; the allegations are factually 
inaccurate, and/or the allegations call for a legal conclusion. 
118. With respect to the allegations contained in Paragraph 1821 the Defendants only 
admit Judge Kerrick entered an Order on Motions to Disallow Costs and Fees on June 18, 2015, 
state that the Order and other court filings speaks for themselves, and deny the allegations to the 
extent they are contrary to the same. 
119. With respect to the allegations contained in Paragraphs 183, 184, the Defendants 
state the documents referenced therein are the best evidence and speak for themselves and deny 
any allegations which are contrary to the same. Defendants also deny the remaining allegations. 
120. Defendants deny the allegations cqntained in Paragraph 185. 
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121. With respect to the allegations contained in Paragraph 186, the Defendants only 
admit, with Plaintiff's consent, Dinius filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff's appeal and the Idaho 
Supreme Court approved such dismissal. Defendants deny the remaining allegations. 
122. The Defendants deny the allegations contained in Paragraph 187 and state the 
Idaho Supreme Court ruled the contract between Kosmann and Gilbride was illegal. 
123. The allegations contained in Paragraphs 188 call for a legal conclusion and the 
Defendants, therefore, deny the same. 
124. The Defendants deny the allegations contained in Paragraph 189. 
125. Defendants deny the allegations contained in Paragraphs 190, 191 as they call for 
a legal conclusion and/or the Defendants are without sufficient information to admit or deny the 
same. 
126. Defendants deny the allegations contained in Paragraphs 192, 193, 194, 195, I 96, 
197, 198, I 99 as they are factually inaccurate, they call for a legal conclusion, andlor the 
Defendants are without sufficient information to admit or deny the same. 
127. With respect to the allegations contained in Paragraphs 200, 201, 202, 203, the 
Defendants state the appellate and trial record speak for themselves and deny the allegations to 
the extent they are contrary to the same. Defendants further deny these allegations as they are 
factually inaccurate, they call for a legal conclusion, and/or the Defendants are without sufficient 
information to admit or deny the same. 
128. Defendants deny the allegations contained in Paragraphs 204, 205, 206 as they 
call for a legal conclusion and/or the Defendants are without sufficient information to admit or 
deny the same. 
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129. With respect to the allegations contained in Paragraphs 207, 208, 209, 210 
Defendants only admit Dinius & Associates incurred over $100,000 in fees and costs in 
representing Plaintiff; and sought to collect such sums from Plaintiff in compliance with the 
parties' agreement. The Defendants deny the remaining allegations to the extent they are 
factually inaccurate and/or call for a legal conclusion. 
130. Defendants deny the allegations contained in Paragraph 211. 
131. TI1e Defendants deny the allegations contained in Paragraph 212. Defendants also 
state that the allegations are inadmissible pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence 408. 
132. Defendants deny the allegations·contained in Paragraphs 213,214 as they call for 
a legal conclusion, th~y are factually inaccurate and/or the Defendants are without sufficient 
information to admit or deny the saine. 
133. The Defendants deny the allegations contained in Paragraph 215. 
134. With regard to the allegations contained in Paragraph 216, Defendants state the 
document referenced therein is the best evidence and speaks for itself and deny the allegations to 
the e:x:tent they are contrary to the same. 
135. With regard to the allegations con~ained in Paragraph 217, Defendants state the 
arbitration agreement referenced therein speaks for itself and deny the a.llegations to the extent 
they ai·e contrary to the same. Defendants further deny the allegations as they call for a legal 
conclusion and to the extent they are factually inaccurate. 
136. With regard to the allegations contained in Paragraph 218, Defendants only admit 
Kevin Dinius and Plaintiff entered into the arbitration agreement in approximately January 2016. 
Defendants deny the remaining allegations as they call for a legal conclusion and/or to the extent 
they are facmally inacc1..irate. 
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137. With regard to the allegations contained in Paragraphs 219,220, Defendants only 
admit the parties agreed to proceed with the arbitration; an arbitration panel was assigned; Dinius 
took the position that the arbitration must proceed in compliance with the plain meaning of the 
arbitration agreement; and Plaintiff threatened to file a malpractice action. Defendants also state 
the arbitration agreement and vmtten communications speak: for themselves and deny the 
allegations to the extent they are contrary to the same. Defendants deny the remaining 
allegations as they call for a legal conclusion and/or to the extent th~y are factually'inaccurate 
138. The Defendants deny the allegations contained in Paragraphs 221. 222, 223, 2241 
225, 226 as they call for a le~al conclusion and are factually inaccurate. 
139. The Defendants deny the allegations ·contained in Plaintiffs Request for Attorney 
Fees and prayer for relief as they caH for a legal conclusion and are factually in.accurate. 
THIRD DEFENSE 
The Plaintiff has waived, or by his conduct, is estopped from asserting the causes of 
action contained in his Complaint. 
FOURTH DEFENSE 
The Plaintiff has, and/or continues to have, the ability and opportunity to mitigate the 
damages alleged 'With respect to the subject matter of this action, and has failed to mitigate said 
damages, if any, were in fact incurred. 
FIFTH DEFENSE 
Plaintiff's alleged losses ·oi- injuries, if any, were caused by the intervening acts and 
omissions of other third persons for whom the Defendants bear no responsibility. 
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· SIXTH DEFENSE 
Other third persons, not in the Defendants• control, were guilty of negligent, careless, 
reckless, or intentional misconduct at the time of and in connection with the matters and dam.ages 
alleged which misconduct on their part proximately ca.used and/or contributed to said events and 
the Plaintiffs' resultant damages, if any. 
SEVENTH DEFENSE 
The Defendants are immune from suit under the doctrine of judgmental immunity. 
EIGHTH DEFENSE 
A portion or all of the Plaintiff's claims are barred by I.C. § 5-219. 
NINTH DEFENSE 
Plaintiff was guilty of negligent, careless, reckless, or intentional misconduc~ at the time 
of and in connection with the matters and damages alleged, which misconduct on their part 
proximately caused and contributed to said events and resultant dam.ages, if any. 
TENTH DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs claims are barred by the parties' arbitration agreement. 
ELEVENTH DEFENSE 
Plamtiff' s Complaint was filed in violation of Rule 11, Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
TWELFTH DEFENSE 
Plaintiff's claims are barred, at least in p~ by the Idaho Supreme Court's ruling that the 
contract between Gilbride and Kosmamrwas illegal. 
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THIRTEENTH DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs claims are barred1 at least in part, because, pursuant to Idaho law, the statute of 
limitations regarding claims against Justin McCarthy did not run until well after Dinius & 
Associates, PLLC's representation of the Plaintiff ended. 
FOURTEENTH DEFENSE 
Plaintiff has waived, or by its conduct is estopped from asserting, the causes of action 
contained in its Complaint. 
FIFTEENTH DEFENSE 
The Defendants reserve the right to assert any additional affirmative defenses and matters 
in avoidance that may be disclosed in the course of additional investigation and discovery, 
including without limitation, comparative negligence1 statute of limitations, walver/estoppel, 
superseding/intervening cause, negligence of a third-party not in the Defendants' control and 
setoff. 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
These Defendants demand a jury trial as to all issues. 
PRAYERS FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, with respect to Plaintiffs Complaint, Defendants pray Plaintiff take 
nothing by his Complaint, that the same be dismissed, and that Defendants be awarded costs of 
suit and attorney fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-121, Rule 54, Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and all 




DATED this 22th day of March, 2017. 
'~445800 P.0241024 
By_~-------------
Robert A. Anderson 
Yvonne A_ Dunbar, Of the Finn 
Attomeys for Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 22nd day of March, 2017, I served a true and co:r:rect 
copy of the foregoing ANSWER by delivering the same to each of the following attorneys of 
record, by the method indicated below, addressed as follows: 
Loren K. Messerly 
GREENER BURKE SHOEMAKER 
OBERRECHT, P.A. 
950 W Bannock St~ Ste 950· 
Boise, ID 83 702 
T: (208) 319-2600 
F: (208) 319-2601 
E lmesserly@greenerlaw.com 
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CANYON COUNTY ~!,K 
T. CRAWFORD, D!r-u,' 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
DAVID A. KOSMANN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KEVIN DINIUS, an individual; and DINIUS 
& AS SOCIA TES, PLLC, an Idaho 
professional limited liability company, 
Defendants. 
) 
) CASE NO. CV 2017-568*C 
) 
) 













The Court, having reviewed the above entitled matter, determines that this 
case is appropriate for mediation; 
The Court hereby appoints Stephen S. Dunn, District Judge, to serve as mediator 
in this matter. The parties who are fully authorized to resolve the dispute shall attend. 
The mediation is scheduled for July 26, 2017, at 9:00 A.M. at the Canyon 
County Courthouse, Caldwell, Idaho. 
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All named parties and any unnamed party claiming an interest in the case, or their 
agents with full authority to settle, together with the attorneys responsible for handling 
the trial in this case are ordered to be present for the entire mediation conference pursuant 
to I.R.C.P. 16(k:)(10) unless otherwise excused by mediator or the Court upon a showing 
of good cause. 
Each party must submit a mediation statement so that it is received by Judge 
Dunn no later than July 18, 2017, by mail to the Bannock County address listed below or 
by e-mail to secth@canyonco.org. The mediation statement should outline 1) the 
pertinent facts, 2) the issues to be resolved, 3) the strengths and weaknesses of your 
position, 4) the current status of the litigation, and 5) the current settlement 
positions. Please feel free to provide additional information or documents which you 
would like Judge Dunn to review, but note that there is limited time to read volumes of 
information. Voluminous documents should be sent by mail or overnight (so as to be 
received by the date set forth above) to Judge Dunn at the Bannock County Courthouse, 
624 E. Center, Room 302, Pocatello, ID 83201. 
Also attached are a Mediation Agreement and the Rules of Mediation, for your 
review. The parties and their attorneys will be expected to sign the Mediation Agreement 
at the beginning of the mediation. The Judge will expect full compliance with both the 
Mediation Agreement and the Rules of Mediation. All parties and insurance 
representatives, if any, with settlement authority, must be physically present at the 
mediation unless excused by Judge Dunn in advance, after discussions with both sides. A 
stipulation by the parties to allow a party or representative to participate by telephone is 
not permitted unless Judge Dunn also agrees. The parties should make a full disclosure 
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of all special dam.ages claimed, if any, so there is not a dispute or surprise at the 
mediation about that part of any claim. 
Within seven (7) days following the last mediation session, the mediator or the parties 
shall advise the court, with a copy to the parties, only as to whether the case has, in whole 
or in part, settled. If the case is settled by mediation, within twenty-eight (28) days of a 
mediated final settlement, plaintiff shall dismiss the underlying action with or without 
prejudice as the parties agree. 
DATED: ""S';11, l~t,ot1 · 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) ss 
COUNTY OF CANYON ) 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was 
forwarded to the following: 
Hon. Stephen S. Dunn 
Sixth District Court 
624 E. Center Street, Room 220 
Pocatello, ID 83201 
Phone: (208) 236-7250 
FAX: (208) 236-7208 
E-Mail Address: stephend@bannockcounty.us 
Loren K. Messerly 
GREENER BURKE SHOEMAKER OBERRECHT, P.A. 
950 W Bannock St, Ste 950 
Boise, ID 83 702 
Robert A. Anderson 
Yvonne A. Dunbar 
ANDERSON JULIAN & HULL, LLP 
250 S 5th St, Ste 700 
PO Box 7426 
Boise, ID 83707-7426 
Either by depositing the same in the U.S. mail, first class postage prepaid, or by personal 
service. 
DATED this \ ~ day of June, 2017. 
Chris Yamamoto 
Clerk of the District Court 
7v': 
by Deputy Clerk of the Court 
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Robert A. Anderson, ISB No. 2124 
Yvonne A. Dtmbar, ISB No. 7200 
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP 
C. W. Moore Plaza 
250 South Fifth Street, Suite 700 
Post Office Box 7426 
Boise, Idaho 83707-7426 
Telephone: (208) 344-5800 
Facsimile: (208) 344~5510 
E-Mail: ra.ande.rson@ajhla.w.com 
ydunbar@ajblaw.com 
Attorneys for Defendant 
I -
~ A.~~Moos 
AUS ... 2 2011 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD ruDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUN1Y OF CANYON 
DA V1D A. KOSMANN, 
Plaintiffs, . 
vs. 
KEVIN DINIUS an individual; and DINIUS & 
ASSOCIATES, PLLC, an Idaho professional 
limited liability company, 
Defendants. 
CaseNo. CV-2017-568 
MQTION TO ENFORCE 
SETTLEMENT 
COMES NOW, Defendants, by and through their attorneys of record, Anderson, Julian & 
Hull, LLP, respectfully moves this Court for an Order enforcing the settlement which was 
reached during the July 26, 2017 mediation in the current matter. . 
lbis motion is based upon the record,, the July 26, 2017 audio recording, and a 
mem6randum and affidavit which will be filed prior to the hearing. As the parties' settlement 
includes a confidentiality clause~ the memorandum and affidavit will be ;filed under seal. 
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The Defendants request oral argument in a closed hearing due to the confidential nature 
of the settlement terms. 
DATED this 2nd· day of August, 2017. 
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP 
A. Anderson 
A. Dunbar, Of the Firm 
'S for Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 2nd day of Au.gust, 2017, I served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing by delivering the same to each of the following attorneys of record, by the 
method indicated below, addressed as follows: 
Loren K. Messerly 
The BRISA Law Group, PA 
205 N. 10th Street, Ste. 300 
Boise, ID 83 702 
T: {208)·342-5522 
F: {208) 342-7672 
E loren@erisalawgroup.com 
Counsel for Plaintiff 
MOTION TO ENFORCE SETTLEMENT- 2 
0 U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
D Hand-Delivered 




08/?2/2017 17:42 FAX 2083427t.._......1 
Loren K. Messerly, ISB # 7434 
205 N. 10th Street, Ste. 300 
Telephone (208) 342~5522 
Facsimile (208) 3427672 
loren@erisalawgroup.com 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
igf002/003 
L E D A.M. ____ P.M. 
AUG - 3 2017 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
TPETERSON.PEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 




Case No. CV17-00568 
Presiding Judge: Gene A. Petty 
CROSS.MOTION TO ENFORCE 
KEVIN DINIUS an individual; and DINIUS & SETTLEMENT 
ASSOCIATES, PLLC, an Idaho professional 
limited liability company, 
Defendant. 
Plaintiff, David A. Kosmann, by and through his attorney of record, Loren K. Messerly, 
hereby moves this Court for an Order enforcing the settlement which was reached during the 
July 26, 2017 mediation in the current matter. 
The motion is based upon the record, the July 26, 2017 audio recording, and a 
memorandum and affidavit which will be filed prior to the hearing. 
DA TED this rl day of August, 2017. 
Loren K. Messerly ·-----r""" 
~ttomey for Pl · tiff, David osmann 
......... , ... ...--••'~ 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I caused to be served the foregoing Cross~Motion to Enforce 
Settlement on the following named person(s) on the date indicated below, in the manner 
indicated below: 
Robert A. Anderson 
Yvonne A. Dunbar 
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP 
250 S. Fifth Street, Suite 700 
P. 0. Box 7426 
Boise, Idaho 83707-7426 
Attorneys for Defendants 
f' \\ o\ 





D Overnight Delivery 
D Email / iCourt: raande.rson@aihlaw.com; 
ydunbar@ajhlaw.com 
Loren K. Messerly 
\. 
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Loren K. Messerly, ISB # 7434 
Messerly Law, PLLC 
205 N. 10th Street, Ste. 300 
Telephone (208) 342-5522 
Facsimile (208) 3427672 
loren@erisalawgroup.com 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
F 1A.k~.M. 
AUG 3 1 2017 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
L. HALE, DEPUTY CLERK 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 




KEVIN DINIUS an individual; and DINIUS & 
ASSOCIATES, PLLC, an Idaho professional 
limited liability company, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV17-00568 
Presiding Judge: Gene A. Petty 
SUPPLEMENTAL DECLARATION 
OF DAVID A. KOSMANN 
I, David Kosmann, make this declaration, pursuant to LC. § 9-1406 and I declare under 
penalty of perjury pursuant to the law of the State ofldaho the following is true and correct: 
1. I am the Plaintiff in the above-captioned matter, and make this declaration based 
upon my own personal knowledge. I previously submitted a declaration that described how the 
mediation proceeded in this case and this is an attempt to supplement regarding certain facts that 
I did not previously understand to be important. 
2. We settled the case around l or 2 pm for $40,000 plus a mutual release and 
confidentiality and non-disparagement agreement. The only issue in dispute was whether my 
release would also include my attorney, Mr. Messerly. 
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3. For the next 1-2 hours we debated this issue. During that debate, Judge Dunn 
repeatedly told us that the other side believed we already had an enforceable agreement because 
we had not timely raised the release for Mr. Messerly prior to agreeing on all other terms. We 
disagreed. Judge Dunn repeatedly said he agreed with the other side. Judge Dunn went back and 
forth between the two rooms many times. During all of that time, the opposing side repeatedly 
said that they might withdraw their offer and the whole mediation might be a waste of time if we 
did not drop this release for Mr. Messerly. Again, they said this many times. They never 
withdrew their offer because this was the threat they had over our head. 
4. My attorney called various people to figure out if there was anything improper 
with me asking for this release to include him. Eventually, after approximately two hours 
debating this issue, Mr. Messerly got off the phone with bar counsel and instructed me that I 
should drop the release issue and just go accept the standing offer. 
5. So, I went in the hall and met with Judge Dunn. The first thing I told him was that 
we were accepting the offer of $40,000 and the other terms already agreed upon except for we 
were dropping the release for Mr. Messerly. Judge Dunn said great. Then I said that I also 
wanted to meet with Mr. Dinius and see if he would also give me his word orally that he would 
not sue Mr. Messerly, not as part of the agreement. Judge Dunn went into the room with the 
opposing counsel and then returned and said that Dinius would not do that. I then asked if he 
would at least tell me that he had no plans to sue Mr. Messerly. Again, Judge Dunn went into the 
other room and then returned and said Dinius would not agree. So, then I asked him to convey 
that I just wanted a chance to talk to Dinius. Again, I had already told Judge Dunn that the deal 
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was resolved. This was just a meeting to talk and make sure we were not enemies after this 
litigation. 
6. During the meeting, I cannot remember who brought it up first, but eventually 
Dinius suggested that if I dropped $8,000 off the settlement, then he would give the written 
release that I had been asking for. I agreed. Dinius never mentioned that the $8,000 would 
actually go to him. 
DATED, this 1:;i\ ~tday of August, 201 
_J--- --
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I caused to be served the foregoing Supplemental Declaration 
of David A. Kosmann on the following named person(s) on the date indicated below, in the 
manner indicated below: 
Robert A. Anderson 
Yvonne A. Dunbar 
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP 
250 S. Fifth Street, Suite 700 
P. 0. Box 7426 
Boise, Idaho 83707-7426 
Attorneys for Defendants 
DATED this tn\ctX'day of August, 2017. 
D U.S.Mail 
0 Facsimile: 344-5510 
0 Hand Delivery 
D Overnight Delivery 
JZl. Email / iCourt: raanderson@ajhlaw.com; 
ydunbar@ajhlaw.com 
Loren K. Messerly 
SUPPLEMENT AL DECLARATION OF DAVID A. KOSMANN • Page 4 
Page 118
Loren K. Messerly, ISB # 7434 
Messerly Law, PLLC 
205 N. 10th Street, Ste. 300 
Telephone (208) 342-5522 
Facsimile (208) 3427672 
loren@erisalawgroup.com 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
F I ~~?@Z,Q,M. 
AUG 3 1 2017 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
L HALE, DEPUTY CLERK 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 




KEVIN DINIUS an individual; and DINIUS & 
ASSOCIATES, PLLC, an Idaho professional 
limited liability company, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CVl 7-00568 
Presiding Judge: Gene A. Petty 
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF IN 
SUPPORT OF DAVID KOSMANN'S 
MOTION TO ENFORCE 
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
Plaintiff, David A. Kosmann, by and through his attorney of record, Loren K. Messerly 
of Messerly Law, PLLC, hereby files the following Supplemental Brief in Support of David 
Kosmann's Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement in the current matter. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Dinius's Claimed Settlement Is Void For Public Policy. 
The settlement agreement that Dinius is trying to enforce is unenforceable for one clear 
reason. It is a contract that is invalid for violation of public policy. See Kosmann v. Gilbride, 
filed December 12, 2016, Opinion No. 146 (Idaho 2016) ("if a contract is void against public 
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policy, then the court will refuse to enforce it and will leave the parties in the identical situation 
in which it found them.") (quoting Trees v. Kersey, 138 Idaho 3, 56 P.3d 765, 774 (2002)). 
Here, there is clear public policy that lawyers are not allowed to meet alone with 
clients who are represented by attorneys unless consent is first obtained from the other lawyer 
(not from the client). Rule 4.2 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure makes this abundantly clear: 
RULE 4.2: COMMUNICATION WITH PERSON REPRESENTED BY 
COUNSEL 
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of the 
representation with a person the lawyer knows to be represented by another 
lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is 
authorized to do so by law or a court order. 
The commentary explains the spirit and purpose of the rule: 
[1] This Rule contributes to the proper functioning of the legal system by 
protecting a person who has chosen to be represented by a lawyer in a matter 
against possible overreaching by other lawyers who are participating in the 
matter, interference by those lawyers with the client-lawyer relationship and the 
uncounselled disclosure of information relating to the representation. 
[2] This Rule applies to communications with any person who is represented by 
counsel concerning the matter to which the communication relates. 
[3] The Rule applies even though the represented person initiates or consents to 
the communication. 
(emphasis added.) Here it is undisputed from the facts that this rule was violated and the 
violation is the reason why the settlement that Dinius wants to enforce was reached. 
Kosmann and Messerly both state unequivocally in their affidavits that Messerly had no 
idea that his client was meeting with the opposing client Dinius, who is an attorney and subject 
to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Dinius was "representing a client." He was representing 
himself. He was. an Idaho licensed attorney who was representing himself in that moment pro 
bono. He cannot get around the rule by saying he was not representing a client. He was clearly 
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... ._..,1 
representing himself , a client. in tryjng to settle his own lawsuit and he claims he reached an 
enforceable agreement through his secret meeting. Clearly he falls within the plain language of 
Rule 4.2. The Court caught me off guard during the hearing and this is a main reason why this 
brief must be submitted to clarify that the plain language of the rule clearly applies to Dinius. 
Dinius also falls within the spirit and intent of the rule. Kosmann states unequivocally 
that Dinius used that secret meeting to bad mouth Messerly, to accuse Messerly of malpractice, 
and to claim that he would have better represented Kosmann in all the last two years of litigation. 
Dinius used his expertise to trick Kosmann into giving up $8,000 in exchange for a valueless 
release that Dinius had been saying for hours was unethical for him to give and for Messerly to 
accept. Dinius did not disclose that this money would actually go to Dinius and not back to the 
insurance company. Kosmann was a layman who had no clue that Dinius was not supposed to be 
meeting with him without first talking to Messerly and getting the consent. Had Messerly been in 
the room, he would have prevented Kosmann from giving up $8,000 in exchange for a worthless 
release that Messerly had already rejected and would again reject on the record. 
So, Dinius did exactly what the rules say Rule 4.2 is supposed to prevent: overreaching 
by a lawyer against a lay person client and interference by the lawyer with Kosmann's client-
lawyer representation with Messerly. Dinius used his legal process to further take advantage of 
Kosmann, which is exactly what the rule is supposed to protect. 
Dinius admits he did not get the consent, did not ask anyone if anyone had obtained 
consent, and instead just assumed he had Messerly's consent. In other words, Dinius is claiming 
it was accidental. The rule, however, does not condone any "accidents." The plain language says 
"shall not" and requires "consent" not assumed consent. Rule 8.4 states that it is "professional 
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misconduct for a lawyer to: violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct ... " 
Note that there is not an intent requirement for there to be professional misconduct. 
In addition, it is not credible that Dinius thought it was okay to meet with Kosmann 
without first making sure Mr. Messerly was on board. As this Court is well aware, Mr. Messerly 
has absolutely no trust for Dinius, believes he is highly unethical, and never would have allowed 
this secret meeting. Dinius could not have actually believed consent was obtained. Dinius did not 
even try to ask if it had been obtained. Dinius did not ask because he did not want to know the 
answer and he did not want to ask my consent because he knew I would not give it. 
In addition, this is not a little known rule. This rule is the first thing an attorney learns in 
law school. You don't get to meet with other represented clients and try to take advantage of 
their lack of knowledge of the law. Dinius cannot claim ignorance or accident. Attorneys know 
from day 1 that they are required to make sure and go the extra mile to make sure that they are 
not communicating with a represented party without their attorney present. 
Dinius is doing much more than just claiming it was an accident. He is claiming that 
because it was an accident, he gets to enforce the settlement that he brokered by egregiously 
violating the rules. In his affidavit, Dinius has no apology for violating the rule and instead 
demands that the Court sanction his actions by enforcing the settlement he brokered in secret. 
This further shows that Dinius is purposely trying to violate the rules and benefit from it. 
Ms. Dunbar sanctioned all of this. In her affidavit she also admits she knew it was 
happening and did nothing to see if consent had been obtained. She, like Dinius, doubles down 
on her client's rules violation by claiming it was not a violation of Rule 4.2 despite the plain 
language of the rule and the plain purpose of the rule. She asks the Court to enforce a settlement 
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that was reached solely because Dinius violated his ethical rules and took advantage of a lay 
person through a secret meeting. Again, this is an egregious violation of the rules and for Ms. 
Dunbar to claim otherwise is disturbing. See IRPC 8.4 Misconduct ("It is professional 
misconduct for a lawyer to: ... knowingly assist [another attorney to violate the rules of 
professional conduct] ... "). 
Those actions by Dinius and Dunbar cannot be sanitized merely because Kosmann then 
chose to follow through with putting that settlement on the record. As stated in Messerly's and 
Kosmann's affidavits, Kosmann only went through with putting it on the record because he faced 
a Sophie's choice of letting 7 hours of mediation fail and then trying to enforce the prior 
settlement agreement through many more weeks of stress and against Judge Dunn who was 
clearly stating that he believed the $32,000 settlement was enforceable and not the $40,000 
settlement. As the Idaho Supreme Court stated in both Kosmann v. Gilbride and Trees v. Kersey: 
"if a contract is void against public policy, then the court will refuse to enforce it and will leave 
the parties in the identical situation in which it found them." 
II. The Court Should Enforce the $40,000 Settlement 
Where the Court '•found them" is with an offer and acceptance regarding the $40,000 
Settlement. Kosmann has now submitted a supplemental affidavit. That affidavit says that when 
he left the room, he first specifically told Judge Dunn that they were accepting the $40,000 offer 
and all other terms, including no release for Mr. Messerly. Kosmann and Messerly both made 
clear that this was a standing offer for many hours that was never withdrawn (rather the opposing 
counsel threatened to withdraw it and also claimed that it was already a final offer and 
acceptance.) 
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Kosmann then asked to meet with Dinius to see if Dinius would just give him his word 
"face to face", separate and apparent from the written settlement, that he would not sue Mr. 
Messerly. Ms. Dunbar and Dinius both confirm that this is what the mediator conveyed to them: 
no written release was requested, Kosmann just wanted to see if Dinius would "look him in the 
eye and promise he would not sue Messerly." Then they say Kosmann wanted Mr. Dinius to say 
he had no present intention to sue Mr. Messerly. Then Kosmann said he just wanted to talk to 
Dinius. This is all consistent with Kosmann's testimony that he told Judge Dunn the case was 
settled and just wanted to see if Mr. Dinius would sit down and talk with him. 
So, the evidence is that there was a standing offer, for many hours, for a $40,000 
settlement plus a confidentiality agreement and non-disparagement clause and mutual releases, 
but without a release Mr. Messerly. Kosmann then conveyed the acceptance of that offer to the 
mediator, who was the person who was conveying all offers and acceptances between the parties. 
That was a proper acceptance. It is that agreement that this Court should enforce. 
III. Dinius's Claims of Messerly's Malpractice Regarding Kosmann Are Specious 
Messerly must also address the continued false accusations that Messerly committed 
malpractice by letting the statute of limitation run regarding Kosmann's claims against his 
realtor. Again, as of March 30, 2017, Kosmann had filed a breach of contract case against his 
realtors in Case No. CVOl-17-05897 in the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho. That 
breach of contract claim incorporated statutory duties that the realtor violated that are part of the 
Seller's Representation Agreement. The Idaho Supreme Court had already ruled that those 
statutory duties were part of a written contract and thus subject to a 5 year statute of limitation. 
See Path to Help, LLP v. Long, 161 Idaho 50,383 P.3d 1220, 1228-29 (2016). Two very capable 
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attorneys for the Defendants in that lawsuit never filed a motion to dismiss that contract claim 
based on a statute of limitation. Eventually, they paid $50,000 to have the case settled (which is 
confidential, subject to a carve out for this case, but should not be discussed outside of this 
litigation). That should be evidence enough that Dinius had no basis to allege malpractice against 
me or to tell my client in a secret meeting that I had committed malpractice. Dinius disparaged 
me to my client, falsely no less, in order to help obtain a settlement to get him an additional 
$8,000. In addition, as stated in Messerly's affidavit, he stated to Ms. Dunbar that he was no 
longer claiming anything against Dinius for not filing the lawsuit against the realtors, which Ms. 
Dunbar does not deny. 
IV. If the Court Chooses Not to Enforce Either Agreement, Then It Should At Least 
Release Kosmann's Funds. 
The Court has Messerly's affidavit that spells out exactly where Dinius left Kosmann 
after the failed litigation against Gilbride. Dinius's actions were completely unfair to his client. 
The Court should release Kosmann's funds. The Court is allowing Dinius to use those funds as 
leverage for settlement, which is improper. Kosmann has given the Court numerous reasons why 
it should exercise its discretion to not hold those fees subject to a lien, including the fact that 
Dinius has been paid over $50,000 in exchange for leaving Kosmann's life in a shambles. Dinius 
should not also be allowed to have a lien on Kosmann's money that Dinius did not win for 
Kosmann. Messerly is the attorney who won release of those funds for Kosmann, by winning the 
appeal that Dinius abandoned. Kosmann and Dinius should be put on equal terms for mediating 
the malpractice case, rather than the Court giving Dinius unequal leverage by keeping 
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Kosmann's funds tied up. Dinius has not had to post any funds during the litigation to protect 
against the possibility that he will be liable. 
ren K. Messerly 
omey for Plaintif£ David A. Kosmann 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I caused to be served the foregoing Supplemental Brief in 
Support of David Kosmann's Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement on the following 
named person(s) on the date indicated below, in the manner indicated below: 
Robert A. Anderson 
Yvonne A. Dunbar 
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP 
250 S. Fifth Street, Suite 700 
P. 0. Box 7426 
Boise, Idaho 83707-7426 
Attorneys for Defendants 
DATED this~/tif;;:iy of August, 2017. 
LJ U.S.Mail 
~ Facsimile: 344-5510 
D Hand Delivery 
D Overnight Delivery 
~ Email / iCourt: raanderson@ajhlaw.com; 
ydunbar@aihlaw.com 
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aA.~ J~.M. . 
Robert A. An~erson, ISB No. 2124 
Yvonne A. Dunbar, ISB No. 7200 
ANDERSON, JULIAN & IIDLL LLP 
C. W. Moore Plaza 
250 South Fifth Street, Suite 700 
Post Office Box 7426 
Boise, Idaho 83707-7426 
Telephone: (208) 344-5800 
Facsimile: (208) 344-5510 
E-Mail: raanderson@ajhlaw.com 
ydunbar@ajhlaw.com. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
SEP 2 0 2017 
CANYON COUNlY CLERK 
S SWANSON, DEPUlY CLERK 
. IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTR,ICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
DAVID A. KOSMANN, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
KEVIN DINWS an individual; and DINIUS & 
ASSOCIATES, PLLC, an Idaho professional 
limited liability company, 
Defendants. 
CaseNo. CV-2017-568 
OPPOSITION TO KOSMANN'S 
MOTION FOR LEA VE TO Fll.E 
SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL 
COMES NOW, Defendants, by and through their attorneys of record, Anderson, Julian & 
Hull, LLP, submits this Opposition to Kosmann 's Motion for Leave to File Supplemental 
Material ("Motion"). 
On September 7, 2017, Kosmann filed his Motion seeking leave to file the supplemental 
declaration and supplemental brief he had filed on August 31, 2017. He filed his Motion in 
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response to the Defendants' Motion to Strike the supplemental materials. Kosxnann's Motion 
should be denied for the same reasons the Motion to Strike should be granted. 
The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure set forth clear and unambiguous deadlines for the 
filing of briefs and affidavits in support of a party's motion. In particular, Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 7(b)(3)(A) requires·a party to file briefing and affidavits supporting his motion at least 
14 days prior to the hearing. If a party wants to file briefing or affidavits after that deadline, 
Rule 2.2(b )(1 )(B) requires the party to file a motion seeking permission to do so and requires the 
party to establish that his failure to timely file the documents was the result of excusable neglect. 
. . 
Kosmann has failed to establish excusable neglect. In fact, the testimony in the 
supplemental declaration was known by Kosma:nn prior to his filing deadline and could have 
been filed prior to the August 31st hearing. Similarly, the additional argument raised in the 
supplemental brief could have been raised in briefing prior to Kosmann's filing deadline. Such 
c#cumstances do not support a finding of excusable neglect. Accordingly, K.osmann's Motion 
should be denied in its entirety. 
To the e:x:.tent the Court is inclined to grant Kosmann's Motion and to consider the . 
supplenien.tal pleadings, despite the lack of evidence of excusable neglect, then the Defendants 
seek permission to file pleadings in response to the supplemental pleadings. The Defendants will 
suffer prejudice if the Court does not allow them to respond to the pleadings. 
DATED this 20th day of September, 2017. 
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 20th day of September, 2017, I served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing by delivering the same to each of the following attorneys of record, 
by the method indicated below, addressed as follows: 
Loren K. Messerly 
The ERISA Law Group, PA 
205 N. 10th Street, Ste. 300 
Boise, ID 83702 
T: (208) 342-5522 
F: (208) 342-7672 
E loren@erisalawgroup.com 
Counsel for Plaintiff 
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Robert A. Anderson, ISB No. 2124 
Yvonne A. Dunbar, ISB No. 7200 
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP 
C. W. Moore Plaza 
250 South Fifth Street. Suite 700 
Post Office Box 7426 
Boise, Idaho 83707-7426 
Telephone: (208) 344.5800 
Facsimile: (208) 344-5510 
E-Mail: raanderson@ajhlaw.com 
ydunbar@ajhlaw.com 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
Z VETOS, DEPUTY CLERK 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TllE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
DAVID A. KOSMANN, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
KEVIN DINIUS an individual; and DINIUS & 
ASSOCIATES, PLLC, an Idaho professional 
limited liability company, 
Defendants. 
CaseNo. CV-2017-568 
OPPOSITION TO KOSMANN'S 
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO 
SHORTEN TIME 
COMES NOW, Defendants, by and through their attorneys of record, Anderson, Julian & 
Hull, LLP, submits this.Opposition to Kosmann'.s Motion for Leave to Shorten Time/or Hearing 
on his Motino for Sanctions Against Dinius and Dunbar ("Motion"). 
On September 20, 2017,. Kosmann filed his Motf,on seeking leave to have his untimely 
filed motion for sanctions heard on October ·2, 2017 .. His Motion should be denied for the 
reasons set forth herein. 
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The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure set forth clear and unambiguous deadlines for the 
filing of briefs and affidavits in support of a party's· motion. In particular, Idaho Rule of Civil . 
Procedure 7(b )(3)(A) requires a party to file briefing and affidavits.supporting his motion at least 
14 da~ prior to the hearing. Rule 2.2(b) governs a party's request to extc::nd the Rule 7(b)(3)(.A) 
deadline_. Rule 2.2(b) provides, in pertinent part:. 
(b) Extending Time. 
(1) In General. When an act may or must be· done within a specified time, the 
court may, for good cause? e~tend the time: · · ' 
(A) .with or without mo.tion ·or-notice if the court acts, or if a :reqµest is made, 
before the. original time or its ex.tension expires; or ·. 
(B) on motion made after ·the time has expired if ·the party failed to act 
because of excusable neglect. · · 
As Kosmanµ is seeking to extend the time after the deadline has e:gpired., relief can only 
' ' 
be granted if the. failure to meet the deadline was the result ·of "excusable .n~glect." . While 
' ' 
Idaho courts have not defined "excusable neglect", a plain reading of the rule establishes that 
' ' ' 
. simply arguirig or finding good cause is not sufficient. Fedciral courts· a~dressing. the _similar 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure .have held that proof of "excusable neglect" "requires both a 
' ' 
demonstration of goo4 faith by the parties seeking ~e enlargement and also it must appear that 
ther~ was a reasona.ble-basis for not complying within the specifi~ period.".Jn re Four Seasons 
Sec. Laws Litig., 493 F.2d 1288, 1290 (10th Cir. 1974). ''The reasons 'ror the delay-including 
whether it was within the reasonable· control of the movant-must be considered.'' Flint v. City 
ofBelvidere, 791 F.3d 764; 768 (7th Cir. 2015). ..Neglect ·is_ generally·not excusable when a 
party should have aQted before the deadlin~. or when _a party's lack 9f diligence ~s t~ l:ilm:ne for its 
failure to secur~ discoverable infopnation.'' See id. (internal citations omitt,ed). 
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Here, Kpsmann has failed to argu~ sufficient facts to establish that his failure to timely 
file the motion for sanctions was the result of excusable neglect. In fact, Kosmann does not even 
explain why he did not or could. not meet the September 25~ deadline. Due to. his failure;, to 
present evidence ?f excusable neglect,_ the r~ement set forth .in Rule .2.2(b) have not been 
. . 
met. Accordingly, Ko:smann•s ¥otion should be denied in its entirety. 
DATED this 26th day of September, 2017. · 
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP . 
A.Anderson, 
A. Dunbar, Of the Firm. 
Atto_rneys f<:>r Defendan_ts 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY ·CERTIFY that on this ·26th day of-September, ·2017,. I served a true and 
correct copy of the f01":egoing by deliverib.g the same to each of the following attoro.eys of record, 
by the method indicated below, addressed as. follows: . · 
Loren K. Messerly 
The BRISA Law Group, PA 
205 N. 10th Street; Ste. 300 
Boise, ID 83702' · 
T: (208). 342-5522. 
F:· (208) 342-7672 
E lore.J1@erisalawgroup.com 
Counsel for Plaintiff 
· .. ~· 
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KEVIN DINIUS an individual; and DINIUS 
& ASSOCIATES, PLLC, an Idaho 
professional limited liability company, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV 2017-568*C 
ORDER DENYING PLINTIFF'S MOTION 
FOR LEA VE TO SHORTEN TIME FOR 
HEARING ON HIS MOTION FOR 
SANCTIONS AGAINST DINIUS AND 
DUNBAR 
A Motion for Leave to Shorten Time for Hearing on His Motion for Sanctions 
Against Dinius and Dunbar was filed by Plaintiff David A. Kosmann on September 20, 2017 
requesting that the motion be heard on October 2, 2017. An Opposition to Kosmann's 
Motion for Leave to Shorten time was filed by Defendants by and through their attorneys of 
record, Anderson Julian & Hull, LLP on September 26, 2017. 
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Motions, affidavits and briefs must be filed with the court and served at least fourteen 
(14) days prior to the hearing. I.R.C.P. 7(b)(3). Plaintiff has not shown why this motion and 
supporting materials could not have been filed in accordance with I.R.C.P. 7(b)(3). 
Based upon a review of the documents filed in this case, evidence presented to the Court, 
and good cause appearing therefore; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Shorten Time for 
Hearing on His Motion for Sanctions Against Dinius and Dunbar is DENIED. 
Dated this ~y of September, 2017. 
Gene A. Petty 
District Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) ss 
COUNTYOFCANYON ) 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order was forwarded 
to the following: 
Loren K. Messerly 
GREENER BURKE SHOEMAKER OBERRECHT, P.A. 
950 W Bannock St, Ste 950 
Boise, ID 83702 
Kevin E. Dinius 
DINIUS & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
5680 E Franklin Rd, Ste 130 
Nampa, ID 83687 
Robert A. Anderson 
Yvonne A. Dunbar 
ANDERSON JULIAN & HULL, LLP 
250 S 5th St, Ste 700 
PO Box 7426 
Boise, ID 83707-7426 
Either by depositing the same in the U.S. mail, first class postage prepaid, or by personal service. 
DATED this~ day of September, 2017. 
Chris Yamamoto 
Clerk of the District Court 
by~theC 
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DAVID A. KOSMANN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KEVIN DINIUS an individual; and DINIUS & 
ASSOCIATES, PLLC, an Idaho professional 
limited liability company, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-2013-795-C 
Case No. CV-2017-568-C 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING MOTION 
FOR LEA VE TO FILE SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIALS 
I. 
INTRODUCTION 
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff David Kosmann's Motion for Leave to File 
Supplemental Material, filed September 7, 2017, and Kevin Dinius's Motion to Strike, filed 
September 5, 2017. These pleadings relate to the parties' respective motions to enforce 
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settlement and a hearing held on those Motions on August 31, 2017. The Court has reviewed 
and considered the pleadings and related documents, as well as the arguments presented at a 
hearing on the Motions held October 2, 2017. 
II. 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
David Kosmann hired Kevin Dinius of Dinius and Associates, PLLC ( collectively 
"Dinius") to represent him in a property sale dispute between Kosmann and Leo Gilbride. That 
case proceeded to a bench trial in January 2015, and was later appealed to the Idaho Supreme 
Court. While Kosmann v. Gilbride was pending on appeal, a conflict over attorney fees arose 
between Kosmann and Dinius. That disagreement ultimately led to the filing of the above-
captioned malpractice case, Kosmann v. Dinius. 
Kosmann and Dinius agreed to mediate their dispute, and upon the parties' request this 
Court entered a Mediation Order setting the matter for mediation on July 26, 2017. The 
mediation resulted in a settlement agreement. 
After the mediation, the parties were unable to agree on a written settlement agreement 
and brought cross-motions to enforce each party's version of the agreed-upon settlement terms. 
A hearing on the cross-motions to enforce settlement was held on August 31, 2017. After the 
hearing, and without leave of the court, Plaintiff filed a Supplemental Brief in Support of David 
Kosmann's Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement ("Supplemental Brief') and Supplemental 
Declaration of David A. Kosmann ("Supplemental Declaration"). On September 5, Dinius filed 
a Motion to Strike on the basis that Plaintiff's Supplemental Brief was untimely and filed 
without first obtaining leave from this Court. On September 7, Kosmann filed a Motion for 
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Leave to File Supplemental Material. On September 20, Dinius filed his Opposition to 
Kosmann's Motion for Leave. 
III. 
DISCUSSION 
A. The Court Will Consider Kosmann's Supplemental Brief. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 7 sets forth specific time limits for filing briefs and other 
documents. LR. C.P. 7 (b )(3 )(A) requires a party to file briefs in support of a motion "at least 14 
days prior to the day designated for hearing." A party must file affidavits opposing a motion or 
any opposing brief"at least 7 days before the hearing." I.R.C.P. 7(b)(3)(B). A movant "may file 
a reply brief or memorandum, which must be filed with the court and served so as to be received 
by the parties at least 2 days prior to the hearing." I.R.C.P. 7(b)(3)(C). 
Even so, "[w]hen an act may or must be done within a specified time, the court may, for 
good cause, extend the time . . . on motion made after the time has expired if the party failed to 
act because of excusable neglect." I.R.C.P. 2.2 (formerly I.R.C.P. 6(b)). Though not controlling, 
the unreported case of Mesenbrink Lumber, LLC v. Lighty indicates that "excusable neglect" in 
the context of Rule 2.2 (then contained in I.R.C.P. 6(b)) should be interpreted using the same 
"excusable neglect" standard under I.R.C.P. 60(b). Case No. 38451, 2014 WL 3895234 at *3 
(Ct. App. Aug. 11, 2014). "Whether a party's conduct ... constitutes 'excusable neglect' is 
determined by examining what might be expected of a reasonably prudent person under similar 
circumstances. The courts must weigh each case in light of its unique facts." Johnson v. Pioneer 
Title Co. of Ada County, 104 Idaho 727, 732, 662 P.2d 1171, 1176 (Ct. App. 1983) (internal 
citations omitted). 
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On appeal, a trial court's decision whether to grant a motion to enlarge time will be 
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. I.R.C.P. 2.2; In re SRBA, 149 Idaho 532,538,237 P.3d 1, 7 
(2010). When reviewing a trial court's discretionary ruling on appeal, the appellate court looks 
to determine: "(l) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) 
whether the trial court acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with 
the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3) whether the trial 
court reached its decision by an exercise of reason." Sun Valley Shopping Center, Inc. v. Idaho 
Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991). 
As a basis for his submission of additional materials, counsel for Kosmann stated that he 
did not anticipate that there would be a question as to whether the meeting between Dinius and 
Kosmann constituted an ethical violation, and thus did not brief that issue. Rather than filing a 
motion to reconsider after the fact, Plaintiff determined it would be most efficient to file the brief 
immediately to resolve this outstanding issue. 
The Court will grant Kosmann's request for leave, on the bases of excusable neglect and 
judicial economy and efficiency. Because Kosmann's Supplemental Brief and Supplemental 
Declaration will be allowed and considered, Dinius will be given the opportunity to fully brief 
the issue in a response to be filed by October 13, 2017. 
B. The Motion to Strike is Moot 
The Court's grant of the Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Material renders Dinius's 
Motion to Strike as moot. 
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C. Dinius Is Not Entitled to Fees Incurred in Prosecuting the Motion to Strike 
Th~ Court noted at the hearing that it intended to awMd foes incurred in filing and 
p:wsecuting Dinius's Moti.on to Strike. However, be(:ause Dinius die :".Ot file h,s reqaer,t for fees 
m a separate motion as required by Rule ~ 1 (,: )(2), n-:> foes s,hall be aws."ded. 
V. 
ORDER 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Kosman.ri's Motion for Leave to File Sup:1'.)Iemental 
Materials is GRANTED. Dinius shall have until October 13, 2017 tr Sle a Response. The Court 
'JltlE take the matter unde:· w.visement on that date, and no further hdefing on the issue will be 
allowed or accepted. 
Dated this~ cf October, 2017. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned certifies that on _5_ day of October, 2017, s/he served a true and 
correct copy of the original of the foregoing Memorandum Decision and Order on the following 
individuals in the manner described: 
James G. Reid 
KAUFMAN REID, PLLC 
1211 W. Myrtle St., Ste. 350 
Boise, ID 83702 
Loren K. Messerly 
MESSERLY LAW, PLLC 
205 N. 10th Street, Ste. 300 
Boise, ID 83702 
Kevin E. Dinius 
Sarah Hallock-Jayne 
DINIUS LAW 
5680 E. Franklin Rd., Ste. 130 
Nampa, ID 83687 
Robert A. Anderson 
Yvonne A. Dunbar 
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP 
C.W. Moore Plaza 
250 S. Fifth St., Ste. 700 
P.O. Box 7426 
Boise, ID 83707-7426 
CHRIS YAMAMOTO, 
Clerk of the Court 
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DAVID A. KOSMANN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KEVIN DINIUS an individual; and DINIUS & 
ASSOCIATES, PLLC, an Idaho professional 
limited liability company, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-2013-795-C 
Case No. CV-2017-568-C 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER TO ENFORCE SETTLEMENT 
AGREEMENT AND ORDER TO RELEASE FUNDS 
I. 
INTRODUCTION 
This matter is before the Court on Dinius's Motion to Enforce Settlement ("Motion"), 
filed August 2, 201 7, and Plaintiffs Cross-Motion to Enforce Settlement ("Cross-Motion"), filed 
August 3, 201 7. Each party seeks to enforce its own version of an agreement reached after their 
remaining disputes in the above-captioned cases were mediated by Hon. Stephen S. Dunn on 
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July 26, 2017. The Court has reviewed and considered the motions, briefs, affidavits, and 
declarations submitted by the parties, as well as the arguments made at the hearing, and has 
reached a decision as articulated below. 
II. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Kevin Dinius is an Idaho attorney who maintains a legal practice, Dinius and Associates, 
PLLC (collectively "Dinius"), in Canyon County, Idaho. In 2013, David Kosmann hired Dinius 
to represent him in a property sale dispute between Kosmann and Leo Gilbride. That case 
proceeded to a bench trial in January 2015. On March 30, 2015, the Court issued a 
Memorandum Decision and Order awarding $30,990.00 to Kosmann and possession of the 
property to Gilbride. The case was subsequently appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court. See 
Kosmann v. Gilbride, 161 Idaho 363,386 P.3d 504 (2016). 
While Kosmann v. Gilbride was pending on appeal, a conflict arose between Kosmann 
and Dinius regarding Dinius's legal fees. In August 2015, Dinius withdrew from his 
representation of Kosmann and asserted a lien on the case. Kosmann and Dinius eventually 
agreed to arbitrate their dispute, but as the January 2017 arbitration date approached it became 
apparent that the parties disagreed as to the scope of the arbitration. Dinius filed a Motion to 
Compel Arbitration on January 18, 2017, which was briefed by the parties and heard by the 
Court at a June 8, 2017 hearing. On July 7, 2017, the Court issued a Memorandum Decision and 
Order denying Dinius's Motion to Compel Arbitration, finding that the arbitration agreement 
between the parties was ambiguous, and that extrinsic evidence failed to show that the parties 
had agreed to its material terms - namely the scope of arbitration. Meanwhile, on January 20, 
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2017, Kosmann filed Kosmann v. Dinius, Case No. CV-2017-568, alleging claims of 
professional negligence and breach of contract against Dinius. 
At the parties' request, the Court entered a Mediation Order, setting mediation before 
Hon. Stephen Dunn on July 26, 2017. At mediation, Judge Dunn heard the disputes between 
Kosmann and Dinius related to both Dinius's attorney lien in Kosmann v. Gilbride and to 
Kosmann's claims in Kosmann v. Dinius. After several hours of mediation, Kosmann left the 
room where he had been talking with his attorney, Loren Messerly. Messerly was under the 
impression that Kosmann was going to confirm with Judge Dunn that, based on negotiations up 
to that point, Kosmann would agree to settle for a payment of $40,000.00. Instead, Kosmann 
asked Judge Dunn ifhe (Kosmann) could meet one-on-one with Dinius. Judge Dunn agreed. In 
the meeting between Kosmann and Dinius, the parties agreed to settle their disputes for 
$32,047.19 (the amount held by the Court in Kosmann v. Gilbride), with the understanding that 
Dinius would not pursue any future litigation against Messerly. 
Kosmann left the meeting with Dinius and returned to the room where Messerly had been 
waiting. The two discussed the agreement Kosmann and Dinius had reached, and Messerly 
advised that Kosmann could either commit to the $32,047.19 settlement agreement and bring an 
end to the litigation, or pursue a $40,000.00 settlement through further negotiations. Kosmann 
chose the former. The parties and their counsel then memorialized the $32,047.19 settlement 
agreement on the record. A transcript of those proceedings reflects that the agreement included 
the following terms: 
• Payment of thirty-two thousand forty-seven dollars and nineteen cents ($32,047.19), the 
amount held by the Court in Kosmann v. Gilbride, to Kosmann; 
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• Release of all claims between Kosmann and Dinius, with each party to bear its own costs 
and fees; 
• Confidentiality; and 
• Nondisparagement between the parties. 
Transcr. 2: 10 - 3 :6 (Jul. 26, 2017). 
Messerly noted on the record that the parties initially discussed settling the matter for 
forty thousand dollars ($40,000.00), but that after the meeting between Kosmann and Dinius, 
without counsel present, the parties agreed to settle the disputes between them for the thirty-two 
thousand forty-seven dollars and nineteen cents ($32,047.19) and a release of claims between 
Dinius and Messerly. Messerly further clarified that, based on ethical considerations, he did not 
want to be included in any release of liability and had instructed his client not to request that he 
be included in the release. 
Counsel for Dinius clarified on the record that the funds held by the Court would be 
distributed as follows: fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000.00) to Dinius and seventeen thousand 
forty-seven dollars and nineteen cents ($17,047.19) to Kosmann. Dinius would then pay to 
Kosmann fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000.00) in settlement funds provided by Dinius's insurer. 
Neither party made any additional objections or clarifications regarding the agreement. Upon 
inquiry from the Court, counsel for Dinius agreed to draft the final settlement agreement. 
On August 2, 2017 Dinius filed a Motion to Enforce Settlement. The following day, 
Kosmann filed a Cross-Motion to Enforce Settlement. On August 17, Dinius filed, under seal, a 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Enforce Settlement and the Affidavit of Yvonne Dunbar 
in Support of Motion to Enforce Settlement. On August 28, Kosmann filed, under seal, a 
Memorandum in Response to Dinius's Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement, two affidavits 
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of counsel in support of the Memorandum, and a Declaration of David A. Kosmann. Finally, on 
August 29, Dinius filed, under seal, a Reply in Support of Motion to Enforce Settlement, 
Supplemental Affidavit of Yvonne Dunbar in Support of Motion to Enforce Settlement, and 
Declaration of Kevin Dinius in Support of Motion to Enforce Settlement. A hearing on the 
Motion and Cross-Motion was held on August 31, 2017. 
After the hearing, Kosmann filed a Supplemental Brief in Support of David Kosmann's 
Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement. On September 5, Dinius filed a Motion to Strike on 
the basis that Kosmann's Supplemental Brief was untimely and filed without leave from the 
Court. On September 7, Kosmann filed a Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Material. 
Dinius filed an Opposition to Kosmann's Motion for Leave on September 20. At a hearing held 
on October 2, 2017, the Court granted the Motion for Leave and set a deadline for Dinius to 
respond to that Motion, as reflected in the Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Motion 
for Leave to File Supplemental Materials issued on October 5. The Court found that that Order 
rendered Dinius's Motion to Strike moot. Dinius filed an Opposition to Kosmann's 
Supplemental Brief in Support of David Kosmann's Motion to Enforce Settlement on October 
13, 201 7, after which the Court once again took the matter under advisement. 
III. 
LEGAL STANDARDS 
A. Court Enforcement of Settlement Agreements. 
"[A] party may ask the trial court to enforce a settlement reached in mediation before the 
original suit is dismissed." Mihalka v. Shepherd, 145 Idaho 547, 551, 181 P.3d 473, 477 (2008) 
(citing Goodman v. Lothrop, 143 Idaho 622, 626, 151 P.3d 818, 822 (2007)). A motion for 
enforcement of a settlement agreement is treated as a motion for summary judgment when no 
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evidentiary hearing has been conducted. Vanderford Co., Inc. v. Knudson, 150 Idaho 664, 671, 
249 P.3d 857, 864 (2011). When considering a motion to enforce a settlement agreement, a 
court will not inquire into the merits of the underlying claims; rather, it will consider only 
whether the settlement agreement is enforceable. Goodman, 143 Idaho at 625, 151 P.3d at 821. 
A settlement agreement is a contract, and must satisfy the same requirements as any other 
contract. Lyle v. Koubourlis, 115 Idaho 889, 891, 771 P.2d 907, 909 (1988). See also 
Vanderford, 150 Idaho at 672, 249 P.3d at 865 ("A settlement agreement stands on the same 
footing as any other contract and is governed by the same rules and principles as are applicable 
to contracts generally."). A contract must be the result of "a meeting of the minds," evidenced 
by an offer and acceptance of the terms of the agreement, representing the parties' mutual intent 
to contract. Lawrence, 146 Idaho at 898, 204 P.3d at 538. "A contract must be complete, 
definite and certain in all its material terms, or contain provisions which are capable in 
themselves of being reduced to certainty." Vanderford Co., 150 Idaho at 672,249 P.3d at 865. 
Settlement agreements need not be in writing to be enforceable. Lyle, 115 Idaho at 891, 
771 P.2d at 909. In determining whether a settlement agreement stipulated to on the record is 
enforceable, the Supreme Court has held: 
Oral stipulations of the parties in the presence of the court are generally held to be 
binding, especially when acted upon or entered on the court records. Stipulations 
for the settlement of litigation are regarded with favor by the courts and will be 
enforced unless good cause to the contrary is shown. An attempted stipulation is 
ineffective when it is clear from the record that the parties never assented to it. A 
stipulation is a contract. The enforceability of an oral stipulation is determined by 
contract principles. Whether the parties to an oral agreement or stipulation 
become bound prior to the drafting and execution of a contemplated formal 
writing is largely a question of intent. A contract must be complete, definite and 
certain in all its material terms, or contain provisions which are capable in 
themselves of being reduced to certainty. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER TO ENFORCE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT - 6 
Page 148




Dinius seeks enforcement of the settlement agreement as it was memorialized on the 
record by Judge Dunn at the conclusion of the July 26 mediation. As stated above, that 
agreement would require payment of thirty-two thousand forty-seven dollars and nineteen cents 
($32,047.19) to Mr. Kosmann; a release of all claims between Kosmann and Dinius, with each 
party to bear its own costs and fees; confidentiality; and nondisparagement between the parties. 
Dinius also seeks sanctions against Kosmann and/or his attorney pursuant to I.R.C.P. 1 l(b), 
arguing that Kosmann's opposition to enforcement of the settlement agreement is not warranted 
by existing law and was put forth for an improper purpose. 
Kosmann seeks enforcement of a purported agreement reached during the mediation prior 
to the meeting between Kosmann and Dinius, which would have required Dinius to pay 
Kosmann forty thousand dollars ($40,000.00). 
This Court must decide whether the settlement agreement entered on the record was an 
enforceable contract, or whether that agreement should be set aside and Plaintiffs request to 
enforce a $40,000.00 settlement granted. If the Court finds that the stipulated settlement 
agreement is binding and enforceable, it must then determine if sanctions against Kosmann 
and/or his counsel are appropriate. 
A. The Settlement Agreement Entered on the Record before Judge Dunn Is 
Enforceable. 
At the conclusion of the July 26, 2017 mediation, the parties agreed to the essential terms 
of the settlement agreement on the record in front of Judge Dunn. Both the clients and counsel 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER TO ENFORCE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT - 7 
Page 149
for each side made clarifying remarks. Neither client repudiated the agreement or sought to 
modify the material terms. The Court tasked counsel for Dinius with taking the lead on 
memorializing the agreement in writing. 
The Idaho Supreme Court case of Kohring v. Robertson presented a similar scenario to 
the one at hand. 137 Idaho 94, 44 P.3d 1149. In that case, parties to a shareholder dispute over 
division of corporate property successfully negotiated a settlement, which they put on the record 
before the district court. Id. at 99, 44 P .3d at 1154. The court asked each party if it understood 
the agreement, whether each party agreed with the terms as stated, and whether the agreement 
resolved their issues. Id. at 100, 44 P.3d at 1155. The parties responded in the affirmative. Id. 
However, as the litigants attempted to reduce their settlement terms to writing, the agreement 
unraveled, and a motion to enforce and clarify the settlement agreement was filed. Id. On 
review of the stipulation made in open court, the Idaho Supreme Court found that the record 
reflected that the material terms of the agreement were certain, that the parties intended to settle, 
and that the settlement agreement was enforceable. Id. at 101, 44 P.3d at 1156. 
Here, as in Kohring, the essential terms of the settlement were defined, and the agreement 
"merely needed to be memorialized in writing." Id. at 100, 44 P.3d at 1155. Both parties 
received material benefits from the agreement. Both parties assented to its terms on the record, 
indicating their intent to be bound by those terms. The Court, therefore, concludes that the 
settlement agreement as stipulated to on the record is a valid, enforceable contract. 
B. The Meeting Between Kosmann and Dinius Did Not Void the Settlement 
Agreement. 
Kosmann argues that the stipulated agreement should not be enforced because it was 
reached in violation of public policy. The alleged violation occurred when, by meeting one-on-
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one with Kosmann, Dinius violated Idaho R. Prof. Conduct 4.2, the "no contact rule," which 
prohibits attorneys from speaking about a case with a represented party. 
"Whether a contract violates public policy is a question of law for the court to determine 
from all the facts and circumstances of each case. Public policy may be found and set forth in 
the statutes, judicial decisions or the constitution." Bakker v. Thunder Spring-Wareham, LLC, 
141 Idaho 185, 189, 108 P.3d 332, 336 (2005) (internal citations omitted). Persuasive authority 
from numerous jurisdictions supports the proposition that Rules of Professional Conduct may 
constitute statements of public policy, carrying the equivalent force and effect as statutes for 
purpose of arguing that a contract is void for a violation thereof. See Rich v. Simoni, 235 W.Va. 
142, 149, 772 S.E.2d 327, 334 (W. Va. 2015) (Rule 5.4 prohibiting fee sharing between lawyers 
and nonlawers was an explicit judicial declaration of public policy); Martello v. Santana, 713 
F.3d 309 (6th Cir. 2013) ("The Kentucky bar is a mandatory unified bar and the Kentucky Rules 
of Professional Conduct are public policy set by the Kentucky Supreme Court."); Evans & 
Luptak, PLC v. Lizza, 251 Mich. App. 187, 196, 650 N.W.2d 364, 370 (Mich. App. 2002) 
("contracts that violate our ethical rules violate our public policy and therefore are 
unenforceable."); and Altschul v. Sayble, 83 Cal. App. 3d 153, 163, 147 Cal. Rptr. 716, 721 (Cal. 
App. 1978) ("The [State Bar] Rules are not only ethical standards to guide the conduct of 
members of the Bar; but they also serve as an expression of public policy to protect the public."). 
The public policy expressed in Idaho's Rule 4.2 is articulated in the first comment to the Rule, 
which states that the purpose of the rule is "protecting a person who has chosen to be represented 
by a lawyer in a matter against possible overreaching by other lawyers who are participating in 
the matter, interference by those lawyers with the client-lawyer relationship and the uncounseled 
disclosure of information relating to the representation." Idaho R. Prof. Conduct 4.2 cmt. 1. 
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During the mediation, Kosmann requested to sit down with Dinius outside the presence 
of their attorneys. Judge Dunn later explained this on the record thusly: 
I think there was - I'll note for the record that there were, in the last few minutes, 
individualized discussions between the parties, Mr. Kossman [sic] and Mr. 
Dinius, outside the presence of counsel that that discussion led, in part, to this 
agreement. 
Transcr. 1: 16 - 21. Judge Dunn went on to explain with regards to the meeting that: 
It was a request by Mr. Kossman [sic] to visit with Mr. Dinius. I came in and 
asked Mr. Dinius to at least have a conversation with him. All he had to do was 
get in a room and converse with him because that was Mr. Kossman's [sic] 
request. And so I allowed them to do that because clients can meet if they wish. 
Transcr. 10:10 - 16. 
Kosmann now argues that the meeting between he and Dinius was improper because 
Dinius, as an attorney, was prohibited by Idaho R. Prof. Conduct 4.2 from meeting with a party 
he knew to be represented. Dinius has argued that he was not "representing a party" when he 
met with Kosmann, and that because Kosmann and Dinius were both represented parties, they 
were allowed to speak directly with each other. Dinius further argues that the settlement 
agreement cannot be deemed void for violation of public policy because the settlement 
agreement is enforceable on its face. 
This precise issue under Rule 4.2 has not been directly addressed by Idaho's appellate 
courts. However, even if the meeting between Kosmann and Dinius constituted a violation of 
Rule 4.2, any public policy concerns were mitigated by the subsequent meeting between 
Kosmann and his attorney before the parties put the agreement on the record. After the Dinius-
Kosmann meeting, Kosmann had the opportunity to discuss that meeting with his attorney, to 
disaffirm the agreement, or to terminate the mediation proceedings prior to agreeing to the 
settlement on the record. However, as evidenced by Messerly's Affidavit, after meeting with his 
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attorney, Kosmann chose to settle the matter in order to bring an end to the litigation between 
him and Dinius. Specifically, Messerly explained: 
I then told Kosmann that he had two options: 1) we would fight to get the $40,000 
settlement and enforce it, through more mediation that day or likely through a 
motion practice, with the unfortunate belief that Judge Dunn would do whatever 
he could to support the other side; or 2) he could take the $32,000 and be done but 
I would put on the record that I had not asked for Dinius' verbal release and also 
the other highly irregular things that had happened during the mediation .... 
Kosmann wanted to be done and did not want to have to litigate for many more 
weeks to try and get back his $40,000 settlement. So he chose the 2nd option. 
Aff. Messerly 1146 - 47 (Aug. 23, 2017) (emphasis added). Any concern about overreaching or 
interference that Dinius may have exerted in the meeting with Kosmann was counteracted by 
Kosmann consulting with his attorney after the meeting and before agreeing to the settlement 
agreement on the record. Discussing the agreement with his attorney, also provided Kosmann 
with an opportunity to reject the agreement rather than later committing to it. Aff. Messerly 11 
33 - 48. Kosmann chose not to repudiate the agreement, and instead, the parties then went into 
the courtroom and agreed to the settlement on the record. In the transcript of the proceeding, 
Kosmann stated: 
I'll express the same things I expressed with Kevin [Dinius]. It is my hope to be 
done today. And I want to move forward with my life. I feel comfortable with 
the agreement that I made with Kevin just from man to man, besides all the legal 
stuff. Would I prefer having more money? Yes. But I also want my peace of 
mind. And I want to continue with my lawyer, Loren [Messerly], to go on to the 
litigation that I have ahead of me. And I want bygones to be bygones between 
Kevin and I so that we can end on good terms and we can - we can both move on 
with our lives. 
This did not end the way we wanted it to end today. But from just man to man, 
today was the day that, you know, it's time to move on and be done. And I'm -
I'm happy with it. Loren has to protect himself for those types of things. I want 
him to protect himself. Probably didn't do what he asked. But I'm doing this for 
my own accord because today is the day to move forward. 
Transcr. 8:4 -23. 
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In sum, after discussing the status of the case and the proposed agreement with his 
attorney, Kosmann exercised his ultimate authority as a client to settle these matters. Idaho R. 
Prof. Conduct l.2(a) and comment 1. Kosmann and his attorney knew what had occurred in the 
meeting between Kosmann and Dinius prior to agreeing to the settlement on the record. They 
had an opportunity to disaffirm the agreement reached by Kosmann and Dinius and/or to end the 
mediation without reaching a settlement. Yet Kosmann chose not to walk away, and instead 
agreed to the settlement he had reached with Dinius. The Court has already found that the 
settlement agreement as entered on the record is a valid and enforceable contract. The facts and 
circumstances surrounding the meeting between Kosmann and Dinius and subsequent 
opportunity for Kosmann to discuss that meeting with his attorney do not render the settlement 
agreement void for violation of public policy, and the Court finds no basis to upset the settlement 
agreement under these facts. 
C. Dinius is Not Entitled to Fees Incurred in Prosecuting the Motion to Enforce 
Settlement. 
Dinius seeks attorney's fees for drafting the settlement agreement and for prosecuting 
their Motion to Enforce Settlement. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 11 states, in relevant part: 
By presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or other paper, whether by 
signing, filing, or submitting, or later advocating it, an attorney or unrepresented 
party certifies that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, 
formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances: 
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause 
unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation; 
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing 
law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversmg 
existing law or for establishing new law; 
(3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so 
identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity 
for further investigation or discovery; and 
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(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if 
specifically so identified, are reasonably based on belief or a lack of 
information. 
I.R.C.P. ll(b). A court may sanction any attorney, law firm, or party that it finds has violated 
this rule. I.R.C.P. 11 ( c ). A showing of subjective bad faith is not necessary for the imposition of 
sanctions for making a frivolous or unfounded filing; rather, the standard is one of 
reasonableness. Flying A Ranch, Inc. v. Board of County Commrs. for Fremont County, 156 
Idaho 449,453,328 P.3d 429,433 (2014). 
"The intent of [Rule 11] is to grant courts the power to impose sanctions for discrete 
pleading abuses or other types of litigative misconduct." Campbell v. Ki/dew, 141 Idaho 640, 
650, 115 P .3d 731, 7 41 (2005). "Before imposing Rule 11 sanctions, the district court must 
determine whether the attorney exercised reasonableness under the circumstances and made a 
proper investigation upon reasonable inquiry into the facts and legal theories before signing and 
filing the document." Flying A Ranch, Inc., 156 Idaho. at 454, 329 P.3d at 434. A court should 
consider the amount of time the attorney had to make the relevant investigation, the source of 
factual information underlying the pleading, and whether the pleading is based on a plausible 
view of the law. Id. 
On review, a district court's imposition of sanctions pursuant to I.R.C.P. 11 will be 
reviewed for abuse of discretion. Flying A Ranch, Inc., 156 Idaho at 453, 328 P.3d at 433. 
In making a determination of whether a trial court abused its discretion, this Court 
considers: (1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of 
discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted within the boundaries of this discretion 
and consistent with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available 
to it; and (3) whether the trial court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. 
Id. This Court recognizes that it has discretion in levying sanctions against a party or its counsel 
upon a finding that Rule 11 has been violated. 
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The Court will not award attorney's fees associated with drafting the settlement 
agreement. On the date of mediation, defense counsel agreed to draft the agreement. No 
mention was made that Dinius would request or be entitled to fees for doing so. The time spent 
drafting the agreement was a cost of litigating the case, and is unrelated to the parties' later 
dispute about enforcement of the agreement. 
As to Dinius's request for attorney's fees in relation to prosecuting the Motion to Enforce 
Settlement, Dinius asserts that Plaintiff and/or Plaintiff's counsel have violated I.R.C.P. 1 l(b) by 
necessitating the Motion without a legitimate basis. According to Dinius, Plaintiff's refusal to 
sign any version of the draft agreement and demand to include additional language or terms in 
the agreement warrants sanctions against Plaintiff and/or his counsel because those positions are 
not supported by law or fact and are "being asserted to harass, cause unnecessary delay to the 
settlement, and needlessly increase the cost oflitigation." 
The Court finds that Kosmann had a good faith basis to argue that the meeting between 
Kosmann and Dinius constituted a violation of Rule 4.2, and rendered the agreement void for 
violation of public policy. Idaho R. Prof. Conduct 4.2 states: 
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of the 
representation with a person the lawyer knows to be represented by another 
lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is 
authorized to do so by law or a court order. 
The purpose of Rule 4.2 is to protect "a person who has chosen to be represented by a lawyer in 
a matter against possible overreaching by other lawyers who are participating in the matter, 
interference by those lawyers with the client-lawyer relationship and the uncounseled disclosure 
of information relating to the representation." Idaho R. Prof. Conduct 4.2 cmt. 1. 
It is not disputed that Dinius is an attorney licensed to practice in Idaho. Kosmann and 
Dinius are parties to the cases at hand. Kosmann was represented by Messerly before and during 
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the mediation. There are no facts in the record indicating that Dinius did not know that Kosmann 
was represented. Further, it is clear from Kosmann's briefing on the issue that Messerly was not 
aware of the meeting between Kosmann and Dinius and did not give his consent for the meeting 
to take place. The only remaining question under the rule is, therefore, whether Dinius was 
"representing a client" during his direct contact with Kosmann. 
The plain language of Rule 4.2 prohibits a lawyer "[i]n representing a client," from 
communicating about the subject of the representation with an opposing party the lawyer knows 
to be represented. Idaho R. Prof. Conduct 4.2 (emphasis added). See also S.C. Bar Ethics 
Advisory Committee, Advisory Opinion 11-04, 2011 WL 7657360 at *1 (May 20, 2011) ("An 
attorney is bound by the applicable Rules of Professional Conduct regardless of whether he or 
she is acting as an attorney at any given point in time. Certain rules, however, by their terms 
apply only when a lawyer is acting in a representative capacity. Rule 4.2 is one such rule: the 
prohibition against communications with a represented person does not apply to an attorney who 
is not 'representing a client.'") ( citation omitted). Comment 2 to the Rule also states that 
"[p]arties to a matter may communicate directly with each other." Idaho R. Prof. Conduct 4.2 
cmt. 2. 
Had Dinius been representing himself pro se in this matter, under existing Idaho 
precedent Rule 4.2 would have prohibited his communication with Kosmann. Runsvold v. Idaho 
State Bar, 129 Idaho 419, 420 - 421, 925 P.2d 1118, 1119 - 1120 (1996) (A pro se 
lawyer/litigant is representing a client when representing himself in a matter.). However, 
Runsvold did not address the particular fact scenario presented here-whether an attorney, who 
is a party to a lawsuit and represented by counsel, may speak to a represented, non-attorney 
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opposing party. In other words, did Dinius's status as an attorney prohibit him from 
communicating directly with Kosmann? 
A survey of opinions from other states does not reveal a uniform approach to the question 
presented. South Carolina courts have taken the position that an attorney who is not representing 
a client may contact a represented party. S.C. Bar Ethics Advisory Committee, Advisory Op. 92-
07, 1992 WL 810425 at *1 (April 1, 1992) ("We conclude that Rule 4.2 does not preclude 
contact by one individual with another represented individual, even though the contacting party 
is a lawyer, when the contact is not made in the course of representing a client."). Likewise, the 
Supreme Court of Connecticut has held that Rule 4.2 was not violated where a represented 
attorney contacted an opposing party, based on the language of comment 2 and a finding that 
attorney was not "representing a client." Pinsky v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 216 Conn. 
228, 235 - 236, 578 A.2d 1075, 1079 (Conn. 1990) ("While the plaintiffs conduct may have 
been less than prudent, it did not violate Rule 4.2."). 
In contrast, the New York Bar has taken the position that lawyers are always subject to 
Rule 4.2's "no contact" requirement. NY Eth. Op. 879, 2011 WL 7784089 (Sept. 27, 2011): 
[A]ll lawyers - whether they are pro se parties or represented parties or 
representatives of other parties in a matter - must (unless authorized by law) 
secure "prior consent" of opposing counsel under Rule 4.2(a) or give "reasonable 
advance notice" to opposing counsel under Rule 4.2(b) before communicating 
with a counterparty known to be represented by counsel. Under this interpretation 
of Rule 4.2, the usual rights of nonlawyer parties to engage in direct 
communications are outweighed by the lawyer's professional obligations to the 
system of justice and the goal of protecting represented parties. Our view reflects 
the fact that lawyers, by virtue of their professional status, have a unique 
responsibility to the system of justice that requires them to subordinate their 
personal interest in having direct communications with represented individuals 
unless the exacting conditions stated in Rule 4.2 are satisfied. 
Texas courts have similarly reasoned that a represented attorney should not be allowed, based on 
the language of Rule 4.2, to "do that which he would otherwise be unable to do ifhe represented 
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himself, by simply employing a counsel of record." Vickery v. Commission for Lawyer 
Discipline, 5 S.W.3d 241,259 (Tex. App. -Houston [14th Dist.] 1999). 
This is a matter of first impression in Idaho. In Runsvold, the Court recognized that 
ignoring a pro se attorney-litigant's status as an attorney would frustrate the intent of Rule 4.2, 
because the opposing party "would lose the protection a represented person has achieved by 
obtaining counsel." Runsvold, 129 Idaho at 421, 925 P.2d at 1118. Based on Runsvold and the 
rationale articulated by New York and Texas courts, this Court finds that a represented attorney 
litigant may violate Rule 4.2 by directly contacting a non-attorney opposing party. The Court 
also notes, however, that because Idaho courts have not previously addressed this precise issue, 
Dinius and Dinius's counsel had a good faith basis to believe that the contact between Dinius and 
Kosmann was appropriate based on the text of Rule 4.2, comment 2 to Rule 4.2, and the rationale 
articulated by the South Carolina Bar and Connecticut Supreme Court. 
Whether Dinius's meeting with Kosmann violated Rule 4.2 is not clearly settled under 
Idaho law. While the Court finds that the agreement is enforceable for the reasons stated above, 
it does not appear from this Court's reading of the briefs, affidavits, or correspondence between 
counsel that Plaintiffs refusal to sign the agreement was for an improper purpose, such as 
harassment, delay to the settlement, or intentional but needless increase of litigation costs. The 
Court in its discretion declines to levy sanctions against the Plaintiff or Plaintiffs counsel. 
Additionally, Rule 11 requires a motion for sanctions to be made separately from any 
other motion. I.R.C.P. 1 l(c). Dinius did not make his request for sanctions in a separate motion. 
For this reason, in addition to the rationale set forth above, the request is denied. 




IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Dinius's Motion to Enforce Settlement is GRANTED. 
Pursuant to the settlement agreement, Plaintiff shall receive payment of thirty-two thousand 
forty-seven dollars and nineteen cents ($32,047.19); the parties shall release any and all claims 
between them, including a release of any claim of indemnity between Dinius and Plaintiffs 
counsel, Loren Messerly; the parties are prohibited from disparaging each other and either side's 
attorneys; and each party shall bear its own costs and fees. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs Cross-Motion to Enforce Settlement is 
DENIED. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the funds held by the Court in Kosmann v. Gilbride in 
the amount of total thirty-two thousand forty-seven dollars and nineteen cents ($32,047.19) shall 
be immediately released as follows: 
► Fifteen Thousand Dollars ($15,000.00) to Anderson, Julian & Hull LLP at the address 
below; and 
► Seventeen Thousand Forty-Seven Dollars and Nineteen Cents ($17,047.19) to Messerly 
Law, PLLC at the address below. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Dinius shall pay to Kosmann the amount of Fifteen 
Thousand Dollars ($15,000.00), by delivering that amount to Messerly Law, PLLC at the address 
below within thirty (30) days of this Order. Dinius's attorney lien, filed in Kosmann v. Gilbride, 
Case No. CV-2013-795-C, is hereby dismissed. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Dinius's request for attorney fees is DENIED. 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Kosmann v. Dinius, Case No. CV-2017-568-C is 
hereby resolved in its entirety and is dismissed. 
Dated this ~iay of November, 2017. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned certifies that on _2___ day of November, 2017, s/he served a true and 
correct copy of the original of the foregoing on the following individuals via the Court's 
electronic filing system: 
James G. Reid 
KAUFMAN REID, PLLC 
1211 W. Myrtle St., Ste. 350 
Boise, ID 83 702 
Loren K. Messerly 
MESSERLY LAW, PLLC 
205 N. 10th Street, Ste. 300 
Boise, ID 83 702 
Kevin E. Dinius 
Sarah Hallock-Jayne 
DINIUS LAW 
5680 E. Franklin Rd., Ste. 130 
Nampa, ID 83687 
Robert A. Anderson 
Yvonne A. Dunbar 
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP 
C.W. Moore Plaza 
250 S. Fifth St., Ste. 700 
P.O. Box 7426 
Boise, ID 83707-7426 
CHRIS YAMAMOTO, 
Clerk of the Court 
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F L E D 
Date / Time: 
CHRIS YAMAMOTO 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
By: 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
?)41-:? 
DAVID A. KOSMANN, 
Plaintiff, 
Case No. CV-2017-568-C 
vs. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
KEVIN DINIUS an individual; and DINIUS & ORDER ON PARTIES' CROSS-MOTIONS ASSOCIATES, PLLC, an Idaho professional FOR SANCTIONS 




This matter is before the Court on two motions: (1) Plaintiff David Kosmann's Motion 
for Sanctions against Defendant Kevin Dinius and his attorney, Yvonne Dunbar, and (2) 
Defendants' Motion for Sanctions against Mr. Kosmann and his attorney, Loren Messerly. The 
Court has reviewed and considered the motions, briefs, affidavits, and declarations filed by the 
parties, as well as the arguments of counsel, in reaching the decision below. 
II. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
In 2013, David Kosmann retained Kevin Dinius of Dinius and Associates PLLC 
( collectively "Dinius") to represent him in a property dispute. The case proceeded to a bench 
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trial, where the Court awarded $30,990.00 to Mr. Kosmann and possession of the contested 
property to Leo Gilbride. The case was subsequently appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court. See 
Kosmann v. Gilbride, 161 Idaho 363, 386 P.3d 504 (2016). 
While Kosmann v. Gilbride was pending on appeal, Mr. Dinius withdrew as Mr. 
Kosmann's attorney and asserted a lien on the case. Mr. Kosmann retained new counsel, and the 
parties entered into extended negotiations regarding their attorney fee dispute in that case. 
Meanwhile, Mr. Kosmann filed Kosmann v. Dinius, Case No. CV-2017-568, alleging claims of 
professional negligence and breach of contract against Mr. Dinius. 
With the agreement of the parties, the Court set mediation before Hon. Stephen Dunn to 
address the parties' disputes over Mr. Dinius's attorney lien in Kosmann v. Gilbride and Mr. 
Kosmann's claims in Kosmann v. Dinius. At the conclusion of the mediation, the parties reached 
a settlement agreement, which was summarized and agreed to on the record. The agreement 
included payment of thirty-two thousand forty-seven dollars and nineteen cents ($32,047.19) to 
Mr. Kosmann, a release of all claims between Mr. Kosmann and Mr. Dinius, an agreement that 
each party would bear its own costs and fees, confidentiality, and nondisparagement between the 
parties. Mediation Hearing Transcr. 2:10- 3:6 (Jul. 26, 2017). 
Mr. Dinius later filed a Motion to Enforce Settlement, asking the Court to enforce the 
agreement entered on the record. Mr. Kosmann filed a Cross-Motion to Enforce Settlement, 
seeking to enforce a purported agreement reached earlier in the mediation. After considering 
briefs and arguments by the parties, the Court determined the settlement agreement entered on 
the record was enforceable, and issued a Memorandum Decision and Order to Enforce 
Settlement and Order to Release Funds ("Order to Enforce Settlement"). 
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After the cross-motions to enforce settlement were taken under advisement and prior to 
the entry of the Order to Enforce Settlement, Plaintiff filed Kosmann's Motion for Sanctions 
against Dinius and Dunbar for Obtaining a Settlement Through Unethical Behavior and Then 
Repeatedly Refusing to Admit and Remedy Their Violations, At Great Expense to Kosmann 
("Kosmann's Motion for Sanctions"). Defendants filed an Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion: for 
Sanctions and a Motion for Sanctions against Mr. Kosmann and his counsel, Loren Messerly, 
which Plaintiff opposed. The parties also filed reply briefs in support of their respective motions 
for sanctions. 
A hearing on the cross-motions for sanctions was held on November 8, 2017. At the 
hearing, Defendants moved to strike Exhibit A to Plaintiff's Affidavit of Counsel in Opposition 
to Defendants' Motion for Sanctions. The Court heard arguments on all pending motions and 
took the matter under advisement. 
III. 
LEGAL STANDARDS GOVERNING IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS 
District courts have the authority to impose sanctions on a party or attorney stemming 
from several sources in the law, including the Idaho Code and the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure. The ability to impose sanctions empowers trial courts to confront common issues 
that arise during litigation. The decision whether or not to impose a sanction in within the 
discretion of the district court. State v. Rogers, 143 Idaho 320, 322, 144 P.3d 25, 27 (2006). On 
appeal, a reviewing court "will not overrule the trial court's determination unless the trial court 
clearly abused its discretion." Id. 
In reviewing an exercise of discretion, [the Idaho Supreme Court] determines 
whether the trial court: ( 1) "correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion"; (2) 
"acted within the outer boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any 
legal standards applicable to specific choices"; and (3) "reached its decision by an 
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exercise of reason." If all three factors exist, the district court's ruling is beyond 
the purview of this Court. 
Id. See also Kantor v. Kantor, 160 Idaho 810, 819, 379 P.3d 1080, 1089 (2016). 
IV. 
DISCUSSION 
A. Neither Party Is Entitled to Sanctions Under I.R.C.P. 11. 
Both parties request sanctions under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 11, which imposes the 
following requirements upon Idaho attorneys: 
(b) Representations to the Court. By presenting to the court a pleading, written 
motion, or other paper, whether by signing, filing, or submitting, or later advocating it, an attorney or unrepresented party certifies that to the best of the 
person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable 
under the circumstances: 
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause 
unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation; 
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing 
law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing 
existing law or for establishing new law; 
(3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so 
identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity 
for further investigation or discovery; and 
( 4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if 
specifically so identified, are reasonably based on belief or a lack of 
information. 
I.R.C.P. ll(b). The Rule goes on to require the imposition of appropriate sanctions on any 
attorney, law firm, or party found to have violated the requirements in Rule ll(b). I.R.C.P. 
1 l(c). Sanctions under Rule 11 may include reasonable expenses and attorney's fees, in addition 
to nonmonetary directives. I.R.C.P. 1 l(c)(4). 
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Mr. Kosmann cites I.R.C.P. 11 as a basis for imposing sanctions against Mr. Dinius for 
violating Idaho R. Prof. Conduct 4.2 and against Ms. Dunbar for violating Idaho R. Prof. 
Conduct 4.2 and 8.4. Mr. Kosmann claims Mr. Dinius violated Idaho R. Prof. Conduct 4.2 by 
meeting with Mr. Kosmann outside the presence of Mr. Messerly without Mr. Messerly's 
permission. Mr. Kosmann states that Mr. Dinius's attorney, Yvonne Dunbar, violated Idaho R. 
Prof. Conduct 8.4 by directing her client to meet with Mr. Kosmann in violation of Rule 4.2. Mr. 
Kosmann argues that Mr. Dinius's Motion to Enforce Settlement should not have been filed; or 
should have been withdrawn, because it seeks to enforce a settlement agreement that was 
reached in violation of the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct. As sanctions, Mr. Kosmann 
requests: (1) his post-mediation attorney fees; (2) a finding that the settlement agreement 
promoted by Defendants is void; (3) release of Ms. Kosmann's $32,000 in the Kosmann v. 
Gilbride case; and (4) removal of Ms. Dunbar as Mr. Dinius's counsel. 
Defendants argue that Mr. Dinius did not violate Rule 4.2 because Mr. Dinius was acting 
as a party, not as an attorney representing a client, when he met with Mr. Kosmann, so Rule 4.2 
did not prohibit their interaction. Mr. Dinius also states that Ms. Dunbar did not initiate the 
contact, nor did she direct Mr. Dinius on what to say or do during the meeting, and therefore 
Rule 8.4 was not violated. 
Defendants were justified m seeking enforcement of the settlement based on their 
interpretation of Idaho law on the enforceability of oral settlement agreements and their analysis 
of Rule 4.2, the comments thereto, and relevant case law. Idaho R. Prof. Conduct 4.2 states: 
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of the 
representation with a person the lawyer knows to be represented by another 
lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is 
authorized to do so by law or a court order. 
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The language of the Rule prohibits a lawyer "[i]n representing a client" from communicating 
about the subject of the representation with an opposing party the lawyer knows to be 
represented. Comment 2 to the Rule states that "[p ]arties to a matter may communicate directly 
with each other." The purpose of the Rule is to protect "a person who has chosen to be 
represented by a lawyer in a matter against possible overreaching by other lawyers who are 
participating in the matter, interference by those lawyers with the client-lawyer relationship, and 
the uncounseled disclosure of information relating to the representation. Idaho R. Prof. Conduct 
4.2 cmt. 1. A pro se lawyer has been found to be representing a client when he represents 
himself in a legal matter. Runsvold v. Idaho State Bar, 129 Idaho 419, 420 - 421, 925 P.2d 
1118, 1119- 1120 (1996). 
A survey of opinions from other jurisdictions does not reveal a uniform approach to the 
question of whether an attorney-litigant violates Rule 4.2 by meeting with a represented 
opponent. South Carolina courts have taken the position that an attorney who is not representing 
a client may contact a represented party. S.C. Bar Ethics Advisory Committee, Advisory Op. 92-
07, 1992 WL 810425 at *1 (April 1, 1992) ("We conclude that Rule 4.2 does not preclude 
contact by one individual with another represented individual, even though the contacting party 
is a lawyer, when the contact is not made in the course of representing a client."). See also S.C. 
Bar Ethics Advisory Committee, Advisory Opinion 11-04, 2011 WL 7657360 at * 1 (May 20, 
2011) ("[T]he prohibition against communications with a represented person does not apply '.to 
an attorney who is not 'representing a client."'). Likewise, the Supreme Court of Connecticut 
has held that Rule 4.2 was not violated where a represented attorney contacted an opposing 
party, based on the language of comment 2 and a finding that attorney was not "representing a 
client." Pinsky v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 216 Conn. 228, 235 - 236, 578 A.2d 1075, 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SANCTIONS - 6 
Page 168
1079 (Conn. 1990) ("While the plaintiff's conduct may have been less than prudent, it did not 
violate Rule 4.2."). 
In contrast, the New York Bar has taken the position that lawyers are always subject to 
Rule 4.2's "no contact" requirement. NY Eth. Op. 879, 2011 WL 7784089 (Sept. 27, 2011): 
[ A ]11 lawyers - whether they are pro se parties or represented parties or representatives of other parties in a matter - must (unless authorized by law) secure "prior consent" of opposing counsel under Rule 4.2(a) or give "reasonable 
advance notice" to opposing counsel under Rule 4.2(b) before communicating 
with a counterparty known to be represented by counsel. Under this interpretation of Rule 4.2, the usual rights of nonlawyer parties to engage in direct 
communications are outweighed by the lawyer's professional obligations to the system of justice and the goal of protecting represented parties. Our view reflects the fact that lawyers, by virtue of their professional status, have a unique responsibility to the system of justice that requires them to subordinate their personal interest in having direct communications with represented individuals 
unless the exacting conditions stated in Rule 4.2 are satisfied. 
Texas courts have similarly reasoned that a represented attorney should not be allowed, based on 
the language of Rule 4.2, to "do that which he would otherwise be unable to do if he represented 
himself, by simply employing a counsel of record." Vickery v. Commission for Lawyer 
Discipline, 5 S.W.3d 241,259 (Tex. App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 1999). 
This is an issue of first impression in Idaho, and Defendants have presented nonfrivolous 
arguments based on a good faith believe that Mr. Dinius's meeting with Mr. Kosmann was 
permissible under Rule 4.2. If Mr. Dinius had been representing himself pro se in this matter, 
under Runsvold, Rule 4.2 would have prohibited his communication with Mr. Kosmann. 
However, Runsvold did not address the scenario presented here: whether an attorney litigant who 
is represented by counsel may speak to a represented, non-attorney opposing party. Mr. Dinius 
and Ms. Dunbar had a legitimate basis to believe that the contact between Mr. Dinius and Mr. 
Kosmann was permissible based on the text of Rule 4.2, the comments thereto, and cases from 
Idaho and elsewhere. Mr. Dinius's subsequent request that the Court enforce the settlement 
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agreement reached at mediation was not frivolous, unwarranted by existing fact or law, nor was 
it filed for an improper purpose. Sanctions are therefore not warranted against Mr. Dinius or Ms. 
Dunbar under Rule 11. 
Defendants also seek sanctions against Mr. Kosmann and Mr. Messerly pursuant to 
I.R.C.P. l l(b), arguing that Plaintiffs opposition to Defendants' Motion to Enforce Settlement 
and Plaintiffs Motion for Sanctions were frivolous and unwarranted by existing law or fact. 1 
Defendants seek attorney's fees for 40.6 hours of billable time expended in prosecuting their 
Motion to Enforce Settlement and an estimated 5 to 7 hours for defending against Plaintiffs 
Motion for Sanctions. Mr. Kosmann opposes Defendants' claims for sanctions, arguing that his 
actions have been made in an attempt to counter Mr. Dinius's unethical conduct and to enforce 
the purported agreement in place prior to Mr. Dinius and Mr. Kosmann's one-on-one meeting. 
Just as Defendants could reasonably interpret Rule 4.2 to allow the Dinius-Kosmann 
meeting, Plaintiff reasonably sought to overturn the settlement agreement based on his 
interpretation of and nonfrivolous argument for extending Rule 4.2 and Runsvold. Plaintiff 
argued that the meeting constituted a violation of Rule 4.2 and rendered the agreement void for 
public policy. As stated above, whether Mr. Dinius violated Rule 4.2 by meeting with Mr. 
Kosmann has not been directly addressed by the Idaho appellate courts. The Rule and comments 
are silent as to whether an attorney who is also a party runs afoul of the rule by communicatit;1g 
with a non-lawyer opposing party. Runsvold dealt with a similar, but not identical, issue in 
determining that an attorney who represents himself pro se violated the rule by meeting with a 
represented opposing party. However, Idaho courts have not determined whether an attorney, 
1 Defendants also request sanctions against Mr. Kosmann and his counsel for filing Kosmann's Motion for Sanctions under I.R.C.P. ll(a) because the memorandum in support of the Motion was unsigned. The version of Plaintiffs memorandum in support received by the Court is signed, and this is therefore not a basis for sanctions. 
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who is a party to a lawsuit and represented by counsel, may speak to his represented, non-
attorney opponent. 
Since no Idaho court has previously addressed this precise issue, it was reasonable for 
Mr. Kosmann and Mr. Messerly to argue that a logical extension of Runsvold would prohibit an 
attorney-litigant from avoiding the requirements of Rule 4.2 simply by hiring counsel to 
represent him. Tenaciously arguing a nonfrivolous interpretation, extension, or modification of 
this unsettled issue of Idaho law is not sanctionable conduct. Plaintiffs position that Mr. 
Dinius's meeting with Mr. Kosmann rendered the settlement agreement unenforceable and 
warranted the imposition of sanctions, while not prevailing, is not frivolous or unwarranted by 
existing law. Those arguments and the briefs filed to advance them do not support imposition of 
Rule 11 sanctions. 
B. The Rules of Professional Conduct Do Not Provide a Basis for Sanctions by a 
District Court. 
Even if the Court were to determine that the meeting between Mr. Dinius and Mr. 
Kosmann constituted a clear violation of Rule 4.2, district courts do not have authority to 
sanction attorneys for violations of the professional rules. The Idaho Rules of Professional 
Conduct work within a larger legal context to shape a lawyer's professional role. The Scope 
the Rules clearly articulates their regulatory role: 
[14) The Rules of Professional Conduct are rules of reason. They should be 
interpreted with reference to the purposes of legal representation and of the law 
itself. Some of the Rules are imperatives; cast in the terms "shall" or "shall not." 
These define proper conduct for purposes of professional discipline. Others, 
generally cast in the term "may," are permissive and define areas under the Rules 
in which the lawyer has discretion to exercise professional judgment. No 
disciplinary action should be taken when the lawyer chooses not to act or acts 
within the bounds of such discretion. Other Rules define the nature of 
relationships between the lawyer and others. The Rules are thus partly obligatory 
and disciplinary and partly constitutive and descriptive in that they define a 
lawyer's professional role. Many of the Comments use the term "should." 
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Comments do not add obligations to the Rules but provide guidance for practicing 
in compliance with the Rules. 
(19] Failure to comply with an obligation or prohibition imposed by a Rule is a 
basis for invoking the disciplinary process. The Rules presuppose that disciplinary 
assessment of a lawyer's conduct will be made on the basis of the facts and 
circumstances as they existed at the time of the conduct in question and in 
recognition of the fact that a lawyer often has to act upon uncertain or incomplete 
evidence of the situation. Moreover, the Rules presuppose that whether or not 
discipline should be imposed for a violation, and the severity of a sanction, 
depend on all the circumstances, such as the willfulness and seriousness of the 
violation, extenuating factors and whether there have been previous violations. 
[20) Violation of a Rule should not itself give rise to a cause of action against a 
lawyer nor should it create any presumption in such a case that a legal duty has 
been breached. In addition, violation of a Rule does not necessarily warrant any 
other nondisciplinary remedy, such as disqualification of a lawyer in pending 
litigation. The Rules are designed to provide guidance to lawyers and to provide a 
structure for regulating conduct through disciplinary agencies. They are not 
designed to be a basis for civil liability. Furthermore, the purpose of the Rules can 
be subverted when they are invoked by opposing parties as procedural weapons. 
The fact that a Rule is a just basis for a lawyer's self-assessment, or for 
sanctioning a lawyer under the administration of a disciplinary authority, does not 
imply that an antagonist in a collateral proceeding or transaction has standing to 
seek enforcement of the Rule. Nevertheless, since the Rules do establish standards 
of conduct by lawyers, a lawyer's violation of a Rule may be evidence of breach 
of the applicable standard of conduct. 
Idaho R. Prof. Conduct SCOPE. The disciplinary process is contained in rules established by the 
Board of Commissioners of the Idaho State Bar and approved by the Idaho Supreme Court. LC. 
§ 3-412; Idaho Bar Commn. R. 500, et seq. Violations of the Idaho Rules of Professional 
Conduct should be raised with the Idaho State Bar. 
None of the sources cited above provide for the imposition of sanctions by a district court 
for violation of the professional rules. Thus, the Court has no basis or authority to sanction Mr. 
Dinius or Ms. Dunbar for their alleged violation of Rule 4.2 or Ms. Dunbar's alleged violation bf 
Rule 8.4. 
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C. Neither Party Is Entitled to Attorney Fees under I.C. § 12-121 or I.R.C.P. 54(e)(2). 
Idaho Code§ 12-121 and I.R.C.P. 54(3) allow a court to award fees to a prevailing party 
in a civil action under certain circumstances. "In any civil action, the judge may award 
reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party or parties when the judge finds that the case was 
brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation." I.C. § 12-121. 
A party must present some argument as to why fees should be awarded pursuant to I.C. § 12-121. 
"A citation to statutes and rules authorizing fees, without more, in insufficient." Carroll v. 
MBNA America Bank, 148 Idaho 261,270,220 P.3d 1080, 1089 (2009). 
Rule 54 does not provide additional authority to award attorney fees; it merely provides 
the procedure for doing so when they are otherwise provided for by a statute, such as I.C. § 12-
121, or contract. Capps v. FIA Card Services, NA., 149 Idaho 737, 744, 240 P.3d 583, 590 
(2010). I.R.C.P. 54 states, "[i]n any civil action the court may award reasonable attorney fees, 
including paralegal fees, to the prevailing party or parties as defined in Rule 54( d)(l )(B), when 
provided for by any statute or contract." The Rule includes the following guidance on deciding 
which party has "prevailed" for purposes of the Rule: 
Prevailing Party. In determining which party to an action is a prevailing party and 
entitled to costs, the trial court must, in its sound discretion, consider the final 
judgment or result of the action in relation to the relief sought by the respective 
parties. The trial court may determine that a party to an action prevailed in part 
and did not prevail in part, and on so finding may apportion the costs between and 
among the parties in a fair and equitable manner after considering all of the issues 
and claims involved in the action and the resulting judgment or judgments 
obtained. 
I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B). The determination of whether a party is the prevailing party for purposes 
of an attorney fee award is within the discretion of the trial court, and is reviewed on appeal for 
an abuse of discretion. Silver Creek Seed, LLC v. Sunrain Varieties, LLC, 161 Idaho 270, 275, 
385 P.3d 448,453 (2016); see also Mihalka v. Shepherd, 145 Idaho 547, 549, 181 P.3d 473, 415 
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(2008). A district court "has the discretion to decline an award of attorney fees when it 
determines that both parties have prevailed in part." Hobson Fabricating Corp. v. SEIZ Const., 
LLC, 154 Idaho 45, 49,294 P.3d 171, 175 (2012). 
Each party cites LC. § 12-121 and LR.C.P. 54 as bases for awarding fees against the 
other. However, this Court finds that neither party is the "prevailing party" under the statute, 
because the parties agreed to a settlement and release of their claims and, in so doing, further 
agreed to bear their own costs and fees. Transcr. 2:10 - 15. Additionally, as explained above, 
the Court does not find that either party's position was taken "frivolously, unreasonably or 
without foundation," and thus sanctions are not warranted under LC.§ 12-121 or LR.C.P. 54(e). 
D. Plaintiff's Supplemental Brief, Filed After the Hearing and without Court Approval, Necessitated Defendants' Motion to Strike. 
Defendants also seek attorney's fees for one (1) hour of billable time expended in 
preparing and prosecuting their Motion to Strike Kosmann' s Supplemental Brief. The Motion to 
Strike was filed in response to Plaintiff's Supplemental Brief in Support of David Kosmanµ's 
Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement, filed after a hearing on the cross-motions to enforce 
settlement. Mr. Kosmann did not obtain prior permission from the Court to file supplemen;tal 
materials, nor did he file a Motion for Leave with the Supplemental Brief. After Defend~ts 
filed their Motion to Strike, Mr. Kosmann filed a Motion for Leave, which this Court granted. 
The Rules of Procedure set forth specific filing requirements and deadlines for briefs. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 7(b )(3) sets forth the time limits for filing affidavits, memoran~a 
! 
and briefs in relation to a motion that has been set for a hearing. Rule 7(b )(3)(H) provides tha~ a 
court may make an exception to the time limits upon a showing of good cause. Additionally, 
Rule 2.2(b)(l)(B) states that a deadline may be extended on a party's motion if the party shows 
that it failed to act because of excusable neglect. 
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In his Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Sanctions, Mr. Kosmann argues that "[t]here 
is not even a rule that requires a motion for leave." Opposition at 8. This is not accurate. 
I.R.C.P. 7 lays out specific pre-hearing briefing deadlines, and I.R.C.P. 2.2 provides the 
procedure for extending a filing deadline. Mr. Kosmann's filing of his Supplemental Brief 
without an accompanying motion for leave or approval from the Court was not warranted under 
existing law. I.R.C.P. 1 l(b). Further, Mr. Kosmann's filing of the Supplemental Brief 
necessitated Defendants' Motion to Strike, which then prompted Mr. Kosmann to remedy his 
earlier procedural mistake. The Court finds it appropriate to award Defendants attorney's fees 
for the time expended in preparing and prosecuting the Motion to Strike, and that the request for 
one (1) hour of billable time is reasonable. The court will, therefore, require Plaintiff to pay 
Defendant $200. 
E. Defendants' Oral Motion to Strike Will be Granted. 
At the hearing on this matter, Defendants moved to strike Exhibit A to Plaintiffs 
Affidavit of Counsel in Opposition to Defendants' Motion Seeking Sanctions. Exhibit A 
consists of an email exchange between Mr. Messerly and another attorney and a redacted copy! of 
a document entitled "Mutual Release and Settlement Agreement." The exhibit was submitted
1
to 
show that settlement agreements may include a release of liability that covers a party's attorneys. 
Aff. Loren Messerly 132 (Nov. 1, 2017). Defendants argued at the hearing that Exhibit A is :qot 
relevant to their Motion for Sanctions, because whether Mr. Messerly violated a professional nile 
at the mediation is not at issue in the Motion for Sanctions. Plaintiff countered that Exhibit A 
was relevant to prove that Plaintiff's conduct during the mediation was ethical, despite 
suggestions from Defendants during the mediation that Plaintiff's request to include Mr. 
Messerly on a release was unethical. 
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A party may raise a motion to strike at a hearing, and must "state with particularity the 
grounds for the relief sought including the number of the applicable civil rule, if any." I.R.C.P. 
7(b)(l). Defendants generally referenced Idaho Supreme Court cases allowing a party to make a 
motion to strike at a hearing, but did not provide specific authority. The stated basis for 
Defendants' motion was that the Exhibit was irrelevant. Relevance is an evidentiary standard 
governed by the Idaho Rules of Evidence. Under the rules, '"Relevant Evidence' means 
evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without evidence." 
I.R.E. 401. 
Exhibit A to Mr. Messerly's affidavit is not relevant to the substance of Defendants' 
Motion for Sanctions. The basis for Defendants' Motion is that Plaintiff should be sanctioned 
under Rule 11 by taking legal positions regarding the settlement agreement and Plaintiffs 
Motion for Sanctions that were either frivolous or unwarranted by existing law or fact. 
Defendants did not request sanctions against Plaintiff or his counsel on the basis that Mr. 
Messerly acted unethically. In fact, Defendants have taken the position that the Idaho Rules of 
Professional Conduct do not provide a basis for sanctions by a district court. Whether Mr. 
Messerly acted ethically in requesting or agreeing to a release covering him does not tend to 
make the existence of any fact relevant to Defendants' Motion for Sanctions more or less likely, 
and is, therefore, irrelevant. Defendant's oral motion to strike is granted. 




IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Mr. Kosmann's Motion for Sanctions is DENIED. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for Sanctions is DENIED IN 
PART as to fees incurred relating to Mr. Kosmann's opposition to Defendants' Motion to 
Enforce Settlement and Mr. Kosmann's Motion for Sanctions. Defendants' Motion for 
Sanctions is GRANTED IN PART as to one (1) billable hour in fees incurred in prosecuting 
Defendant's September 5, 2017 Motion to Strike, and Plaintiff is ORDERED to pay Defendant 
$200. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants' Oral Motion to Strike is GRANTED. J 
Dated this~ day of November, 2017. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned certifies that on __ day of November, 2017, s/he served a true and 
correct copy of the original of the foregoing on the following individuals via the Court's 
electronic filing system: 
Loren K. Messerly 
MESSERLY LAW, PLLC 
205 N. 10th Street, Ste. 300 
Boise, ID 83702 
Robert A. Anderson 
Yvonne A. Dunbar 
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP 
C.W. Moore Plaza 
250 S. Fifth St., Ste. 700 
P.O. Box 7426 
Boise, ID 83707-7426 
CHRIS YAMAMOTO, 
Clerk of the Court 
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F L E D 
Date I Time: 
CHRIS YAMAMOTO 
CLERK OFT E DISTRICT COURT 
B: 41., 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 





DAVID A. KOSMANN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KEVIN DINIUS an individual; and DINIUS & 
ASSOCIATES, PLLC, an Idaho professional 
limited liability company, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-2013-795-C 
Case No. CV-2017-568-C 
JUDGMENT 
JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: the funds held by the Court in Kosmann v. 
Gilbride, in the amount of total thirty-two thousand forty-seven dollars and nineteen cents 
($32,047.19), shall be immediately released as follows: 
• Fifteen Thousand Dollars ($15,000.00) to Anderson, Julian & Hull LLP at the address 
below; and 
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• Seventeen Thousand Forty-Seven Dollars and Nineteen Cents ($17,047.19) to Messerly 
Law, PLLC at the address below; 
Defendants shall pay to Kosmann the amount of Fifteen Thousand Dollars ($15,000.00), 
by delivering that amount to Messerly Law, PLLC at the address below within thirty (30) days of 
this Judgment. Dinius's attorney lien, filed in Kosmann v. Gilbride, Case No. CV-2013-795-C, 
is hereby dismissed; 
Plaintiff shall pay Defendants $200 within thirty (30) days of this Judgment; and 
Based upon the settlement reached by the parties in the above-captioned matters, found to 
be enforceable by this Court, Kosmann v. Gilbride, Case No. CV-2013-795-C is resolved in its 
entirety and dismissed ~~1if rejudice. 





Signed: 11/22/2017 04:25 PM
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned certifies that on __ day of November, 2017, s/he served a true and 
correct copy of the original of the foregoing on the following individuals via the Court's 
electronic filing system: 
James G. Reid 
KAUFMAN REID, PLLC 
1211 W. Myrtle St., Ste. 350 
Boise, ID 83702 
Loren K. Messerly 
MESSERLY LAW, PLLC 
205 N. 10th Street, Ste. 300 
Boise, ID 83 702 
Kevin E. Dinius 
Sarah Hallock-Jayne 
DINIUS LAW 
5680 E. Franklin Rd., Ste. 130 
Nampa, ID 83687 
Robert A. Anderson 
Yvonne A. Dunbar 
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP 
C.W. Moore Plaza 
250 S. Fifth St., Ste. 700 
P.O. Box 7426 
Boise, ID 83707-7426 
CHRIS YAMAMOTO, 
Clerk of the Court 
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This matter is before the Court on two motions: (1) Plaintiff’s Motion to Reconsider, 
filed under seal on December 5, 2017 and (2) Defendants’ Second Motion to Strike, filed 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
AND DEFENDANTS’ SECOND MOTION TO STRIKE - 1 
Signed: 1/24/2018 03:30 PM
Page 181
F I L E D 
Date I Time: 
CHRIS YAMAMOTO 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
By: dl+L 




The parties to this matter participated in a mediation on July 26, 2017 with Hon. Stephen 
Dunn.  After several hours of mediation, Mr. Kosmann left the room to which he and his 
attorney, Loren Messerly, had been assigned for the mediation proceeding.  Mr. Kosmann asked 
Judge Dunn if he (Kosmann) could meet privately with Dinius.  The parties then met one-on-
one, and agreed to settle their disputes for approximately $32,000.00 with the understanding that 
Mr. Dinius would not pursue any future litigation against Mr. Messerly.   
After Mr. Kosmann’s meeting with Mr. Dinius, Mr. Kosmann returned to the room where 
Mr. Messerly was waiting.  Mr. Kosmann and Mr. Messerly discussed the meeting and the 
agreement that Mr. Kosmann and Mr. Dinius had reached.  Mr. Messerly stated that the meeting 
had been improper and that he did not condone the agreement.  Mr. Messerly further advised Mr. 
Kosmann that he could commit to the approximately $32,000 settlement agreement and bring an 
end to the litigation, or pursue the enforcement of a purported $40,000 agreement discussed 
earlier in the process.   
Kosmann decided to accept the $32,000 settlement agreement and end the litigation.  The 
parties stipulated to the settlement agreement on the court record.  A dispute later arose regarding 
the enforceability of the agreement, and the parties filed cross-motions to enforce their respective 
versions of the agreement.  The parties also filed cross-motions for sanctions.  On November 3, 
2017, the Court enforced the agreement reached at the end of mediation in its Memorandum 
Decision and Order to Enforce Settlement Agreement and Order to Release Funds.  On 
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November 22, 2017, the Court denied the sanctions requested by the parties in its Memorandum 
Decision and Order on Parties’ Cross-Motions for Sanctions and entered Judgment.   
On December 5, 2017, Plaintiff David Kosmann filed Plaintiff’s Motion to Reconsider 
and Second Supplemental Declaration of David A. Kosmann.  On December 24, Mr. Kosmann 
untimely filed Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Support of His Motion to Reconsider and Declaration 
of Counsel in Support of Kosmann’s Motion to Reconsider.  On December 27, Plaintiff untimely 
filed the Exhibits to the Declaration of Counsel.  Defendants filed an Opposition to Plaintiff’s 
Motion to Consider and Affidavit of Yvonne Dunbar in Support of Opposition to Kosmann’s 
Motion to Reconsider.  Plaintiff filed a timely Plaintiff’s Reply Memorandum in Support of His 
Motion to Reconsider.  
Defendants subsequently filed a Second Motion to Strike and a Memorandum in Support 
of Defendant’s Second Motion to Strike, asking the Court to disregard materials associated with 
Plaintiff’s Motion to Reconsider and to strike the declarations filed by Plaintiff, either in full or 
in part.  Plaintiff filed an Opposition to Defendants’ Second Motion to Strike.  Defendants 
subsequently filed a Reply in Support of Defendants’ Second Motion to Strike and Affidavit of 
Yvonne Dunbar in Support of Defendants’ Second Motion to Strike.     
III. 
ANALYSIS 
A. Defendants’ Second Motion to Strike.  
Defendants moved to strike Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Support of His Motion to 
Reconsider and the Declaration of Counsel in Support of Kosmann’s Motion to Reconsider on 
the basis that these documents were untimely filed.  Defendants also ask the Court to strike 
portions of the Second Supplemental Declaration of David A. Kosmann and the Declaration of 
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Counsel in Support of Kosmann’s Motion to Reconsider, which they state are inadmissible under 
various evidentiary rules.  
1. Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Support of His Motion to Reconsider, the 
Declaration of Counsel in Support of Kosmann’s Motion to Reconsider, and 
the Exhibits to the Declaration of Counsel were Untimely Filed and Will Be 
Stricken.   
 
Defendants argue that I.R.C.P. 11.2(b), as applied in Franklin Bldg. Supply Co. v. Hymas, 
157 Idaho 632, 642, 339 P.3d 357, 367 (2014) and Marek v. Hecla, Ltd., 161 Idaho 211, 221, 384 
P.3d 975, 985 (2016), requires a party to file any affidavits or memoranda in support of a motion 
to reconsider within 14 days of a final judgment or order after judgment.  Defendants further 
assert that the deadline set under I.R.C.P. 7(b)(3)(A) is rendered inapplicable by I.R.C.P. 
7(b)(3)(I), because the Memorandum in Support was subject to a different time limit provided by 
another rule of civil procedure.   
Plaintiff concedes that, under Franklin Bldg. Supply Co. and Marek, he was required to 
file his Memorandum in Support and the Declaration of Counsel within the 14-day deadline 
contained in Rule 11.2.  Plaintiff explains that the Memorandum and Declaration of Counsel 
were filed after the 14-day deadline based on Plaintiff’s counsel’s interpretation of the plain 
language of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.  Plaintiff requests that the Court exercise its 
discretion to excuse this error and consider the late-filed Memorandum and Declaration of 
Counsel, citing Marek, 161 Idaho at 221, 384 P.3d at 985.   
Based on I.R.C.P. 11.2, Franklin Bldg. Supply Co. v. Hymas, and Marek v. Hecla, Ltd., 
the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Support of His Motion to Reconsider and the 
Declaration of Counsel in Support of Kosmann’s Motion to Reconsider were untimely.  
“Although Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 11(a)(2)(B) does not require a movant to support a 
motion for reconsideration with a brief or affidavit, [a] movant who does so . . . must serve the 
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affidavit and brief with the motion and within the period of time for filing the motion.”  Marek, 
161 Idaho at 221, 384 P.3d at 985.   
Plaintiff has not requested leave to file untimely pleadings.  Nor does the Court find good 
cause or excusable neglect warranting an extension of the filing deadline.  Plaintiff’s counsel has 
an obligation to familiarize himself with and follow Idaho law governing applicable filing 
deadlines.  The explanation that counsel was unaware of the controlling cases is unavailing.  
Secured Inv. Corp v. Myers Executive Bldg., LLC, 162 Idaho 105, 394 P.3d 807, 814 – 815 (Ct. 
App. 2016) (A mistake of law, including lack of knowledge of filing deadlines, does not 
constitute excusable neglect.)  This is the second time in this case that Plaintiff has filed untimely 
documents without first filing a motion for leave.  In the exercise of the Court’s discretion, it 
declines to consider the late-filed Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Support of His Motion to 
Reconsider and Declaration of Counsel in Support of Kosmann’s Motion to Reconsider.  Those 
documents are stricken from the record.   
2. The Use of an Electronic Signature Does Not Warrant Striking the Second 
Supplemental Declaration of David A. Kosmann in its Entirety.  
 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 2.7 states that a party may file a declaration under oath in 
lieu of an affidavit, on the condition that the declaration complies with Idaho Code § 9-1406.  
Defendants argue that Kosmann’s Declaration does not satisfy the requirement in § 9-1406 that 
the declaration be “subscribed” (i.e., signed) because it was signed by an electronic signature.   
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 2.1 states that “[a]n electronic signature may be used on 
any document that is transmitted electronically, and a notary’s seal may be in electronic form.”  
Where a mandatory e-filing requirement is now in place in this judicial district, it would be 
contrary to the e-filing rule promulgated by the Idaho Supreme Court to require litigants or 
attorneys to prepare a document electronically, print and sign a hard copy, and then scan the 
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document into a digital format to submit it to a court.  See Idaho Supreme Court, In re: Order 
Amending Rule on Electronic Filing and Service, https://www.isc.idaho.gov/main/idaho-court-
rules (Dec. 20, 2016).  Although Kosmann’s electronic signature does not contain the “/s/” 
designation that it is an electronic signature, it is clear that his typed name is intended as an 
electronic signature.  There is no indication that the Declaration is not that of Mr. Kosmann or 
that Mr. Kosmann did not read and approve it prior to it being filed.  The Court finds that the 
Declaration is “subscribed” as required by I.C. § 9-1406. 
3. Portions of the Second Supplemental Declaration of David A. Kosmann Are 
Inadmissible.  
 
Defendant makes a number of evidentiary arguments that certain portions of Kosmann’s 
Declaration should be stricken, which the Court will address individually.  Defendants generally 
object to Mr. Kosmann’s use of the word “secret” in describing the meeting between Mr. 
Kosmann and Mr. Dinius because “such a claim is contrary to Kosmann’s testimony that he 
requested and participated in the meeting” and because it is unfairly prejudicial under I.R.E. 403.  
The implication in these statements is clearly that the meeting was kept secret from Mr. 
Messerly, not Mr. Kosmann.  As such, it is not so patently inaccurate or unfairly prejudicial as to 
warrant striking the word “secret” from the Declaration.   
Defendants seek to have paragraph 3 stricken on the basis that the statements attributed to 
Judge Dunn are inadmissible hearsay.  The Court declines to strike Paragraph 3, where it appears 
that the statements of Judge Dunn are not hearsay because they were presented for a purpose 
other than to prove the truth of the matter asserted.  I.R.E. 801(c).  Specifically, the alleged 
statements of Judge Dunn included in paragraph 3 appear to be introduced to show their effect on 
Kosmann.  Inadmissible hearsay may be admissible to prove its effect on the listener where such 
an effect is relevant.  State v. Parker, 157 Idaho 132, 145, 334 P.3d 806, 819 (2014).  Here, the 
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effect of Judge Dunn’s alleged statements on Kosmann are relevant to show why Kosmann 
claimed he ultimately decided at mediation to agree to accept the approximately $32,000.00 
settlement.  The Court will not strike paragraph 3.  
Defendants next seek to strike paragraph 4 to the extent it conflicts with statements made 
by Mr. Kosmann on the record after the mediation.  Defendants have not directed the Court to 
any legal authority stating that conflicting evidence is inadmissible, and the Court is not aware of 
any such rule.  For these reasons, the Court declines to strike paragraph 4.  
Defendants ask the Court to strike paragraph 7, arguing that the statements attributed to 
Mr. Messerly are inadmissible hearsay and that Mr. Kosmann lacks personal knowledge as to 
Mr. Messerly’s state of mind of being “highly agitated.”  Whether a person appears angry or 
“highly agitated” is a permissible lay witness opinion, as it may be “rationally based on the 
perception of the witness.”  I.R.E. 701.  However, the statements of Mr. Messerly contained in 
the second and third sentences of paragraph 7 are inadmissible hearsay, where they present 
statements by Mr. Messerly that are apparently intended to prove the truth of the matters 
asserted, and where no exception applies.  The second and third sentences of paragraph 7 are 
therefore stricken from Kosmann’s Declaration and will not be considered by the Court.   
Similarly, paragraphs 8 and 9 consist almost exclusively of inadmissible hearsay 
statements by Mr. Messerly, and include double hearsay statements of Bar Counsel, Dinius, 
Dunbar, and Judge Dunn.  The Court hereby strikes these two paragraphs in their entirety, with 
the exception of the non-hearsay portion of paragraph 8 stating: “Dinius had convinced me, 
during our meeting, that the release was okay after all.” 
Like the alleged statements of Judge Dunn contained in paragraph 3, the Court finds that 
Judge Dunn’s alleged statements in paragraphs 10 and 11 were included to show their effect on 
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Mr. Kosmann, and not to prove the truth of the matter asserted.  The statements are therefore not 
hearsay under I.R.E. 801, and are admissible.   
Defendants also move to strike the first and third sentences of paragraph 12, on the basis 
that Mr. Kosmann lacks personal knowledge as to Judge Dunn’s state of mind.  This objection is 
well-taken, and those sentences are hereby stricken on the basis that they are inadmissible under 
I.R.E. 602, because they are not based on the personal knowledge of the witness.  Defendants 
objected to the remainder of paragraph 12 on the basis of hearsay, but because the remaining 
sentences do not describe any out-of-court “statements,” the Court finds that they are not hearsay 
and are admissible.  
Defendants ask the Court to strike paragraph 13, arguing again that statements attributed 
to Judge Dunn are inadmissible hearsay.  The Court finds that the statements of Judge Dunn 
contained in that paragraph are introduced for their effect on Mr. Kosmann (the listener), and are 
not hearsay.  With regard to paragraph 14, the statements of Mr. Messerly are relevant for their 
effect on Mr. Kosmann as the listener, and the remaining sentences are statements of fact and 
opinion which are rationally based on Mr. Kosmann’s perception of the events around him.  The 
Court will likewise allow the alleged statements of Mr. Messerly and Judge Dunn in Paragraph 
16, as those statements related to and informed Mr. Kosmann’s decision to settle his case.   
Finally, the Court will allow Paragraph 17 in its entirety, as it contains facts within the 
personal knowledge and based on the rational perception of Mr. Kosmann.   
B. Plaintiff’s Motion to Reconsider.  
Pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, “[a] motion to reconsider any order of the 
trial court entered before final judgment may be made at any time prior to or within 14 days after 
the entry of a final judgment.”  I.R.C.P. 11.2(b)(1).  A motion for reconsideration “allows the 
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court – when new law is applied to previously presented facts, when new facts are applied to 
previously presented law, or any combination thereof – to reconsider the correctness of an 
interlocutory order.”  International Real Estate Solutions, Inc. v. Arave, 157 Idaho 816, 819, 340 
P.3d 465, 468 (2014). 
A motion to reconsider will be reviewed using “the same standard of review that the 
court applied when deciding the original order that is being reconsidered.”  Westby v. Schaefer, 
157 Idaho 616, 621, 338 P.3d 1220, 1225 (2014).  The underlying orders in this case were made 
on cross-motions to enforce a settlement agreement and cross-motions for sanctions.  The cross-
motions to enforce settlement were treated as motions for summary judgment, with the Court 
determining whether any genuine issues of material fact existed and whether either party was 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Vanderford Co., Inc. v. Knudson, 150 Idaho 664, 672, 
249 P.3d 857, 865 (2011).  A decision granting or denying a motion for sanctions is within the 
discretion of the trial court, and reviewable for abuse of discretion.  Lester v. Salvino, 141 Idaho 
937, 939, 120 P.3d 755, 757 (Ct. App. 2005).  Upon review for abuse of discretion, an appellate 
court will determine:  
whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; whether 
the trial court acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently 
with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and 
whether the trial court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. 
 
Id.  
 The Court will therefore reconsider its decision on the cross-motions to enforce 
settlement under a summary judgment standard.  It will reconsider its decision on the cross-
motions for sanctions with the understanding that the decision to grant or deny those motions 
was within the Court’s discretion.  As stated above, the Court will not consider Plaintiff’s late-
filed documents, where no good cause or excusable neglect exists to excuse the delay and 
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Plaintiff did not seek leave of the Court to file an untimely brief pursuant to Rule 7.  Therefore, 
the Court will only consider Plaintiff’s Motion to Reconsider, Plaintiff’s Reply in Support of His 
Motion to Reconsider, and the portions of the Second Supplemental Declaration of David A. 
Kosmann not stricken as outlined above.   
 The timely filed pleadings largely present the same issues previously decided by the 
Court in its decisions.  Mr. Kosmann’s Declaration appears to be largely a reiteration of facts 
previously presented to the Court, and the Court finds that it does not raise a disputed issue of 
material fact warranting a different outcome in the Court’s decision on the cross-motions to 
enforce settlement.  Specifically, in reviewing the Court’s prior decisions in light of Plaintiff’s 
Motion to Reconsider, the Court finds as follows: 
1. The Court Correctly Decided the Cross-Motions to Enforce Settlement.  
 
The issue presented by the cross-motions to enforce settlement is whether an agreement 
stipulated to on the court record by the parties after mediation is enforceable if there was an 
alleged violation of Idaho R. Professional Conduct 4.2 during mediation, but after the violation 
the represented client conferred with his attorney, received legal advice from his attorney about 
his settlement options, and decided to accept the agreement.  This is clearly a matter of first 
impression.  Blake v. Starr, 146 Idaho 847, 852, 203 P.3d 1246, 1251 (2009) (A matter of first 
impression exists where a case involves the “determination of an issue not heretofore expressly 
decided” by the Idaho Supreme Court.). 
Idaho Supreme Court precedent tells us that: 
Oral stipulations of the parties in the presence of the court are generally held to be 
binding, especially when acted upon or entered on the court records.  Stipulations 
for the settlement of litigation are regarded with favor by the courts and will be 
enforced unless good cause to the contrary is shown.  An attempted stipulation is 
ineffective when it is clear from the record that the parties never assented to it.  A 
stipulation is a contract.  The enforceability of an oral stipulation is determined by 
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contract principles. Whether the parties to an oral agreement or stipulation 
become bound prior to the drafting and execution of a contemplated formal 
writing is largely a question of intent.  A contract must be complete, definite and 
certain in all its material terms, or contain provisions which are capable in 
themselves of being reduced to certainty.  
 
Kohring v. Robertson, 137 Idaho 94, 99, 44 P.3d 1149, 1154 (2002) (internal markings and 
citations omitted).   
This Court finds no reason to deviate from binding precedent that stipulated settlement 
agreements are enforceable.  Mr. Kosmann’s opportunity to consult with his attorney prior to 
assenting to the settlement agreement on the court record removed the potential for possible 
overreaching or interference by Mr. Dinius in his meeting with Mr. Kosmann.  In an affidavit 
previously submitted to the Court, Mr. Kosmann’s attorney, Loren Messerly, explained: 
I then told Kosmann that he had two options: 1) we would fight to get the $40,000 
settlement and enforce it, through more mediation that day or likely through a 
motion practice, with the unfortunate belief that Judge Dunn would do whatever 
he could to support the other side; or 2) he could take the $32,000 and be done but 
I would put on the record that I had not asked for Dinius’ verbal release and also 
the other highly irregular things that had happened during the mediation. . . .  
 
Kosmann wanted to be done and did not want to have to litigate for many more 
weeks to try and get back his $40,000 settlement. So he chose the 2nd option.  
 
Aff. Messerly ¶¶ 46 – 47 (Aug. 23, 2017).  After consulting with his attorney about those 
options, Mr. Kosmann chose to settle for approximately $32,000.00.  Mr. Kosmann went on to 
explain his decision on the record after mediation:  
I’ll express the same things I expressed with Kevin [Dinius].  It is my hope to be 
done today.  And I want to move forward with my life.  I feel comfortable with 
the agreement that I made with Kevin just from man to man, besides all the legal 
stuff.  Would I prefer having more money? Yes.  But I also want my peace of 
mind.  And I want to continue with my lawyer, Loren [Messerly], to go on to the 
litigation that I have ahead of me.  And I want bygones to be bygones between 
Kevin and I so that we can end on good terms and we can – we can both move on 
with our lives.   
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This did not end the way we wanted it to end today.  But from just man to man, 
today was the day that, you know, it’s time to move on and be done.  And I’m – 
I’m happy with it.  Loren has to protect himself for those types of things.  I want 
him to protect himself.  Probably didn’t do what he asked.  But I’m doing this for 
my own accord because today is the day to move forward. 
 
Transcr. 8:4 – 23.   
Mr. Kosmann consulted with Mr. Messerly prior to assenting to the settlement 
agreement.  Mr. Kosmann was apprised of his options, including disaffirming his agreement with 
Mr. Dinius, terminating the mediation, or accepting his agreement with Mr. Dinius and 
stipulating to it on the record.  A client has the ultimate authority to decide whether to settle his 
case, and Mr. Kosmann exercised that authority.  Idaho R. Prof. Conduct 1.2(a), cmt. 1.  If Mr. 
Kosmann had not had the opportunity to meet with Mr. Messerly prior to putting the settlement 
on the record, the Court’s decision may have been different.  However, given the facts presented, 
the Court affirms its decision that Mr. Kosmann knowingly and willingly entered into the 
settlement agreement after consulting with his attorney, and that the agreement was enforceable.   
2. The Rule 4.2 Issue Presented a Matter of First Impression Under Idaho Law.  
 
Plaintiff takes issue with the Court calling the Rule 4.2 issue in this case a matter of first 
impression.  This case does present an issue not previously addressed by the Idaho Supreme 
Court.  That Court has held that where an attorney represents him or herself pro se in litigation, 
he or she is “representing a client” within the meaning of that phrase in Idaho Rules of 
Professional Conduct 4.2, and therefore violates that rule if he or she contacts a represented 
opposing party without permission.  Runsvold v. Idaho State Bar, 129 Idaho 419, 421, 925 P.2d 
1118, 1120 (1996).  The Idaho Supreme Court has not addressed, in Runsvold or any other case 
brought to this Court’s attention, whether a represented attorney-litigant is “representing a client” 
if he or she meets with a represented opposing party.  The events which unfolded at the 
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mediation in this matter therefore presented an issue of first impression under Idaho law.  Based 
upon the Court’s analysis above, it did not need to decide whether an ethical violation occurred.   
3. The Court Declined to Decide Whether Dinius’s Conduct Constituted an 
Ethical Violation under Rule 4.2.  
 
Although Plaintiff has focused his briefing almost exclusively on whether the meeting 
between Mr. Kosmann and Mr. Dinius constituted an ethical violation, the Court’s decision that 
the settlement agreement was enforceable was actually grounded in a different issue.  
Specifically, the Court found that Mr. Kosmann had the opportunity to confer with his attorney 
after the meeting with Mr. Dinius and prior to agreeing to the settlement on the record.  Mr. 
Kosmann and Mr. Messerly discussed Mr. Kosmann’s options regarding the settlement, and his 
attorney provided him with advice on those options.  The Court found all of this was sufficient to 
overcome any potential overreaching or influence exerted by Mr. Dinius in the parties’ one-on-
one meeting.  Mr. Kosmann decided to settle after he had consulted and received the counsel of 
his attorney and was advised as to his options.  Mr. Kosmann is bound by his decision.   
In its subsequent consideration of the cross-motions for sanctions, the Court found that 
neither party had violated I.R.C.P. 11 in its briefing on the cross-motions for settlement.  The 
Court then reviewed various sources of authority to impose sanctions and determined that a 
potential violation of Rule 4.2, where I.R.C.P. 11 had not been violated, did not warrant invoking 
the Court’s inherent authority to impose sanctions.1  It was therefore not necessary on the cross-
motions to enforce settlement or the cross-motions for sanctions for the Court to determine 
whether or not an ethical violation occurred, and the Court declined to make such a 
determination.   
1 As stated in the Memorandum Decision and Order on Parties’ Cross-Motions for Sanctions, 
violations of the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct should be raised with the Idaho State Bar.  
See Idaho R. Prof. Conduct SCOPE; I.C. § 3-412; and Idaho Bar Commn. R. 500, et seq.  
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4. The Court Properly Exercised Discretion in Declining to Impose Sanctions 
against Defendants.  
 
Upon review of its Memorandum Decision and Order on Cross-Motions for Sanctions, 
the Court finds that it applied the correct discretionary standard in determining whether sanctions 
should be imposed upon the Defendants, and acted within the permissible bounds of its 
discretion in declining to impose sanctions.   
Plaintiff argues in his Reply Brief in Support of Motion to Reconsider that the Court 
could, and should, have exercised its inherent authority to impose sanctions against Dinius and 
Dunbar for ethical violations.  This Court acknowledges that a trial court may exercise inherent 
power to sanction a party who acts in bad faith, but also recognizes that the Rules of Civil 
Procedure, and particularly I.R.C.P. 11, were adopted “to provide guidance to the courts in the 
exercise of these inherent powers” and that, when possible, a court should rely on the rules in 
considering the appropriateness of a sanction, rather than its inherent powers.  Talbot v. Ames 
Const., 127 Idaho 648, 652 – 653, 904 P.2d 560, 564 – 565 (1995).  This Court determined that 
the motions for sanctions were most appropriately analyzed pursuant to I.R.C.P. 11, and declined 
to exercise its discretion to rely exclusively on its inherent authority to sanction conduct that the 
Court determined did not violate Rule 11.  
5. The $200 Sanction against Plaintiff’s Counsel Was Proper under the Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure.  
 
After a hearing on the cross-motions to enforce settlement, Plaintiff filed a supplemental 
brief, which was neither requested by the Court nor accompanied by a motion for leave to file 
additional materials.  This brief was untimely as it was filed after the hearing under I.R.C.P. 
7(b)(3), and it was not accompanied by a request for leave to file an untimely brief.  Defendants 
filed a Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s supplemental brief, on the bases that it was untimely and was 
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filed without the Court’s permission.  After Defendants filed their Motion to Strike, Plaintiff 
filed a Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Material.   
Defendants’ Motion to Strike was a direct result of Plaintiff’s improperly filed 
supplemental brief.  Defendants sought an award of attorney’s fees reasonably expended in 
preparing and prosecuting the Motion to Strike.  The request was for one (1) hour of billable 
time.  The Court recognized that the decision of whether to impose sanctions under I.R.C.P. 
11(b) was within its discretion.  The Court found that Plaintiff violated I.R.C.P. 11(b) by filing a 
brief not warranted by existing law (specifically the rules governing filing deadlines set forth in 
I.R.C.P. 7(b)(3) and 2.2(b)(1)(B)); that Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure necessitated Defendants’ filing of the Motion to Strike; and that Defendants’ request 




IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Reconsider is DENIED.  
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ Second Motion to Strike is GRANTED 




      _________________________________ 
      Gene A. Petty 
      District Judge 
  
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
AND DEFENDANTS’ SECOND MOTION TO STRIKE - 15 
Signed: 1/24/2018 11:47 AM
Page 195
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned certifies that on _____ day of January, 2018, s/he served a true and 
correct copy of the original of the foregoing on the following individuals via the Court’s 
electronic filing system: 
Loren K. Messerly 
MESSERLY LAW, PLLC 
205 N. 10th Street, Ste. 300 
Boise, ID 83702 
lorenmesserly@gmail.com 
 
Robert A. Anderson 
Yvonne A. Dunbar 
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP 
C.W. Moore Plaza 
250 S. Fifth St., Ste. 700 
P.O. Box 7426 
Boise, ID 83707-7426 
ydunbar@ajhlaw.com  
      CHRIS YAMAMOTO,  
Clerk of the Court 
 
      By: ___________________________ 
       Deputy Clerk of the Court 
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LorenK. Messerly, ISB # 7434 
Messerly Law, PLLC 
2350 E. Roanoke Dr. 
Boise, ID 83712 
Telephone {208) 407-2188 
lorenmesserly@gmail.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
J COTTLE, DEPUTY CLERK 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 





DAVID A. KOSMANN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KEVIN DINIUS an individual; and DINIUS 
& ASSOCIATES, PLLC, an Idaho professional 
limited liability company, 
Defendants. 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANTS: 
Case No. CV-2013-795-C 
Case No. CV-2017-568-C 
PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF 
APPEAL 
FILING FEE: $129.00 
CLERKF'EE: $100.00 
REPORTER'S FEE: $200.00 
Kevin Dinius and Diniuis & Associates, and their attorneys of record, Robert A. 
Anderson, Yvonne A. Dunbar of the firm Anderson, Julian & Hull LLP, and 
THE CLERK OF TIIE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
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1. The above-named Plaintiff, David A. Kosmann ("Kosmann"), hereby appeals 
from the Memorandum Decision and Order on Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider and Defendants' 
Second Motion to Strike, entered on the 24th day of January 2018, the Memorandum Decision 
and Order on Parties' Cross-Motions for Sanctions and Judgment, both entered on the 22nd day 
of November, 2017, and the Memorandum Decision and Order to E,iforce Settlement Agreement 
and Order to Release Funds, entered on the 3rd day of November 2017, by the Honorable Gene 
A Petty, District Judge presiding. A copy of these Orders and Judgment being appealed is 
attached to this notice. 
2. Kosmann bas a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court and the Orders and 
Judgment described in paragraph 1 above are appealable under and pursuant to Rule 11, Idaho 
Appellate Rules. A final judgment was entered in this case, on November 22, 2017, and then 
again on January 24, 2018 when the District Court denied a motion to reconsider that final 
judgment 
3. There is arguably a confidentiality agreement to not disclose the settlement terms 
that were reached in this matter. For that reason and in an abundance of caution, many or all of 
the filings after the Mediation date have been filed with a cover page indicating that they are 
"FILED UNDER SEAL." 
4. Kosmann intends to assert a number of issues on appeal including, but not limited 
to, the following: 
a. Did the Court err in rewarding Dinius and Dunbar for their unethical actions by using 
the power of the Court to enforce a settlement that Dinius and Dunbar only obtained by blatantly 
and egregiously violating IRPC 4.2. 
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b. Did the Court err in refusing to apply any number of various approaches that it could 
have used to reject a settlement that was obtained because of W1etbical actions by Dinius and 
Dunbar and over the objection of Kosmann 's counsel. 
c. Did the Court err in failing to affirmatively rule that Dinius and/or Dllllbar violated 
IRPC 4.2 by arranging for Dinius to meet with a represented party without that party's coW1Sel 
being present and without first obtaining the consent of that party's COW1Sel. 
d. Did the Court err in failing to affirmatively rule that Dinius and/or Dllllbar violated 
IRPC 4.2 by having Dinius renegotiate a settlement agreement with a represented party without 
that party's counsel being present and without first obtaining the consent of that party's counsel. 
e. Did the Court err in failing to affirmatively rule that Dinius and/or Dllllbar violated 
IRPC 4.2 by having Dinius give legal counsel to a represented party without that party's counsel 
being present and without first obtaining the consent of that party's counsel. 
f. Did the Court err by refusing to apply the Runsvo/d opinion from the Idaho Supreme 
Court that is directly on point and rejects Dinius and Dllllbar' s excuse for their ethical violations. 
g. Did the Court err in refusing to acknowledge and fulfill its important role in the Court 
system to utilize its inherent powers to sanction serious ethical violations by lawyers like those in 
this case. 
h. Did the Court err in failing to impose the logical sanctions for the damages caused by 
the W1ethical actions by Dinius and Dllllbar: reimburse the $8,000 settlement amoW1t that 
Kosmann was tricked and then threatened into giving up and paying the attorney fees for the 
work that Kosmann's attorney has had to perform to address the damages from Dinius's 
W1ethical actions that Dinius refused to volW1tarily remedy ( despite many opportWlities to fix his 
"mistake" without litigation expenses). 
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i. Did the Court err in granting the Defendants' request for Rule 11 sanctions against 
Kosmann and his attorney for merely filing a supplemental brief without filing a motion for 
leave to ask permission to file the supplemental brief. 
j. Did the Court err in granting the Defendants' request for Rule 11 sanctions against 
Kosmann and his attorney when it is undisputed that the Defendants did not comply with the 
safe-harbor requirements of Rule 11. 
k. Did the Court err in granting the Defendants' request for Rule 11 sanctions against 
Kosmann and his attorney when the request and imposition of that sanction appeared to be a 
retaliatory use of Rule 11 in order to punish Kosmann and his attorney for revealing the ethical 
violations by Defendant Dinius, his attorney Dunbar, and mediator Judge Dunn. 
l. Did the Court err in granting the Defendants' request for Rule 11 sanctions against 
Kosmann and his attorney for an indisputably trivial and disputable procedural error by counsel. 
m. Did the Court err in granting the Defendants' request for Rule 11 sanctions against 
Kosmann and his attorney for an alleged procedural error that was not an error. 
n. Did the Court err in granting the Defendants' request for Rule 11 sanctions against 
Kosmann and his attorney for an alleged procedural error by counsel that was fixed within two 
days after it was first raised by opposing counsel. 
o. Did the Court err in granting the Defendants' request for Rule 11 sanctions against 
Kosmann and his attorney without giving any explanation for why the sanctions were consistent 
with the large body of case law discussing the purpose of such sanctions. 
p. Did the Court err in granting the Defendants' request for Rule 11 sanctions against 
Kosmann and his attorney for alleged procedural errors that Defendants also committed several 
times during the litigation. 
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q. Did the Court err in granting the Defendants' request for Rule 11 sanctions against 
Kosmann and his attorney for an alleged procedural error that pales by comparison to the 
substantive ethical violations by Dinius and Dunbar that the Court allowed to go completely 
unpunished. 
r. Did the Court err in granting the Defendants' request for Rule 11 sanctions against 
Kosmann and his attorney for an alleged procedural error that caused no prejudice to Defendants. 
s. Did the Court err in granting the Defendants' request for Rule 11 sanctions against 
Kosmann and his attorney for an alleged procedural error that is easily resolved without resort to 
a monetary sanction. 
t. Did the Court err in not imposing sanctions on Defendants for their repeated frivolous 
requests for Rule 11 sanctions and Plaintiff and his counsel, which requests were an attempt to 
intimidate and harass. 
u. Did the Court err in not considering a Memorandum in Support of the Motion to 
Reconsider and Affidavit of Counsel that were inadvertently filed untimely but that included 
highly relevant arguments and evidence to help the Court avoid judicial error. 
v. Did the Court err in striking certain evidence that was relevant to the central issues of 
this case. 
w. Should Dinius have to pay Kosmann's counsel's attorney fees on appeal as part of the 
sanction for his conduct in violating the ethical rules and then failing to remedy the violation and 
instead forcing Kosmann to have to bring this appeal. 
Kosmann reserves the right to add additional issues on appeal and to revise and/or restate 
the issue set forth above. See IAR 17(t). 
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5. Kosmann requests the preparation of an electronic version of the reporter's 
transcript of the hearings on August 31, 2017 (Kathy Klemetson), October 2, 2017 (Monica 
Fuhs), and November 8, 2017 (Kathy Klemetson), before the Honorable Gene A Petty, District 
Judge presiding. The transcript from what was put on the record after the mediation on July 26, 
ri-k: t: ~ 
2017 has already been filed and included in the record of this case and it is requested that it be 
included in the Clerk's Record. 
6. Kosmann requests that any and all documents filed with the Court Case No. CV-
2017-568-C from August 2, 2017, up to and including the filing and issuance of the Court's 
Memorandum Decision and Order on Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider and Defendants' Second 
Motion to Strike, entered on the 24th day of January 2018, be included in the Clerk's Record in 
addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R. Kosmann specifically requests the 
following filings in electronic fonnat. 
In Case No. CV-2017-568-C: 
a. Kosmann's Verified Complaint, filed on January 20, 2017; 
b. Mediation Order, issued on June 19, 2017; 
c. Dinius's Motion to Compel Settlement, filed on August 2, 2017; 
d. Kosmann's Cross-Motion to Enforce Settlement, filed on August 3, 2017; 
e. Transcript of statements after July 26, 2017, filed on August 3, 2017; 
f. Dinius's Memorandum and Affidavit of Counsel in support of Motion to Compel 
Settlement, filed on August 17, 2017; 
g. Kosmann's Memorandum in Opposition, First and Second Affidavits of Counsel, and 
Kosmann Affidavit, filed and served on August 24, 2017 (entered by the Court on 
August 28, 2107). 
h. Dinius' s Reply Brief: Dinius Declaration, Supplemental Dunbar Declaration, filed on 
August 29, 2017. 
i. Kosmann's Supplemental Brief and Kosmann Supplemental Declaration, filed on 
August 31, 2017. 
j. Dinius Motion to Strike and Memorandum in Support, filed on September 5, 2017. 
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k. Kosmann's Motion for Leave and Third Affidavit of Counsel in Support, filed on 
September 7, 2017. 
I. Dinius Opposition to Motion for Leave, filed on September 20, 2017. 
m. Kosmann's Motion for Sanctions and Memorandum in Support and Motion for Leave 
to Shorten Time, filed on September 20, 2017. 
n. Dinius Opposition to Motion to Shorten Time, filed on September 26, 2017. 
o. Dinius's Supplemental Reply in Support of Motion to Enforce Settlement, Dinius 
Supplemental Declaration, and Dunbar Second Supplemental Declaration, filed on 
September 27, 2017. 
p. Order denying Motion to Shorten Time, issued on September 29, 2017 (though not 
added to the Court's on-line docket). 
q. Order Granting Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Materials, issued on October 
5, 2017. 
r. Dinius second Supplemental Brief, filed on October 13, 2017. 
s. Dinius Motion for Sanctions and Memorandum In Support, filed on October 25, 
2017. 
t Dinius Opposition to Kosmann' s Motion for Sanctions, filed on October 31, 2017. 
u. Kosmann Opposition to Dinius' s Motion for Sanctions and Declaration of Counsel in 
Support, filed on November 1, 2017. 
v. Dinius Reply in Support of Motion for Sanctions, filed on November 6, 2017. 
w. Kosmann Reply in Support of Motion for Sanctions, filed on November 6, 2017. 
x. Memorandum Decision and Order to Enforce Settlement Agreement and Order to 
Release Funds, issued on November 3, 2017. 
y. Memoralllium Decision and Order on Parties' Cross-Motions for Sanctions entered 
on November 22, 2017; 
z. Judgment entered on November 22, 2017; 
aa. Kosmann's Motion to Reconsider and Kosmann Second Supplemental Declaration, 
filed on December 5, 2017. 
bb. Kosmann's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Reconsider and Declaration of 
Counsel in Support, filed on December 24, 2017. 
cc. Exhibits to Declaration of Counsel, filed on December 27, 2017. 
dd. Dinius's Second Motion to Strike and Memorandum in Support, filed on December 
28, 2017. 
ee. Kosmann's Opposition to Motion to Strike, filed on December 29, 2017. 
ff. Dinius's Opposition to Motion to Reconsider and Counsel Affidavit in Support, filed 
on January 4, 2018. 
gg. Kosmann's Reply Brief in Support of Motion to Reconsider, filed on January 9, 2018. 
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hh. Dinius's Reply in Support of Second Motion to Strike and Counsel Affidavit. 
ii. Memorandum Decision and Order on Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider and 
Defendants' Second Motion to Strike, entered on January 24, 2018. 
lJ. Complete Docket Report. 
In Case No. CV-2013-795-C: 
a. Judgment, issued March 30, 2015; 
b. Dinius Notice of Attorney Lien; 
c. Order Granting Defendants' Motion for Stay of Execution and Permission to Deposit 
Funds, issued on August 7, 2015; 
d. Order, issued on September 16, 2015; 
e. Order, issued on December 11, 2015; 
f. Kosmann's Motion for Release of Funds Held by the Court and Memorandum in 
Support, filed on May 23, 2017; 
g. Dinius's Objection to Motion for Release of Funds, filed on June 2, 2017; 
h. Order Denying Release of Funds, issued on July 7, 2017; 
1. Complete Docket Report. 
7. The undersigned hereby certifies: 
a. That a copy of this Notice of Appeal and any request for additional transcript has 
been served on the reporters. 
b. That the Clerk of the District Court has been paid the estimated fee for preparation of 
the Reporter's Transcript and Clerk's Record. 
c. That the appellate filing fee has been paid. 
d. That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 20. 
DATED this 3/ Sf-day of January, 2018. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the :'.>15'-"' day of January, 2018, a true and correct copy of 
the within and foregoing instrument was served upon: 
Robert A. Anderson, Yvonne A. Dunbar ~ U.S.Mail 
ANDERSON, IDLIAN & HULL LLP 0 Facsimile: 344-5510 
250 S. Fifth Street, Suite 700 D Hand Delivery 
P. 0. Box 7426 0 Overnight Delivery 
Boise, Idaho 83707-7426 181 Email/ iCourt: raanderson@ajhlaw.com; 
Attorneys for Defendants ydunbar@ajhlaw.com 
Monica Fuhs ~ U.S.Mail 
M & M Court Reporting 181 Email anniew@m-mservice.com 
101 S Capitol Blvd, Ste 503 
Boise, ID 83702 
Kathy Klemetson ~ U.S.Mail 
Court Reporter 
1115 Albany St, 
Caldwell, ID 83605 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
) 







LEO GILBRIDE, ) 
) 
Defendant-Respondent, ) ________________ ) 
) 




KEVIN DINIUS an individual; and DINIUS ) 
& ASSOCIATES, PLLC, an Idaho professional ) 




Supreme Court No. 45779-2018 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
OF APPEAL 
Appeal from the Third Judicial District, Canyon County, Idaho 
HONORABLE GENE A. PETTY, Presiding 
Case Number from Court: CV-13-00795*C 
CV-17-00568*C 
Order of Judgment appealed from: Memorandum Decision and Order to Enforce 
Settlement Agreement and Order to Release Funds, 
signed and filed November 3, 2017. 
The Order of Memorandum Decision and Order on 
Parties' Cross-Motions for Sanctions, 
signed and Filed November 2, 2017. 
The Order of Judgment, signed and filed November 22, 2017. 
The Memorandum Decision and Order on Plaintiffs Motion 
to Reconsider and Defendants' Second Motion to Strike, 
signed and filed January 24, 2018. 
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Attorneys for Appellants: Loren K. Messerly, ISB #7434, Messerly Law, PLLC 
2350 E. Roanoke Dr., Boise, Idaho 83712 
Attorneys for Respondents: Robert A. Anderson, Yvonne A. Dunbar, 
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP 
250 S. Fifth Street, Suite 700. PO Box 7426, Boise, Idaho 83707-7426 
Appealed by: David A. Kosmann 
Appealed against: Leo Gilbride 
Kevin Dinius 
Notice of Appeal filed: February 2, 2018 
Notice of Cross-appeal filed: None 
Appellant fee paid: $129.00 filing fee paid, and $100.00 was deposited for the Clerk's 
Record and $200.00 deposited for transcripts on February 2, 2018. 
Request for additional Clerk's Record filed: No 
Request for additional Reporter's Transcript filed: No 
Name of Reporter: Kathy Klemetson 
Monica Fuhs, M&M Court Reporting 
Was Reporter's Transcript requested: Yes 
CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District 
Court of the Third Judicial 
District of the State of Idaho, 
in and for the County of Canyon. 
cf< t,J~ Deputy 
By: Deputy Clerk - 
Chris Yamamoto, Clerk of the Court
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DAVID A. KOSMANN, .... 
P1aintiff:.Appellant, 
v. 
KEVIN DINIUS, an individual; DINIUS &. 
ASSOCIATES:. PLLC,. an Idaho professicmal 


























C~yon County'No. cv-2013,..795 
A NO'llCE OP APPBAL was filed iu .the Distriet:·Court on Feb~ 2, 2018, from the 
Judgmelif and Orders enter1cU,y f)ismQt Judge OeM A. P~ 
L JUDGMENT filed<>n November 22, 2017 i and 
2~ MEMORANDUM DE<;{~JON. AND ORDER ON PL~IPF'S MOTION TO 
RECONSID!R AND DEFENDANTS' SECOND MOTION TO STRID.filed on 
JantlafY 24~ 2018. 
ft being uncu,ar if~ JUOOMENT filed <m: No~ber 22, 2011, .. js fiiw as to ·all claim$ of 
reJiefJor aJlparties in~ of thcS.e Can)'ln ~umy cases; thed'ore, 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that this appeal shall ··be CONDmONALLY DISMISSED as 
the JUDGMENT ·does not ,p~ to be final as to all el~ of relief for an patties in both of ttae. 
Can,yon County ~; bQWever. ~, in this appeal SHALL BE SVSPBNDBD fOR 
TWENTY .-ONE (21) DAYS OF THE DATE OF THIS ORDER tor film& ·of a RESPONSE with. 
tbi$Courtti to why this appal •uld oontinue. 
o. 45779-2018. 
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~l of Record 
District Court Clerk 
Court~ 
Di$bict lm)ge ~; A. Petty 
For .tbe Supteme Court 
By: Deputy Clerk - 
Chris Yamamoto, Clerk of the Court
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KEVIN DINIUS, an individual; DINIUS & ) 
AS SOCIA TES, PLLC, an Idaho professional ) 




CONDITIONAL DISMISSAL AND 
REINSTATING APPEAL 
Supreme Court Docket No. 45779-2018 
Canyon County No. CV-2013-795 
Canyon County No. CV-2017-568 
Ref. No. 18-82 
This Court issued an ORDER CONDITIONALLY DISMISSING APPEAL on March 5, 
2018, as it appeared there was no final judgment as to all claims in both cases. Thereafter, a 
RESPONSE TO CONDITIONAL . DISMISSAL was filed by Appellant on March 6, 2018. 
Therefore, good cause appearing, 
IT IS ORDERED that this Court' s ORDER CONDITIONALLY DISMISSING APPEAL 
be, and hereby is, WITHDRAWN, and proceedings in this appeal are reinstated. 
ff FURTHER IS ORDERED that the Clerk's Record and Reporter' s Transcripts shall be 
filed with this Court on or before May 14, 2018. 
DA TED this .:i_ day of March, 2018. 
cc: Counsel of Record 
District Court Clerk 
Court Reporter 
ORDER - Docket No. 45779-2018 
By Order of the Supreme Court 
